BAGHDAD ESSENTIAL SERVICES: 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000204 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018 TAGS: AMGT EAID ECON ENRG IZ PGOV PINR PREL SOCI SUBJECT: BAGHDAD ESSENTIAL SERVICES: 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3045 ¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 0038 ¶C. 07 BAGHDAD 3997 ¶D. 08 BAGHDAD 0003 ¶1. SUMMARY: Initiated in 2007, Fardh Al Qanoon (FAQ),aka the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP),emphasized several themes, including the delivery of essential services. Although initially led by DPM Zoubai, his attempted assassination and the political boycott of the Tawafuq bloc hindered efforts to improve the delivery of services. The recent Prime Ministerial appointment of Ahmed Chalabi to temporarily fill the leadership vacuum has been relatively successful, but only within the context as an ombudsman that provides quick, short-term solutions. The GoI would be well served by resolving political impasses and appointing a new DPM to coordinate services. Despite the absence of a DPM, the creation of the JROC/JPC proved to be a significant achievement in 2007 which promoted reconciliation and established inter-GoI lines of communication. END SUMMARY. -------------- Fardh Al Qanoon -------------- ¶2. With the January 2007 commencement of Fardh Al Qanoon (FAQ),aka the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP),the Government of Iraq (GoI) created six supporting committees. Oversight of the essential services portfolio was assigned to Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zoubai, who's USEMB counterpart was the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Director, Ambassador Joseph Saloom (NOTE: In May 2007, IRMO evolved into the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, ITAO. END NOTE). Each supporting committee was responsible for presenting a weekly report to the PM at the Iraqi Executive Steering Committee (IESC). (NOTE: Leading to the September 2007 Congressional hearings the IESC was identified as Benchmark #8. END NOTE) ¶3. Prior to his assignment, Zoubai had been viewed by his Iraqi counterparts as ineffective and incapable of delivering critical services. FAQ invigorated his office, cultivating momentum and progress. Furthermore, USG engagement contributed to increased GoI deference to the office of the DPM and consequently provided a foundation upon which the DPM built a new level of credibility. The newfound authority allowed Zoubai to exert pressure and leverage on the Iraqi government at both local and national levels to ensure coordination in the provision of services. Zoubai's legitimacy was demonstrated by his ability to host meetings with staunch Sadrist ministers, specifically the former ministers of agriculture and health. This was a noteworthy political achievement as a Sunni and in the presence of USG officials. ¶4. Myriad issues were jointly addressed by DPM Zoubai and IRMO: Procurement, transportation, and warehouse security of pharmaceuticals; increased salaries of Iraqi teachers; installation of solar street lights and provision of micro generators (1.75MW) to neighborhoods; reopening closed gas stations and addressed administrative corruption; municipal trash collection; and thwarting insurgent access to chlorine amidst terrorist attacks. ¶5. One of the initial impediments resided at the deputy level. On March 28, the first Deputy IESC (D-IESC) meeting convened in order to prepare IESC agenda items and track implementation of policy. As the committee progressed, however, accusations of sectarianism were levied against the secretariat, Ali Yassri of the National Security Advisor's SIPDIS office, who was alleged to be a member of the Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS). Zoubai's advisors complained that agenda topics imposed by Ali were trivial and failed to address exigent issues. The animosity also presented a bureaucratic obstacle to an avenue that otherwise would have been a means for IRMO to influence GoI strategy and elevate critical USG concerns. ¶6. Another challenge was the dysfunctional nature of the national government. It became evident that national leaders failed to communicate with each other at even the most basic of levels. Ministries did not fully appreciate the interdependency of their respective sectors. For example, the delivery of clean water to Baghdad residents requires fuel to run electrical generators, and subsequently water treatment facilities require electricity to power pumping units. Above all, security is needed to protect the linear infrastructure that actually delivers the product. Unfortunately, absence of inter-ministerial dialogue resulted in a disconnect of project implementation and failure to deliver services. -------------- JROC/JPC Support -------------- BAGHDAD 00000204 002 OF 003 ¶7. Reconstruction initiatives were also pursued simultaneously by several entities without knowledge of each other's activities. The efforts were duplicative and counterproductive. To deal with the problem, USEMB and MNF-I established the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) and Joint Planning Committee (JPC). ¶8. The JROC provides a common picture of all non-kinetic programs impacting BSP, and serves as a repository of reconstruction projects. The primary responsibility of JROC personnel is the coordinated execution of projects. The key deliverable is a weekly brief to the JPC outlining focus projects within target neighborhoods and identification of dilemmas requiring JPC resolution. Providing strategic direction to the JROC, JPC composition includes myriad implementing agencies, both Iraqi and USG. Most notably, members are derived from local organizations to ensure that community interests are adequately represented. The group reviews local undertakings and verifies that mechanisms deliver essential services. (Ref A) ¶9. The JROC/JPC offers a forum in which Iraqi leaders vent frustrations and support local development efforts. In particular, they allow Iraqis to jointly manage expenditures with their USG colleagues. This counters perceptions of misdirected funding and ensures that demand equitably meets supply, thereby ensuring maximum efficiency. ¶10. Zoubai's staff serve as co-chairs to both organizations, providing national oversight to an otherwise local endeavor. Their role is vital in verifying that District Advisory Councils (DAC) are actively committed to representing neighborhood interests. DPM advisors also understand indigenous attitudes that are sometimes difficult for Coalition members to perceive. -------------- Assassination & Withdrawal -------------- ¶11. In the afternoon of March 23, 2007, a member of DPM Zoubai's security team detonated a ball bearing suicide vest inside Zoubai's residence. Severely injured, Zoubai spent several months recuperating in Jordan. His absence proved debilitating to efforts to improve the delivery of essential services. Without Zoubai's authority, his advisors felt powerless and were timid in presenting reconstruction developments to the PM. ¶12. Shortly after Zoubai's return to Iraq, the Tawafuq bloc withdrew from the PM's cabinet in August. Several months passed without any political resolution. In the interim, Zoubai's advisors continued to co-chair the JROC/JPC, but did not wield clout and remained under pressure to disband the office during Tawafuq's boycott. (Ref B) ¶13. In November, an Executive Order was issued by the PM that designated Ahmed Chalabi as temporarily lead for Baghdad services. Since his appointment, however, his role and responsibilities remain fluid. Chalabi does not occupy a constitutionally recognized cabinet position, and the Baghdad Amanat, Governor, Provincial Council, and Ministers do not necessarily recognize his authority. Furthermore, he does not have direct access to financial resources. Despite these administrative hurdles, he remains actively engaged and Iraqi citizens tend to swarm Chalabi with their petitions in public settings. ITAO Director, Mark Tokola, has noted that Chalabi's advantage is expediency, but he may not be dealing with the most important issues. (Ref C) ¶14. Chalabi cheerfully admits that the purpose of his committee is "to provide band-aids, not structural solutions to problems." Maliki's intent in putting Chalabi in charge of the committee was to produce quick, tangible solutions to Baghdad citizens' problems. It is serving an ombudsman function rather than an overarching strategic purpose, and it is functioning relatively well within that limitation. -------------- ITAO Reflection -------------- ¶15. The Coalition's military surge has improved security throughout Baghdad. The GoI is less often citing security as a primary concern that precluded policy implementation. Failure to offer alternative explanations, however, exposed the larger problem of a lack of capacity. ¶16. The most successful achievement of 2007 was the establishment of inter-GoI lines of communication. For example, the JPC fostered Iraqi relationships that did not exist previously. The still imperfect rapport facilitates synchronization of projects and provides dialogue that is essential for reconciliation. BAGHDAD 00000204 003.2 OF 003 ¶17. ITAO has cautioned that the USG should not overload Chalabi with issues nor become reliant upon his "fixer" role. (Ref C) Moving forward in 2008 it will be imperative that the USG continue to support existing institutions, i.e. the Amanat and the Ministries, rather than contribute to their diminishment. ¶18. The best outcome would be for the GoI to appoint a Deputy Prime Minister to fill the long vacant position, and to empower the new DPM to pull the services ministries together. The new DPM also could play a part in coordinating the efforts of the Ministries, Amanat, Governor, and Provincial Council. Ahmed Chalabi does not have the institutional platform to play that role. ¶19. During the September 28 IESC meeting, the PM declared 2008 would be the "Year of Services." Later he would decide that the upcoming year would also focus on corruption. Meanwhile, during a December 30 meeting with the Ambassador and CG, DPM Salih opined that 2008 should focus on political and economic maturity. (Ref D) Despite GoI inconsistency and inability to establish priorities, essential services will remain a critical component of counterinsurgency, economic development, and winning the confidence of the Iraqi people in the Iraqi government. CROCKER