NECHIRVAN BARZANI ON SOFA, OIL LAW, ELECTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001989 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ SUBJECT: NECHIRVAN BARZANI ON SOFA, OIL LAW, ELECTIONS, TURKEY Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, accompanied by Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official Rowsch Shaways and KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami, on June 26 met with the Ambassador, Special Assistant to the President Brett McGurk, Econ Minister-Counselor Charlie Ries, PolMil Minister-Counselor Marcie Ries, Special Advisor for Northern Iraq Tom Krajeski, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Kimmitt. On the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),Nechirvan said Prime Minister Maliki hopes to sign a Memorandum of Understanding or other short-term deal until he can negotiate a SOFA with the next U.S. administration, but said KRG President Massoud Barzani is ready to come to Baghdad whenever the Ambassador deems it helpful to negotiations. On hydrocarbon legislation, Nechirvan and Hawrami laid out extensive and probably unattainable Kurdish-proposed changes to the February 2007 draft, but said KRG-GOI discussions are continuing in earnest. On the provincial elections law, Nechirvan said the Kurds support open lists and delaying the election in Kirkuk and will attempt to bring the law to a vote in the Council of Representatives (COR) next week. Finally, Nechirvan said KRG contacts with the Turkish government continue productively, enumerated KRG measures to curb Kongra-Gel (PKK) activity, and described his efforts to mitigate Massoud Barzani,s alleged comment that the PKK is not a terrorist organization. End summary. SOFA: Maliki Stalling but Massoud Ready to Help -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Nechirvan assessed with confidence that Prime Minister Maliki prefers to negotiate the SOFA with the next administration. He claimed that Maliki expects presidential candidate Barack Obama both to win the November election and to seek a quick withdrawal from Iraq, which Maliki feels will help Baghdad negotiate a more favorable SOFA; in the interim, he will seek a Memorandum of Understanding or some other temporary measure to justify the presence of US forces. Nechirvan claimed to have questioned both of Maliki,s assumptions about Obama and argued that a SOFA is in the interest of all Iraqis, but reiterated his past assertion that Maliki has a newfound feeling of strength and deep down prefers not to sign one. Nechirvan added that Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani strongly supports a SOFA and will come to Baghdad anytime the Ambassador requests his presence. Oil Law: Major Kurd Demands, Talks Perhaps at Deputies Level -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Nechirvan and KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami summarized the far-reaching substantive changes to the February 2007 draft hydrocarbon legislative package that had been briefed to PM Maliki the previous day. First, the KRG seeks to drop from the package the annexes to the law which would allocate "discovered" deposits between the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) and other entities, in order to delegate these decisions to the Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC),which would be established by the Hydrocarbon Framework Law. (Hawrami explained that in the FOGC, the KRG would seek to impose performance requirements on any entity, including INOC, that should be granted a discovered field.) Second, the KRG is seeking a clause "echoing Article 112 of the Constitution" (which specifies that oil and gas are shared competencies between federal and regional authorities and that revenues should be shared). Third, the KRG proposes to delete references to the Council of Ministers, oversight of hydrocarbons (the Kurds prefer to leave it with the FOGC, where they are represented). Fourth, the KRG seeks to delete Article 41 -- which deals with oil reserves in areas that experience a change in internal boundaries -- of the draft hydrocarbon framework law, presumably for fear the KRG could annex Kirkuk but not inherit primacy over its oil fields. ¶4. (C) Dr. Ashti also said the KRG would oppose FOGC review and approval of the existing KRG contracts. That had been included to cover the four pre-existing KRG contracts in February 2007, but since then "time has moved on" and the KRG passed its regional law. PM Barzani quickly interjected to say "we can have a review of these contracts if that is necessary to close the deal." But then Ashti clarified that "we are happy to debate" but if disagreements surfaced in a review, they would have to go directly "to the political level, the Executive Council" for resolution. Finally, Dr. Ashti said that in the coming week the KRG will release another Clifford Chance study, this one on the economic issues related to Iraqi oil and gas contracting. The study would show that had the KRG not signed its PSAs when it did, it would cost the region $30 billion on a net present value BAGHDAD 00001989 002 OF 002 basis. The study would also estimate that it would cost the nation $450 billion more to develop its oil resources through technical service agreements than with production sharing agreements. ¶5. (C) In negotiating these proposals, Nechirvan said the Kurds are determined not to be seen as the obstacle to an agreement, but he said he believes that the Maliki government does not truly want to pass an oil law. The contracts the KRG signed with foreign oil companies remain contentious and Hawrami said the Kurds cannot abrogate them entirely, but that with better salesmanship the GOI might soften its stance. He noted that he had recently hosted members of the COR energy committee in the Kurdish region, after which many of the members allegedly abandoned their belief that the contracts are bad for Iraq as a whole. Nechirvan said that he planned to meet with Maliki shortly afterward to begin talks on the new Kurdish proposals, but suggested that the Executive Council,s "Deputies group," perhaps including VP Abdel Mahdi directly, begin regular sessions to hash out a compromise. Dr. Rowsch Shaways would be the KRG,s representative for such discussions. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Although in April PM Barzani had told us he would scale back Kurdish hydrocarbon regime requirements in the interest of getting an early agreement, what he laid out for us now was a list of demands essentially identical to what Kurdish representatives had been seeking for over a year. These requirements will make it very difficult to reach agreement with the federal government. Paradoxically, the KRG needs an agreement now in order to open export possibilities for its PSA partners. Meanwhile, the TSAs under negotiation by the federal government with major oil companies -- while they only deal with existing "brownfields" rather than new exploration blocks that under the February 2007 compromise would be opened to PSAs -- are being seen in many quarters as the alternative way to accelerate oil production in the short-run. Provincial Elections: Open Lists, Delay Kirkuk, Pass ASAP -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Nechirvan promised Kurdish support for prompt passage of the provincial election law, ideally with open lists and a delay on the contentious Kirkuk election. He endorsed open lists unequivocally and said the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) now supports the same, in contrast to what Nechirvan had heard previously. On Kirkuk, he claimed the Kurds do not demand a delay but are open to it as a useful means of resolving other disputes. Most importantly, the Kurds would work with COR leaders to bring a draft election law to a vote within the next week. KRG-Turkey Relations Still Expanding -------------- ¶8. (C) KRG-Turkish relations continue to improve, and Nechirvan said his primary mission is to build confidence with the Turkish military. Regarding the PKK, the KRG has welcomed a Turkish liaison officer to Erbil International Airport to work with local officials to apprehend any PKK members who are transiting through it, and have asked the Turkish government for a "weekly watchlist" of suspects that KRG officials potentially could interdict. He confirmed the KRG has arrested two persons in connection with supplying the PKK, adding that the KRG is very serious about continuing these measures. He noted there is also an effort underway to convince some of the PKK to leave the organization. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan,s office has offered a list of Turkish companies wishing to do business in the KRG, which Nechirvan accepted provisionally but wants assurances the Turkish military also supports these companies, especially those in the hydrocarbon industry. ¶9. (C) The Kurdish PM is attempting to mitigate Massoud Barzani,s alleged statement to Turkish journalists that the Kongra-Gel (PKK) is not a terrorist organization. He argued in the first place that his uncle was misquoted -- Massoud avoids either acknowledging or denying that the PKK are terrorists, but the Turkish press is adept at luring him into such unfortunate remarks. Nechirvan said he would give an interview the next day to Turkish and other media to "clarify" Massoud,s comments, and will speak shortly to Turkish Special Envoy for Iraq Murat Ozcelik to avoid a hiccup in relations. CROCKER