SHIA REACTION TO SADR CALL FOR ANTI-SOFA PROTEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001637

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: SHIA REACTION TO SADR CALL FOR ANTI-SOFA PROTEST

REF: BAGHDAD 239 (THE STREET IS STRONGER THAN
PARLIAMENT)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) On May 27, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement decrying
"the security agreement between the forces of darkness, by
which I mean the occupation, and the current Iraqi
Government." Sadr asked Iraqis to stage demonstrations
throughout Iraq, and prodded political blocs to oppose the
agreement through various means. Preliminary soundings among
Shia contacts reveal little surprise that Sadr and his
followers would resort to such measures to protest the
agreement: indeed, a senior Sadrist told us several months
ago that Sadrists would employ street demonstrations and
various forms of civil disobedience to register opposition to
such an agreement (reftel). CoR member Abdul Hadi al-Hassani
of the Dawa Tanzim Party stated that much will depend on
whether the Maliki government permits street protests, and
how GOI security forces act in case such demonstrations go
forward. He said the anger of Sadr's statement is directed
not only at the USG but also at the Maliki government.
Stating that he and other Dawa and Dawa Tanzim leaders are
contacting senior Sadrists to urge that any demonstrations be
conducted in a calm and non-violent manner, he opined that
the GOI should not try to quash such protests but to let them
run their course. Hassani said Sadr's statement will cast a
negative shadow on the agreement because it implies that the
agreement is already concluded when in fact it is still being
negotiated. He believes that Sadr's statement will make even
more difficult the already tough task of explaining agreement
advantages to the Iraqi people and convincing them that the
agreement serves their interests.


2. (C) Fadhila Party deputy bloc leader Bassim al-Sharif
agreed with Hassani that the GOI should allow Sadrists to
express themselves as long as they do so in a peaceful
manner. He warned that trouble will likely arise if Sadrists
are not allowed to have a public voice. Bassim noted that
rumors are circulating widely that Grand Ayatollah Sistani
and other senior Shia clerics are opposed to the agreement,
and that the Shia public has accepted such rumors as fact.
He added that Sadr's statement takes full advantage of this.
Shia independent CoR member Qassim Daood affirmed the
prevalence of such rumors, and blamed Tehran for
disseminating false information about Sistani's views. He
claimed that Sistani's personal representative in Lebanon
personally assured him the rumors are not true and that
Sistani will support any agreement as long as "all parties
and blocs agree." Qassim predicted that Sadr's protest call
would draw few people into the street at a time when GOI
prestige is high due to declining violence and improving
economic conditions. Senior ISCI advisor Haitham al-Husseini
echoed Qassim's view by questioning Sadr's ability to draw
mass protests in the wake of the GOI's successful security
operation in Sadr City. Speaking by phone from Berlin where
he is accompanying Amar al-Hakim (who has now fully taken
over day-to-day ISCI leadership duties from his father, Abdel
Aziz) in meetings with German government officials, Haitham
predicted that Sadr's call would be disregarded by all but a
relatively small number of Iraqis.

Negative PCNS View Toward SOFA/SFA
--------------


3. (C) On a related subject, Fadhila's Bassim al-Sharif and
Dawa Party dissident Falih Fayadh told us they had attended a
May 26 meeting of the Political Council for National Security
(PCNS) and both stated that meeting participants were
decidedly negative after Maliki briefed them on the current
status of negotiations and outlined the USG position on
controversial issues such as arrest/detention, operational
authority, legal immunities, and military installations.
(The topic of discussion at the PCNS focused primarily on the
SOFA, not the SFA). Falih said "all agreed that the American
position is unacceptable" and Bassim added that no
participant expressed support for any agreement that
contained the USG position as it was presented (we note that
these reports track with septel readouts provided to the
Ambassador by President Talabani and Deputy CoR Speaker
Attiyah). They said Sadrist Trend representatives did not
attend the meeting. Bassim said there was no discussion
about how Iraqi leaders should explain and "sell" the
agreement to the Iraqi people, which he characterized as a
key element. Stating that he and other Iraqi politicians are
currently unwilling to say anything positive in public about
an agreement that is still being negotiated, Bassim warned
that the entire process will take time, "maybe more than one
year."


4. (C) These engagement are consistent with engagements
Ambassador Crocker and Brett McGurk held with senior leaders

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over the past 72-hours, including Abdel Aziz al-Hakim,
President Talabani, Tariq Hashimi, Barham Salih, Hoshyar
Zebari, and Khalid al-Attiyah, all of whom emphasized the
importance of concluding an agreement that Iraq's leaders can
successfully "market" to the Iraqi people and the parliament.
The leadership is determined to move forward, but they are
also keenly aware of the history in this region and the fate
of leaders who have signed similar security arrangements -
arrangements that are transparent and open to public
scrutiny, unlike our present-day SOFAs in the region - with
the United States or the United Kingdom.
BUTENIS