CONCERNED LOCAL CITIZENS PROGRAM: SECURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000164 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PINS PGOV MOPS PTER IZ SUBJECT: CONCERNED LOCAL CITIZENS PROGRAM: SECURING COMMUNITIES REF: A. BAGHDAD 3722 (2007) ¶B. BAGHDAD 3957 (2007) ¶C. BAGHDAD 4189 (2007) ¶D. BAGHDAD 4205 (2007) Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The expansion of the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) program in 2007 has augmented Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I) efforts to bring security to Iraq. CLCs are temporary arrangements that were organized by Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces in order to augment local force protection, law enforcement and infrastructure security. CLC groups have been credited with sharp reductions in violence in areas where they are present. Always viewed as an interim solution to neighborhood security and the lack of local police, a significant portion who meet the qualifications, are starting to be integrated into Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The remaining CLCs will be eligible for training and employment opportunities within their communities. The core of this transition will be the transfer of the CLC program to the GOI, which will assume responsibility for control and funding of the CLC program. End Summary. -------------- Definitions and Origins of the CLC Program -------------- ¶2. (U) The CLC program was established in 2007 as a temporary security program administered by MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to augment local force protection, law enforcement and/or infrastructure security. These groups of local Iraqi citizens use intimate knowledge of their local neighborhoods in order to detect and deter extremists from within or outside of their communities to reduce violence against the local population. CLC members sign a pledge of loyalty and undergo a screening process, including biometrics registration. Most CLCs are paid under a contract currently administered by Coalition Forces. Salaries for rank and file members average about $300 per month. ¶3. (C) CLC members are motivated by a variety of interests, including a sense that al-Qaida (AQI) had become a destructive force in their communities, that the time had come to reject AQI's corrupt ideology and remove AQI from their communities, as well as the need for employment. These communities stand to benefit from reconstruction opportunities as well as the development of local institutions. Their rapid expansion in 2007 was a direct consequence of the surge. ¶4. (U) The first group of CLCs emerged in Ramadi in late 2006, out of the al-Anbar Awakening. Local tribal leaders, led by Sheik Sattar abu Risha, had become disillusioned with the activities of al-Qaida agreed to work with Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces to secure their neighborhoods against AQI. The well-publicized successes of the al-Anbar Awakening spurred numerous similar "awakening" groups ("sahwa") gaining momentum particularly throughout the spring and summer of 2007. CLCs are also known as Iraqi Security Volunteers in Baghdad. -------------- -------------- CLC Numbers, Locations, and Religious Affiliations -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The CLC program has grown from a handful of initiatives in early 2007 to around 136 separate CLC initiatives across the country today, totaling over 80,000 volunteers, of which almost 70,000 are on contract. That number is expected to increase, though the GOI has been informed that 100,000 is the likely upper limit. The composition of CLCs tends to reflect the local sectarian distribution in the affected areas: there are now Sunni, Shia, and mixed CLC initiatives, covering a diverse set of areas from the desert of western Anbar to the dense urban neighborhoods of Baghdad. However, the majority remain Sunni, reflecting both the decision by Sunni neighborhoods to turn against AQI and the fact that it is primarily Sunni neighborhoods and towns that are without local police forces. -------------- CLC Training and Operations -------------- ¶6. (U) CLC activities take a number of forms, including intelligence-gathering arrangements, infrastructure protection, and checkpoint duty. They work closely with CF in the area, and in many cases with ISF units as well. Some CLCs have been provided up to 80 hours of training, though many receive only very basic instruction in communications BAGHDAD 00000164 002 OF 002 procedures with CF. According to principles agreed between CF and the GOI, CLCs must be recruited locally, and operate only in the neighborhoods where they reside. All volunteers are entered into the CF biometrics database. Inevitably, there have been a small number of incidents of misbehavior by individual CLC members. Where this has occurred, the biometrics and other controls in place have been sufficient to identify and detain these individuals. -------------- Arms and "Uniforms" -------------- ¶7. (U) CLC members are allowed to carry their personally-owned small arms (e.g. AK-47) while on duty. MNF-I does not provide weapons to CLCs. CLC members often wear distinctive clothing and markings so that citizens and security forces can easily identify them. These "uniforms" vary widely from one CLC to another. -------------- Not All CLCs Will be Integrated into the ISF -------------- ¶8. (U) Approximately 80,000 CLC members are currently enrolled in the CLC program, of which 69,800 are currently paid by Coalition Forces on three-month renewable contracts, using CERP funding. The remainder are unpaid volunteers working with Coalition Forces in a variety of ways. The vast majority of these CLCs are concentrated in Baghdad and the areas immediately surrounding Baghdad to the west and south. ¶9. (U) MNF-I is working with the GOI to bring a portion of these individuals into the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army. A first group of about 1,700 volunteers were hired into the Iraqi police last fall, most of them from the formerly troubled West Baghdad Sunni neighborhood of Abu Ghraib. Many of these volunteers had been associated with armed insurgent groups, but had turned against al-Qaida and created one of the early success stories for the program. ¶10. (C) About 23,000 CLC members have now indicated interest in joining the ISF directly. PM Maliki has agreed to a CF proposal to integrate about 20-25 percent of all CLC members into either the MOI or the MOD. The GOI has developed a process for prioritizing this hiring via the Prime Minister's Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation, headed by Deputy National Security Advisor Safa al-Shaykh. Hiring lists are vetted by the Committee, then sent to the MOI for hiring orders. Over the last four weeks, over 5,000 Baghdad CLC names have been released to the MOI for hiring orders, and a first group has begun police training. Several thousand additional CLC names are likely to be released soon, contributing to a portion of the 12,000 additional police envisioned under the Baghdad police hiring plan. ¶11. (C) The GOI has agreed to work with CF to find training and employment opportunities for the remaining 75-80 percent of the CLCs, including assistance with finding jobs in both the private and public sector, small business loans and grants, vocational training and education. MNF-I intends to support the development and implementation of these reintegration programs and where appropriate fund portions of the program to accelerate the implementation using the CF Iraqi Security Force Funds allocated to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The GOI has agreed to match CF funding, and has promised USD 155.5 million in 2008 for such programs. USM-I will use some of its funds to create vocational/technical and other job training programs that will help to train some of these volunteers who choose not to continue in the security field. While it will be an enormous challenge to transition these very diverse local forces into non-security employment, the GOI has made clear to us that they also recognize how critical it will be to get this right. CROCKER