SRSG'S STRATEGY ON IRAQI PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UN IZ SUBJECT: SRSG'S STRATEGY ON IRAQI PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND ARTICLE 140 IMPLEMENTATION Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). USG Participants -------------- Ambassador Crocker David Pearce Brett McGurk, NSC Cathy Westley UNAMI Participants -------------- SRSG Staffan de Mistura D-SRSG Andrew Gilmour ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 18, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Iraq Staffan de Mistura met with the Ambassador to discuss the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI) plan of action to fulfill its expanded mandate under Resolution 1770. Topics included increased staffing for UNAMI; alternatives for its new compound; elections strategies; and Article 140 implementation. De Mistura was open about the obstacles facing him within his own organization and ways in which the Embassy could be of assistance. De Mistura and the Ambassador were of one mind on the need to conduct provincial elections this year and to see progress on Article 140 implementation in the next six months. End Summary. EXPANDING THE MISSION -------------- ¶2. (C) De Mistura described his efforts to increase staffing at UNAMI and cajole various UN agencies into establishing a permanent presence in Iraq. He informed the Ambassador that UNAMI had the capacity for 140 international staff (not including security) at their present location. Their current staffing level ceiling is 85. He plans on requesting an increase of 19. He said he is looking for quality, not quantity, and that he would have a better chance at slowly increasing staff levels rather than asking for all 140 at once. He confirmed Under Secretary for Safety and Security Sir David Veness's upcoming trip to Baghdad to assess the security situation. He said that Veness's perceptions will be colored by the December 11 bombing near the UN headquarters in Algiers. ¶3. (C) Offering up some good news, de Mistura informed the Ambassador that the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) will be sending a full-time international staff person to Baghdad at the end of January and will recruit three national staff. The World Food Program (WFP) plans to place one permanent international employee in Baghdad and one in Irbil. In addition, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will place one international staffer in Basrah and one in Irbil. De Mistura will press them to also place one in Baghdad. He mentioned the World Health Organization (WHO) is getting pressure from the Iraqis to create a permanent presence in Iraq. Even with these increases, de Mistura believes more could be done in moving other agencies to Iraq. He requested that the U.S. continue to pressure Geneva about this. He asked that it be done without mentioning his involvement because of the sensitivity of his position. ALTERNATIVE SITE FOR UNAMI COMPOUND: GEORGIA ON MY MIND -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Because of security concerns, the simple USD 30 million compound de Mistura had envisioned has now grown to a USD 200 million project. De Mistura understands that 70 percent of the cost of relocating the new UNAMI compound to the old U.S. Embassy site would be for security upgrades such as setback walls. He is also concerned that the International Zone (IZ) will continue to get smaller. His goal is to locate the UNAMI mission in one of the last places "to go red." De Mistura suggested the Georgian compound, located along the river and to the west of the New Embassy Compound (NEC). He said they had considered the property earlier, but security experts were concerned that its proximity to the NEC could make it a target. He pointed out that the current compound is closer to the embassy and has not caused any problems. ¶5. (C) Using his best sales techniques, de Mistura pointed out that the location near the NEC would reduce his security costs as UNAMI could take advantage of the security umbrella of the diplomatic neighborhood. He added that other missions look to UNAMI when considering reopening their embassies in Baghdad, and by having UNAMI in the neighborhood, you increase the likelihood of bringing in more missions. He also pointed out that the optic of requesting the Iraqis to help fund a USD 200 million compound when the UN is only BAGHDAD 00000203 002 OF 003 providing USD 19 million to aid with internally displaced persons (IDPs) was not good. The Ambassador promised to look into it. IHEC: SADR AND GOMORRAH? -------------- ¶6. (C) De Mistura confirmed with the Ambassador that they were both hearing the same complaints about the Sadrist infiltration of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and that they were coming from the same people -- those who stand to lose big in the next round of provincial elections. De Mistura said he talked with his election team about this, and they said there was a problem with nepotism and politicization at the govenorate level, but that the commissioners themselves, while being from various political parties, appeared to operate in a fairly neutral manner. The chair of IHEC is a Sadrist, but he is also the most technically capable commissioner and has shown himself to be fair and independent. Both de Mistura and the Ambassador agreed to press for specific information the next time they receive complaints about the politicization of IHEC. ELECTIONS: BACK TO THE FUTURE -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador questioned de Mistura on where the electoral process stands now and what needs to be done to move it forward. De Mistura concurred with the Ambassador that provincial elections need to be held this year. He said that he is hearing it from the Iraqis, too. He opined that if the Sunnis want it and the Sadrists want it, perhaps elections should proceed whether or not IHEC is politicized. De Mistura then updated the Ambassador on voter registration and the need for an election law in order to complete the process. They both discussed the possibility of reverting back to the 2005 election law and procedure if the current law remains deadlocked. De Mistura suggested telling the Iraqis UNAMI is tired of babysitting them if they are not willing to try, and that UNAMI should hand-pick the commissioners and run the elections like they did in 2005, or at least threaten the the GOI with that. The Ambassador asked whether the Prime Minister could make an executive order to make elections happen, but de Mistura worried that the PM would just raise the politicization of IHEC again, and they would be back at square one. He pointed out that the main issue holding things up right now is resolving IDP voting. The Ambassador suggested that they need to drill down to find out what the problem is, or just revert back to 2005. ¶8. (C) De Mistura brought up the topic of rolling elections. He said that they could be done and requested Andrew Gilmour, Deputy SRSG for Political Affairs, to explain more. Gilmour said the key to reducing voter fraud is having nationwide voter registration instead of registering one province at a time before each election. De Mistura then added that the only way to satisfy people with rolling elections is to assure them that eventually all provinces will be able to hold elections. It needs to be shown as a sequence of elections rather than favoring just a few provinces. Gilmour pointed out that national voter registration was still going to be an issue that needs to be resolved. ARTICLE 140 STRATEGY: INFILTRATE AND NEUTRALIZE -------------- --- ¶9. (C) Turning to UNAMI's assistance on Article 140, de Mistura said his initial focus will be on identifying practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) and getting technical assistance moving ahead, including increased hiring of experts. He agreed with the Ambassador that quick action to demonstrate progress would be important politically. UNAMI will follow up with the Embasy to coordinate movement along two tracks, technical and political, De Mistura said. 10 (10) De Mistura emphasized that UNAMI ties its assistance to its expanded mandate under Resolution 1770 to assist with internal boundary adjustments, in part to avoid the politically charged constitutional question of the status of Article 140 with the passage of the December 31 deadline for a referendum. As its work moves ahead, UNAMI will look for the easiest disputed territories to resolve and not begin with Kirkuk, de Mistura noted. Defining disputed territories and gaining a detailed understanding of each area's issues will also be important. De Mistura said UNAMI plans to work with the Prime Minister's High Committee on Article 140 and its Chairman, Minister of Science and Technology Raid Fahmi, as one vehicle to coordinate with the GOI. "We will infiltrate it with some UN DNA," de Mistura offered. Senior Advisor said that he agreed with this approach, but cautioned BAGHDAD 00000203 003 OF 003 that some Iraqis view the committee as too biased towards the Kurds, and this perception would need to be taken into account and neutralized. CROCKER