VP ADEL ON IRAN'S VIEW OF SFA AND IRANIAN MEDDLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001708

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON IRAN'S VIEW OF SFA AND IRANIAN MEDDLING
IN IRAQ

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Rob Waller for reasons 1.4 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: In a June 4 meeting, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi told S/I Satterfield that his recent discussions
with top-tier Iranian Government officials had succeeded in
blunting Tehran's intense hostility toward a USG-GOI security
agreement. Claiming that Iran is less powerful in Iraq than
it was a few months ago, Adel said Tehran views GOI security
operations against Iranian-supported militants in Basrah and
Sadr City as defeats and is re-examining its policy toward
Iraq as a result. He said Iran's ambassador in Baghdad had
told him Tehran is willing to stop using Iraq as a
battlefield against the USG and to cease efforts to replicate
a Hezbollah-like entity in Iraq, but Adel replied the
Iranians must choose between support for the GOI's domestic
enemies and normal relations with a Shia government that is
friendly to Iran. Satterfield stressed that the GOI's best
defense against Iranian influence is the strengthening of GOI
institutions. Adel said he would press Prime Minister Maliki
and Vice
President Hashemi to settle the minor issues that stand in
the way of Tawafuq's return to the cabinet, and said he
thinks all blocs (with the possible exception of Tawafuq) are
ready to resume negotiations over a hydrocarbons framework
law based upon a draft text from February 2007. End Summary.

Iran Re-Assessing Iraq Policy
--------------


2. (C) Adel recently returned from an absence from Baghdad
that began with a mid-May meeting with President Bush in
Sharm-al-Sheikh and ended earlier this week with a three-day
visit to Tehran. In Tehran, Adel said he met with "all top
officials except Khamenei" including President Ahmadinejad,
FM Mottaki, Ali Larijani, Jalil, and Quds Force leader Qassim
Sulaimani. The Iranians have launched a "huge propaganda
campaign" in the Iranian press against the proposed
Iraqi-American security pact, Adel stated, adding that
Iranian officials accused him of being the GOI's chief
proponent of the deal. In response, Adel said he did not
deny this role, but rather defended the GOI's right as a
sovereign state to determine its own interests and to
conclude deals as it sees fit, and demanded a stop to the
propaganda campaign. He said Iranian officials were at first
"skeptical and pessimistic" toward Adel's' approach but
warmed after "hours of discussion" in which he assured them
that the GOI does not seek to "codify the status quo" through
the agreement. He likened the GOI's preferred relationship
with the USG to Turkish-USG relations, reminding his Iranian
hosts that the Turks refused to allow the USG in 2003 to
invade Iraq through Turkey. By the end of his visit, he
claimed that he had persuaded some of his interlocutors to
the extent that Larijani defended the GOI position to
Ahmadinejad, but he says the Iranians asked him to change the
name of the pact to something other than a security agreement.


3. (C) Asked about Tehran's relations with Muqtada al-Sadr,
Adel said Sadr is "not an Iranian player" and that Iranian
officials deride Sadr's political moves as "foolish and
idiotic." Claiming that Iran is less powerful in Iraq than
it was a few months ago, Adel said Sulaimani's Quds Force had
"lost" by siding with and supporting Special Groups and that
Tehran views GOI security operations against
Iranian-supported militants in Basrah and Sadr City as
defeats and is re-assessing its policy toward Iraq as a
result. He stated that Iranian Ambassador Qomi had sent him
a letter last month that made three main points. One, Tehran
is willing to stop using Iraq as a battlefield against the
USG. Two, Iran is willing to cease efforts to replicate a
Hezbollah-like entity in Iraq. Three, Tehran is willing to
accept a constitutional government in Baghdad and will not
try to press a "Wilayat al-Faqih" clerical state model on
Iraq. Adel said he told Qomi this was all well and good, but
the Iranians must now choose between support for the GOI's
domestic enemies and normal relations with a Shia government
that is friendly to Iran. He stressed to Qomi that Iraq is
not like Lebanon where the Shia are a minority, not a
majority like in Iraq. Satterfield agreed that Iran must
indeed make a choice, and he stressed that the GOI's best
defense against Iranian influence is to strengthen state
institutions.

Arab Neighbors, Tawafuq Return to GOI, Hydrocarbons Law
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Satterfield briefed on his recent trip to Arab
capitals, noting a new attitude toward engagement with Iraq
in the wake of continued GOI progress on Sunni
outreach/reconciliation measures, and - of particular
importance to the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt given Hizballah's
coup in West Beirut - GOI operations against Iranian-backed
Shia militias in Basrah and Sadr City. Adel agreed that he
also detected a new approach. Adel said Prime Minister
Maliki and Vice President Hashemi are very close to an
agreement on Tawafuq's return to the cabinet, adding he would
press both men to quickly settle the minor issues that remain
between them. When asked about prospects for resumption of
parliamentary negotiations over a hydrocarbons framework law,
Adel said all blocs (with the possible exception of Tawafuq)
are ready to re-engage in talks based upon a draft law agreed
upon in February 2007.

BUTENIS