VP HASHEMI ON TAWAFUQ RETURN, SFA/SOFA, AND MOSUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001620 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: VP HASHEMI ON TAWAFUQ RETURN, SFA/SOFA, AND MOSUL OPERATION REF: BAGHDAD 1610 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 25 meeting, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi told the Ambassador that his May 24 meeting with Prime Minister al-Maliki had not achieved the return of Tawafuq officials to the GOI cabinet and that Maliki had unexpectedly raised a new issue that could obstruct the return process. Hashemi complained that Maliki had not kept his promise to apprise the Executive Council of progress on SFA/SOFA talks, though Hashemi said his personal representative had kept him well-informed. He said the GOI's lack of experience in dealing with issues related to the consequences of emerging from UN Chapter 7 authority would likely hamper SFA/SOFA talks; claimed that Grand Ayatollah Sistani has a "negative stance" toward the agreement; and warned that "no Iraqi will accept an agreement that damages Iraq's sovereignty." Just back from a visit to Mosul, Hashemi criticized the GOI's ongoing security operation against Sunni insurgents in Ninewa province, declaring that the GOI effort is lacking on various levels. He divulged that he is tentatively planning to head a mixed Sunni-Shia-Kurd delegation on a trip to Arab capitals, and the Ambassador urged him to finalize a deal with Maliki on Tawafuq's return in advance of his trip so that he could highlight national unity to Arab interlocutors. End Summary. Tawafuq Return to Cabinet -------------- ¶2. (C) Hashemi said his May 24 meeting with Prime Minister al-Maliki did not resolve the issue of Tawafuq's long-awaited return to the GOI. He claimed Maliki had unexpectedly insisted that Planning Minister and Tawafuq renegade Ali Baban remain in his post, an issue Hashemi said had not been previously raised. The VP asserted that this post "belongs to Tawafuq," and that Maliki shrugged off his compromise offer to "trade" the Planning Minister job for that of either Finance or Oil Minister. The Ambassador urged him to consider an arrangement whereby Baban would stay for a fixed interval and then leave. Hashemi said he could accept that if Tawafuq held Oil or Finance for the same interval (Comment: Not likely to happen. End comment.) Hashemi said that Maliki claimed that someone in the UIA had objected to Hashemi's list of proposed ministerial candidates, but refused to divulge the refuse-nik's identity. When Hashemi remonstrated by telling Maliki that he had just met with UIA Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, who blessed Hashemi's candidate list, Maliki replied that Hakim was old and sick and had probably forgotten the UIA position (septels report Hakim's take on this matter, as well as efforts by President Talabani to broker a deal). He divulged that he is tentatively planning to head a mixed Sunni-Shia-Kurd delegation that may depart as soon as May 27 on a two-week trip to various Arab capitals: the Ambassador urged him to finalize a deal with Maliki on Tawafuq's return in advance of the trip so that he could highlight national unity to Arab interlocutors as part of his call for greater Arab engagement with Iraq. SFA/SOFA -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador briefed Hashemi on the status of SFA/SOFA consultations, adding that good progress had been made at the working level and that the active and sustained engagement of the GOI Executive Council and Masoud Barzani was now needed to guide the agreement to conclusion. Hashemi whined that Maliki had not kept his promise to regularly apprise the Executive Council of SFA/SOFA progress, adding that his personal representative to the talks had kept him well-informed. He said the GOI's lack of experience in dealing with issues related to the consequences of emerging from UN Chapter 7 authority was a problem the GOI had not adequately addressed, stating that "we don't want to close one chapter and enter a new and unknown chapter." For example, he said the GOI was concerned that lifting of Chapter 7 authority could expose the GOI to USD one trillion in monetary claims that date from the Saddam era, and the GOI may need to hire a private consultant to help evaluate the extent of potential GOI liability. He claimed to have heard that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Qum-based Shia cleric Kadhim al-Ha'iri, and other Shia clerics have a "negative stance" toward the agreement. (On this point, though, he seemed to be referencing news articles from the Iranian press. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim told the Ambassador earlier in the day that Sistani had three demands on the agreement: (1) that it affirm Iraq,s sovereignty; (2) that it be transparent and seen by the public; and (3) that it be supported by all communities.) He said Iranian Revolutionary Guard official Muhammad Jafari-Javaid had cautioned him that "you have no BAGHDAD 00001620 002 OF 002 right to enter into secret deals with the Americans," to which Hashemi claimed to have retorted that Iraq will do whatever it wants as long as Iran continues to undermine Iraq's sovereignty. Hashemi warned that while Iraq wishes to strengthen relations with the USG, "no Iraqi will accept any agreement that damages Iraq's sovereignty" and Iraqi leaders will be unable to "market" the agreement to the CoR or to the Iraqi people unless it is a firm affirmation of Iraq,s sovereignty. He said the agreement must not simply maintain the status quo in another form, but should rather reflect changes in our relationship. More To Do In Mosul -------------- ¶4. (C) Just back from a visit to Mosul, Hashemi said Iraqi forces appeared to be performing well, but he questioned the long-term strategy. He said he reprimanded ISF intelligence officers for what he claimed was an almost complete lack of actionable intelligence about primary targets. He said ISF commanders seemed to have no idea how AQI elements vanished from Mosul and where they were now hiding. He praised cooperation between Coalition Forces and the ISF, but the ISF effort was lacking in manpower (only two divisions were present) and intelligence. He said most of the operation commanders are ethnic Kurds whose actions are hampered by their sensitivity to possible accusations of ethno-sectarian abuses. In spite of this, he said his visit to a GOI detention center revealed numerous instances of human rights abuses, which he brought to the attention of ISF commanders. The GOI was also failing to hold cleared areas, and also to follow-up on security actions with reconstruction programs to employ idle and angry youth, particularly recent college graduates, and drive them away from insurgent recruitment. He said Maliki had agreed to his proposal to bring back former Iraqi Army officers into active duty, but that implementation was still unrealized. CROCKER