MOHR: 5000 AMNESTY RELEASES, PROBLEMS WITH HJC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001921 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 TAGS: PHUM KJUS PINS IZ SUBJECT: MOHR: 5000 AMNESTY RELEASES, PROBLEMS WITH HJC REF: A. BAGHDAD 1332 ¶B. BAGHDAD 1553 Classified By: Deputy PolCouns Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim said on June 19 that her ministry has confirmed that amnesty releases around the country reached almost 5,000. Her estimates are far greater than our numbers, as they include previously unavailable numbers from the Ministry of Interior, which has so far released 2,560 under the Amnesty Law. She questioned the continued gap between release orders from the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) and actual releases from the relevant ministries and attributed much blame to the HJC. She showed us several orders that were unacceptable to the ministries for various reasons, such as missing detainee numbers and signatures for all judges and the prosecutor, incomplete names, and suspicious descriptions like an order to release "Ali and his group." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim gave the latest estimates on amnesty releases to PolOff and MNF-I officials on June 19 based on her ministry's collection of amnesty data. The Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR) has a team of 11 people that has been creating a database of all amnesty release orders from the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) and tracking the actual releases with the relevant ministries: Ministry of Justice (MoJ),Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD),and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) (ref A). Releases are decided upon by HJC-appointed amnesty committees in each province, and the committees send the release orders to the relevant ministry. The HJC is sending the MoHR a copy of each release order; MoHR has received about 11,000 orders, with multiple names on each order. These orders have generally included only the names of the detainees, not the location of the detainee or the detainee number. The MoHR is entering each name in a database and cross-referencing the names with a database they keep of all detainees in the country. (Note: No other ministry has an accurate or up-to-date database of detainees in all the facilities. End Note.) The MoHR team then visits each facility to determine if the detainees have actually been released. According to this method, the MoHR has data on the following release numbers: MoJ-1,567, MoI-2,560, MoD-545, and MoLSA-314, for a total of 4986. ¶3. (C) Comparing actual releases to release orders that the ministries have received, Wijdan said the MoD has best adhered to the judicial orders. The MoD has released almost every detainee for whom they have received a release order, but will not execute 23 release orders for detainees at its intelligence detention facility in Harithiya, a neighborhood in Baghdad. The MoI has released 2,560 detainees out of an unknown total of release orders from the HJC. The MoI has no central or organized collection system, and there is no record of how many release orders have been received. (Note: Before 2003, the MoI had an efficient records and criminal registry department that collected updated information from each ministry on detainee populations, information, and tracking information. It now has only 80% of the MoJ detainee population information; the MoD refuses to send any information; and the MoI itself has no internal mechanism for collecting and organizing detainee information. End Note.) The MoI refuses to release anyone at Khadimiya Second National Police Detention Facility who had been charged with terrorism crimes under the 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law. The MoJ has received 3,354 individual orders and has released about half. The MoJ review committee (ref B) has received several release orders which it believes are false, and so has halted releases over the last few weeks. Generally, Wijdan said that Baghdad has seen the lowest number of releases proportional to release orders compared to other parts of the country. ¶4. (C) Previous blame for the gap between the high numbers of release orders and the low rates of actual releases has rested with the ministries for acting too slowly on the judicial orders. Minister Wijdan however attributed many of the problems to the HJC, showing us examples of unacceptable orders. Wijdan had 207 release orders from a Kirkuk amnesty committee, each with 11 detainees listed, which were only signed by one judge. (Note: Each release order is required to be signed by all four judges and the prosecutor on the committee. End Note.) Some examples from the Rusafa amnesty committee in Baghdad showed only two of a detainee,s four names required for proper identification as well as names without Iraqi Correctional Service detainee identification numbers, which makes it difficult to determine who the release applies to. Wijdan also had examples of duplicate release orders. When a detainee is transferred, each facility keeps a file of the detainee and the charge, and this has resulted in duplicate orders. One outstanding BAGHDAD 00001921 002 OF 002 example from the "Federal Appellate Court of Rusafa" ordered the release of "Ali and his group" without specifying any detainee or case numbers. ¶5. (C) Wijdan also said that the HJC amnesty committees seemed to be at fault for not sending all the release orders to the ministries. The MoJ has not received all the release orders that have been decided upon by the committees. The MoJ has also received orders for over 1500 people who it says are not in MoJ facilities. Wijdan sent teams to several committees to look for records that the committees had actually sent the release orders to the ministries, but the committees refused to let her teams see their records, saying they needed more time to get the records ready for review. Wijdan criticized the lack of follow-up mechanisms written in the law and the implementing regulations. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: The MoHR tracking mechanism for release orders and actual releases has helped supplement incomplete data on amnesty releases and provides a much better picture of GOI implementation of the law. The ministry is playing an invaluable role through its ability to visit all detention facilities, including the MoI (where the USG does not have much visibility),as well as by highlighting the real problems in implementing the law. We hope that its work will improve implementation and help increase actual releases. CROCKER