SUNNI PARTY LEADER ON NEW ANTI-KURDISH POLITICAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000185 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI PARTY LEADER ON NEW ANTI-KURDISH POLITICAL BLOC REF: BAGHDAD 107 Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Khallaf Allyan, leader of the National Dialogue Council party and senior figure in the Tawafuq Coalition, vented to Poloff on January 23 over perceived treachery by Kurdish political leaders and Vice President Hashimi's Iraqi Islamic Party. Recent steps by these groups prompted his decision earlier this month to join forces with Prime Minister Maliki and other political leaders to form a new political bloc in Parliament dedicated to defending Iraq's Arab, nationalist equities (reftel). Admittedly, the strength of that alliance is dubious, with little mutual trust among its participants. On the issue of whether he will depart from the Tawafuq Coalition, Allyan said he and Adnan Dulaymi were seeking a meeting with their partner Tareq al-Hashimi to discuss strategy, but have so far been kept at arm's length by the Vice President. Allyan sought USG support for this new voting bloc, criticized a draft amnesty law as too narrowly crafted, and counseled continued U.S. focus and backing to bring Sunni "awakening" members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). His views on recently-passed de-Baathification legislation were equally negative. End summary. -------------- Kurdish, IIP Perfidy? -------------- ¶2. (S) Khallaf Allyan, Sunni Member of Parliament, and one of the Tawafuq Coalition's three party leaders, blasted the Kurds and Tawafuq partner Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) during a January 23 meeting with Poloff. The IIP, he began, had reached "secret deals" with the Kurds, the Islamic Supreme Coucil of Iraq (ISCI),and "with Iran" to form three territorial regions in Iraq - Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish. The prospective Sunni region, he said, would be led by Tareq al-Hashimi. As a result of such deals, he continued, he and other political leaders decided to act to protect Iraq's national interests. They would work either to withdraw Parliament's confidence in PM Maliki (to force a leadership change) or pressure him to act. Maliki, he said, to their surprise, "took strong positions" - e.g., by rejecting Kurdish unilateral contracting with international oil companies, challenging Kurdish claims vis-a-vis the national budget, and by "placing obstacles in the way" of holding a referendum on the status of Kirkuk. For this reason, he added, "we decided to support him, and we will continue to support him as long as he acts in the national interest." -------------- Seeking Support for the "National Project" -------------- ¶3. (S) Allyan sought USG support for this new Council of Representatives voting bloc (the "National Project"),and continued to rant about perceived Kurdish perfidy. He alleged that the Kurds "don't care about Iraq; they take advantage of Shia-Sunni fighting to further their own interests." Asked about the strength and membership of this new voting bloc, Allyan quickly turned on Fadilah, accusing the Shia group of reaching their own "secret deals" with the Kurds on issues related to ministerial portfolios and interests in Basra. As for plans to remain with the Tawafuq Coalition, Allyan said he and Adnan Dulaymi had been trying to meet with IIP leader Hashimi, but the latter had rebuffed their attempts to talk directly together. "If I feel our requests are answered," he said, "we'll stick together." If not, he concluded, his National Dialogue Council would seek to join forces with Saleh Mutlaq's Hewar bloc, Iraqiya, and the Arab Independent Bloc. -------------- Maintain Support for CLC's, Awakenings -------------- ¶4. (S) Turning to security issues of importance to his Sunni constituents, Allyan pressed for the U.S. to continue its support for the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) program and Awakening movements. It was imperative, he said, that the CLC and Awakening members are brought into the Defense Ministry as professionals, so not to be considered militia members. "We want our sons in the Army so they can defend us," he added. -------------- BAGHDAD 00000185 002 OF 002 Amnesty, De-Baath Laws -------------- ¶5. (S) Asked about recent legislation debated in Parliament, including on amnesty and de-Baathification, Allyan complained that the amnesty bill, as presently drafted, was far too narrow to be meaningful. The law has so many exemptions regarding those to whom amnesty would not apply, as to render the bill "useless." Allyan hoped the Embassy would weigh in to widen the scope and breadth of the bill. As for the Accountability and Justice bill, Allyan lambasted the legislation, saying that it would, among other things, have negative social impacts, including the punishment of family members of former senior Baathists. What family would marry into a Baathist family, if the latter is prevented from having a future in this country? ¶6. (C) Ending the meeting, Poloff urged Allyan and his parliamentarian allies to remain in Baghdad for the coming few weeks to ensure meaningful progress on legislative initiatives. Allyan said he would be ready to leave Iraq the following weekend, complaining that the scheduled end-of-year break had been cut short. Pressed further, he half-jokingly said that such holiday breaks were a sort of "tactic" which helped prevent passage of bills damaging to Iraq's national interests. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (S) While Allyan may still be able to deliver a handful of votes in the CoR, he remains on the fringes of Iraqi politics, reacting to perceived betrayal by the IIP, and accusations of Kurdish and ISCI political leger-demain. While out of step with the power-centers of Baghdad politics, his views do reflect common perceptions among the suspicious and frustrated Sunni populace. It appears increasingly likely that he will depart the Tawafuq Coalition and join forces with whatever national political grouping has the best prospects of challenging the IIP and its Kurdish and Supreme Council allies. In addition to pushing the agenda of the "National Project" group, it is probable that should he depart Tawafuq, his first step will be to join forces with Saleh Mutlaq's Hewar group. But, with very little party structure or grass-roots organization, substantive policy momentum will be difficult for them to generate. CROCKER