PRT SALAH AD DIN: PROVINCIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001617

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KDEM EAID IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: PROVINCIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH
LOCALS LEADS TO FEW TANGIBLE RESULTS

Classified By: PRT Salah ad Din Team Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din reporting cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) Salah ad Din (SaD) provincial officials over the past
six months have engaged in a series of PRT-BCT facilitated
trips to various districts (Qadas) to listen to local
government concerns. While the trips are generally well
received by district officials, the goodwill later evaporates
when provincial leaders fail to deliver on promised
assistance. End Summary.


3. (C) In a series of "Directors General (DG) Roadshows"
over the last six months, which are supported by the PRT and
its partner Brigade Combat Team (BCT),SaD provincial
officials have traveled to a number of Qadas to listen to
local officials' concerns that focus primarily on basic
services delivery. These roadshows generally include the
Governor and/or Deputy Governor and the Assistant Governor
for Technical Affairs, accompanied on occasion by SaD
Provincial Council members, and the DGs of Municipalities,
Water, Sewerage, and Electricity. These officials meet with
local councils, mayors, and local directors. While the trips
are generally well received by district officials, the
goodwill generated by the visits typically evaporates when
promises of assistance are not kept.

Lack of Bureaucratic Capacity Trumps Political Will
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Provincial leaders make promises to local leaders
with the best of intentions. However, their ability to
fulfill their promises is limited by a sclerotic bureaucracy.
Local leaders and the people they serve blame provincial
leadership, unaware of the challenges that those provincial
leaders face in dealing with a bureaucracy that ultimately
does not answer to them.


5. (C) Examples of unfulfilled promises are legion. During
an early March roadshow to Samarra, a SaD Provincial Council
(PC) member promised the new mayor of Samarra that the PC was
ready to provide assistance. Days after the meeting, the
newly-renovated courthouse in Samarra opened (a US-funded
project); however, the court's judges discovered that there
was inadequate furniture. The SaD Provincial Council quickly
approved $12,000 to provide furniture. However, it took
months and constant PRT prodding for the furniture to arrive,
owing to difficulties transferring funds to complete the
purchase.


6. (C) In another example in Balad district in southern
Salah ad Din, it took five months for a promised electrical
transformer to arrive that would boost the power supply to
one neighborhood. In Dulu'iyah, also in the Balad district,
a water project remains half finished. According to a local
official, the contractor was forced to purchase and install
inferior water pumps from Syria because he had not been paid
for months. The Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs had
promised to take action on this issue two months ago but
there has still been no follow-through. In Baiji, promised
specialized equipment to clean sewers remained undelivered
until the U.S. military accompanied Baiji city officials to
Erbil to take possession.


7. (C) More problematic is that there is no systematic
effort to examine and improve the process that would deliver
on these promises. While the Province has begun in earnest
to integrate its capital planning strategy with its vision
for the Province, there is no complementary strategy for
improving the ability of provincial and local ministry
representatives to actually execute the projects envisioned
in the strategy. Ministries have significant challenges at
the Baghdad level that limit their ability to train and
supervise their provincial and local employees.


8. (C) These failures are particularly stark in the face of
the increasing influence and operational capacity of the
provincial and local councils. The Provincial Council has
been particularly effective in removing non-performing mayors
and local council members from their positions. District
councils and mayors, particularly in Balad district, have
been working together to address cross-cutting issues and
have even discussed forming a southern bloc with neighboring
Dujail district for the upcoming elections to counter the
power currently held by the northern cities of Tikrit and
Baiji.


9. (C) Comment: The inability of the provincial-level

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bureaucracy to deliver on what appear to be reasonable
promises/commitments made by provincial politicians has dire
consequences. Salah ad Din residents are clearly frustrated
by the provincial government's failure to improve basic
services. However, they are excited about the prospect of
elections and look forward to holding the next group of
elected provincial officials more accountable. The clear
danger is that a defective provincial-level bureaucracy will
prevent new provincial officials from delivering on their
promises, especially with respect to basic services, leaving
the population even more disillusioned and questioning
whether a democratic system can ever meet their most basic
needs. USAID intends to roll out programs that explicitly
address this issue early in FY09. End Comment.
CROCKER