Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1918
2008-06-23 14:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DFM ABBAWI DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS IN BILATERAL

Tags:  PREL PTER AE DA JO IR IZ SY SZ 
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VZCZCXRO1150
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1918/01 1751404
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231404Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7951
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0418
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1689
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0032
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0285
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0106
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0069
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001918 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AE DA JO IR IZ SY SZ
SUBJECT: DFM ABBAWI DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS IN BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIPS

BAGHDAD 00001918 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries, Reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001918 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER AE DA JO IR IZ SY SZ SUBJECT: DFM ABBAWI DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS BAGHDAD 00001918 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries, Reasons 1.4(b ) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a June 18 tour d'horizon, Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi told Pol-Mil M/C that Iraq's relationship with Syria was stalled due to Syrian mistrust and that Libya had not responded to Iraq regarding its hold on the 1267 designations of several Syria-based Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) facilitators. He related that increasing nationalism and sensitivity regarding Iraq's sovereignty within the Prime Minister's circle were leading to less interest in GOI participation at conferences outside Iraq such as the Friends of Iraq event in the UAE and a decree that such conferences should be held inside Iraq. In Abbawi's opinion, Iran was using violence in Iraq as a lever to force the U.S. to deal with it on equal terms and it was unclear whether Maliki's trip to Iran had yielded a change in its lethal aid to Shia militants. The recent conference held by the MEK at Ashraf was antagonizing Iraqis against the U.S. for no good reason. Abbawi also discussed the Swiss desire to close their embassy in Baghdad, requesting the U.S. to reach out to the Swiss on the issue. Other issues Abbawi mentioned included a disagreement with Denmark regarding the return of Iraqi criminals and refugees, and Russia's negative statement on Iraq at the UNSC. See paragraph 7 for an action request. END SUMMARY. -------------- SYRIA NOT TAKING IRAQ SERIOUSLY -------------- ¶2. (C) Abbawi was pessimistic regarding prospects for improved Syria-Iraq relations in the remainder of the year. He based his assessment on Syrian perceptions that Iraq was not serious about improving the relationship and its feeling that relations with Iraq and the rest of its neighbors would improve after it "normalized" its relations with Europe and after the U.S. presidential election. Syria felt that Iraq's promises of economic deals, particularly involving oil, had been empty, and that they had remained unfulfilled due to U.S. pressure. Abbawi remarked that Syria had failed to respond to Iraq's inquiry regarding the killing of eleven Iraqi Police at Ramanah on May 2 by insurgents who fled to Syria. He had asked the Iraqi Charg in Damascus to follow up but was not optimistic. -------------- LIBYAN HOLD ON
1267 DESIGNATIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) Pol-Mil M/C asked Abbawi if the GOI had made any progress in convincing Libya to lift its hold on 1267 designations of Syria-based AQI facilitator Abu Ghadiyah and three of his associates. Abbawi replied that Foreign Minister Zebari had sent a note to Libya's UN PermRep asking them to reconsider their hold but that Libya had not responded. As AQI's safe havens inside Iraq were squeezed smaller by Iraqi and Coalition operations, Pol-Mil M/C emphasized that AQI was becoming more dependent on its facilitation networks outside Iraq. This would be an appropriate moment for Syria to take action against those networks which were operating in its territory. -------------- CONFERENCES ON IRAQ SHOULD BE HELD IN IRAQ -------------- ¶4. (S) Abbawi affirmed that the GOI would like to hold the next Neighbors Ministerial in Baghdad in October while admitting that it was unclear if this would be possible due to a reluctance among some participating governments. The Prime Minister had also issued a decree a few days before ordering that the government would not participate in international conferences on Iraq taking place outside Iraq; all such events must take place in Iraq. Abbawi attributed this decree and the reluctance of the Prime Minister to support the Friends of Iraq conference currently taking place in Abu Dhabi to a combination of increasing nationalism and sensitivity regarding sovereignty within Maliki's inner circle. He intimated that Iran may have pushed back on the BAGHDAD 00001918 002.2 OF 003 Friends of Iraq conference because it was not invited and because MNF-I was organizing the conference. Abbawi reiterated the frustration many Iraqis feel towards their Arab neighbors which are often the hosts of events which should take place inside Iraq: Jordan often refuses entry or expels Iraqis and the UAE has even refused visas to delegations of Iraqis heading to an energy conference hosted in Dubai. Why should Iraqis go to conferences in other countries to be mistreated and insulted? -------------- IRAN WANTS U.S. TO TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY -------------- ¶5. (S) It was too early to tell whether Iran had really stopped arming, funding, and training Shia militants, according to Abbawi. In his view, Iran was continuing these activities as a means of pressuring the U.S. to recognize Iran as a full diplomatic and economic partner and as a player in Iraq. Iran was also clearly trying to pressure the U.S. by working against the SOFA; the U.S. might ultimately have to ease pressure on Iran in order to secure its approval. Pol-Mil M/C countered that if Iran was seeking a normal relationship with the U.S. killing Coalition servicemembers and causing violence in Iraq sent, at best, a mixed message, as did its failure to cooperate with the UNSC and IAEA. (NOTE: Iraq is a member of the IAEA Board of Governors. END NOTE) -------------- SWISS WANT TO CLOSE EMBASSY -------------- ¶6. (C) Abbawi related that the Swiss Charg had revealed his government's intention to accredit their Ambassador in Damascus to Iraq while at the same time closing their mission in Baghdad. Iraq was considering naming an Ambassador to Switzerland but would have to rethink this if Switzerland proceeded with the closure. The Swiss cited their heavy security expenses, to which Abbawi responded that the GOI would increase security for the mission. He made clear to the Swiss that their closure made no sense at a time when other governments such as Sweden and Brazil were looking to open embassies and would have an adverse effect on bilateral relations. Abbawi asked that the U.S. engage the Swiss on this issue. ¶7. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests the Department to instruct Embassy Bern to encourage the Swiss Government to maintain its embassy and diplomatic staff resident in Baghdad. -------------- DENMARK ON REPATRIATION, RUSSIA AT UN -------------- ¶8. (C) Denmark had also threatened to close their embassy in Baghdad if Iraq did not sign an agreement to accept the return of Iraqis who had been refused refugee status. Abbawi related that Iraq had countered that there should be a bilateral agreement regarding the return of Iraqis who had committed crimes in Denmark. The current practice of returning these persons without formal notice based on an oral agreement made with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration was unacceptable. Separately, Abbawi noted that he had called in the Russian Ambassador to express displeasure at the Russian PermRep's recent unhelpful statements at the UNSC session reviewing UNSCR 1790. The Russian Ambassador pleaded that Churkin's critical remarks were not based on information provided by his embassy, pointing the finger instead at UN reports which supposedly painted the situation in Iraq in a negative light. -------------- MEK CONFERENCE PLAYS INTO IRAN'S HANDS -------------- ¶9. (S) In response to Pol-Mil M/C's question regarding the previous day's debate on the Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK) in the Council of Representatives, Abbawi expressed exasperation that the MEK had been allowed to hold a conference at Camp BAGHDAD 00001918 003.2 OF 003 Ashraf attended by many "Ba'athists" including COR member Saleh Mutlaq. This was "antagonizing Iraqis against the U.S. for no reason." The timing of the event, immediately after Maliki's visit to Tehran, played into the hands of Iran. The fact that the conference was carried live on al Babiliah TV only aggravated the situation. The Council of Ministers decision to ban contacts by anyone, including foreigners, with the MEK was a foregone conclusion in the circumstances. CROCKER

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