RRT ERBIL: KDP INTEL DIRECTOR AND KRG PM BARZANI

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001794

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: KDP INTEL DIRECTOR AND KRG PM BARZANI
ON IRAN

Classified By: RRT Erbil Regional Coordinator Jess Baily for Reasons 1.
4 (b,d)

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message.


1. (S) Summary: In a June 11 meeting with Senior Adviser
Thomas Krajeski to discuss Kurdish reaction to initial UNAMI
reports offering advice for the resolution of disputed
internal boundaries (septel),Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) Intelligence (Parastin) Director Masrur Barzani offered
his views on Iran's reaction to deepening U.S.-Iraq ties,
Iran's relationship with Iraqi Kurds, and Iran's perception
of U.S. policy in the region. In a separate June 12 meeting,
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan
Barzani expressed concern over the possibility of increased
Iranian interference in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) should Iraqi President (and PUK SecGen) Jalal Talabani
become incapacitated and the PUK fall into disarray. End
summary.


2. (S) KDP Intelligence Director Masrur Barzani expressed
surprise at Iran's public and direct rejection of U.S. plans
to conclude a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, to
govern the presence of U.S. troops, and opined that the
announcement sounded more like an "order" to the Iraqi
government. Iran's unwillingness to abide by its
international nuclear agreements in the face of international
pressure and renewed calls from the U.S. and European Union,
and its efforts to destabilize Iraq through support of armed
militias, revealed a "game that Iran was playing," Masrur
suggested. Noting that Iran had great patience, he indicated
that "a very strong message was needed" to compel Iran to
cease its interference in Iraqi affairs.


3. (S) Masrur offered that Iran was calculating its policies
in the region in the context of perceived weakness of U.S.
positions. He pointed to the Iranian view that the
"destabilization" of Iraq since 2003 was seen by Tehran as a
failure of U.S. policy; and that similarly, the political
gains of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza equally could
be seen as "victories" for Iran. Masrur blamed the "very
weak" international reaction to Hezbollah's rise for failing
to yield any real check on Iranian influence, and ultimately
serving to embolden Iran: "these are messages they (Iran)
are getting," he said.


4. (S) Iran's relations with Iraqi Kurds were tactical, more
fragile and nuanced than its relationships with Shi'ites in
the south. Masrur continued. Iran would do nothing to
strengthen the Kurds or the KRG for fear of encouraging its
own Kurdish minority, but it would choose to use its
influence to interfere. Given traditional trade
relationships and geography, Masrur noted that Iran was very
active in Sulaimaniyah province. Masrur opined that Iran was
waiting out the U.S. administration, that it did not
anticipate any military confrontation with the United States
before the U.S. presidential election in November, and judged
the likelihood of such a confrontation as even more remote
after November.


5. (S) In a June 12 meeting, KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani
expressed concern to Senior Adviser Krajeski about the
prospects for the future strength and cohesion of the PUK
should Iraqi President (and PUK SecGen) Jalal Talabani die or
become incapacitated. Pointing to internal PUK splits and
the absence of a clear successor, Nechirvan said the "chaos"
that could ensue would create opportunities for Iran to
increase its interference in the PUK and in Sulaimaniyah.
Regarding Talabani's health, Nechirvan joked, "I told him to
eat sushi," and, emphasizing that it is in the KDP's interest
for the PUK to remain strong, Nechirvan said "we probably
pray for Jalal's health more than the PUK."
BUTENIS