VP HASHEMI ON TAWAFUQ RETURN, SFA/SOFA, AND MOSUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001620

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP HASHEMI ON TAWAFUQ RETURN, SFA/SOFA, AND MOSUL
OPERATION

REF: BAGHDAD 1610

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: In a May 25 meeting, Vice President Tareq
al-Hashemi told the Ambassador that his May 24 meeting with
Prime Minister al-Maliki had not achieved the return of
Tawafuq officials to the GOI cabinet and that Maliki had
unexpectedly raised a new issue that could obstruct the
return process. Hashemi complained that Maliki had not kept
his promise to apprise the Executive Council of progress on
SFA/SOFA talks, though Hashemi said his personal
representative had kept him well-informed. He said the GOI's
lack of experience in dealing with issues related to the
consequences of emerging from UN Chapter 7 authority would
likely hamper SFA/SOFA talks; claimed that Grand Ayatollah
Sistani has a "negative stance" toward the agreement; and
warned that "no Iraqi will accept an agreement that damages
Iraq's sovereignty." Just back from a visit to Mosul,
Hashemi criticized the GOI's ongoing security operation
against Sunni insurgents in Ninewa province, declaring that
the GOI effort is lacking on various levels. He divulged
that he is tentatively planning to head a mixed
Sunni-Shia-Kurd delegation on a trip to Arab capitals, and
the Ambassador urged him to finalize a deal with Maliki on
Tawafuq's return in advance of his trip so that he could
highlight national unity to Arab interlocutors. End Summary.

Tawafuq Return to Cabinet
--------------


2. (C) Hashemi said his May 24 meeting with Prime Minister
al-Maliki did not resolve the issue of Tawafuq's long-awaited
return to the GOI. He claimed Maliki had unexpectedly
insisted that Planning Minister and Tawafuq renegade Ali
Baban remain in his post, an issue Hashemi said had not been
previously raised. The VP asserted that this post "belongs
to Tawafuq," and that Maliki shrugged off his compromise
offer to "trade" the Planning Minister job for that of either
Finance or Oil Minister. The Ambassador urged him to
consider an arrangement whereby Baban would stay for a fixed
interval and then leave. Hashemi said he could accept that
if Tawafuq held Oil or Finance for the same interval
(Comment: Not likely to happen. End comment.) Hashemi said
that Maliki claimed that someone in the UIA had objected to
Hashemi's list of proposed ministerial candidates, but
refused to divulge the refuse-nik's identity. When Hashemi
remonstrated by telling Maliki that he had just met with UIA
Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, who blessed Hashemi's candidate
list, Maliki replied that Hakim was old and sick and had
probably forgotten the UIA position (septels report Hakim's
take on this matter, as well as efforts by President Talabani
to broker a deal). He divulged that he is tentatively
planning to head a mixed Sunni-Shia-Kurd delegation that may
depart as soon as May 27 on a two-week trip to various Arab
capitals: the Ambassador urged him to finalize a deal with
Maliki on Tawafuq's return in advance of the trip so that he
could highlight national unity to Arab interlocutors as part
of his call for greater Arab engagement with Iraq.

SFA/SOFA
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador briefed Hashemi on the status of
SFA/SOFA consultations, adding that good progress had been
made at the working level and that the active and sustained
engagement of the GOI Executive Council and Masoud Barzani
was now needed to guide the agreement to conclusion. Hashemi
whined that Maliki had not kept his promise to regularly
apprise the Executive Council of SFA/SOFA progress, adding
that his personal representative to the talks had kept him
well-informed. He said the GOI's lack of experience in
dealing with issues related to the consequences of emerging
from UN Chapter 7 authority was a problem the GOI had not
adequately addressed, stating that "we don't want to close
one chapter and enter a new and unknown chapter." For
example, he said the GOI was concerned that lifting of
Chapter 7 authority could expose the GOI to USD one trillion
in monetary claims that date from the Saddam era, and the GOI
may need to hire a private consultant to help evaluate the
extent of potential GOI liability. He claimed to have heard
that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Qum-based Shia cleric Kadhim
al-Ha'iri, and other Shia clerics have a "negative stance"
toward the agreement. (On this point, though, he seemed to be
referencing news articles from the Iranian press. Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim told the Ambassador earlier in the day that
Sistani had three demands on the agreement: (1) that it
affirm Iraq,s sovereignty; (2) that it be transparent and
seen by the public; and (3) that it be supported by all
communities.) He said Iranian Revolutionary Guard official
Muhammad Jafari-Javaid had cautioned him that "you have no

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right to enter into secret deals with the Americans," to
which Hashemi claimed to have retorted that Iraq will do
whatever it wants as long as Iran continues to undermine
Iraq's sovereignty. Hashemi warned that while Iraq wishes to
strengthen relations with the USG, "no Iraqi will accept any
agreement that damages Iraq's sovereignty" and Iraqi leaders
will be unable to "market" the agreement to the CoR or to the
Iraqi people unless it is a firm affirmation of Iraq,s
sovereignty. He said the agreement must not simply maintain
the status quo in another form, but should rather reflect
changes in our relationship.

More To Do In Mosul
--------------


4. (C) Just back from a visit to Mosul, Hashemi said Iraqi
forces appeared to be performing well, but he questioned the
long-term strategy. He said he reprimanded ISF intelligence
officers for what he claimed was an almost complete lack of
actionable intelligence about primary targets. He said ISF
commanders seemed to have no idea how AQI elements vanished
from Mosul and where they were now hiding. He praised
cooperation between Coalition Forces and the ISF, but the ISF
effort was lacking in manpower (only two divisions were
present) and intelligence. He said most of the operation
commanders are ethnic Kurds whose actions are hampered by
their sensitivity to possible accusations of ethno-sectarian
abuses. In spite of this, he said his visit to a GOI
detention center revealed numerous instances of human rights
abuses, which he brought to the attention of ISF commanders.
The GOI was also failing to hold cleared areas, and also to
follow-up on security actions with reconstruction programs to
employ idle and angry youth, particularly recent college
graduates, and drive them away from insurgent recruitment.
He said Maliki had agreed to his proposal to bring back
former Iraqi Army officers into active duty, but that
implementation was still unrealized.
CROCKER