PRT SALAH AD DIN: PROVINCIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001617 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KDEM EAID IZ SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: PROVINCIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCALS LEADS TO FEW TANGIBLE RESULTS Classified By: PRT Salah ad Din Team Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din reporting cable. Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) Salah ad Din (SaD) provincial officials over the past six months have engaged in a series of PRT-BCT facilitated trips to various districts (Qadas) to listen to local government concerns. While the trips are generally well received by district officials, the goodwill later evaporates when provincial leaders fail to deliver on promised assistance. End Summary. ¶3. (C) In a series of "Directors General (DG) Roadshows" over the last six months, which are supported by the PRT and its partner Brigade Combat Team (BCT),SaD provincial officials have traveled to a number of Qadas to listen to local officials' concerns that focus primarily on basic services delivery. These roadshows generally include the Governor and/or Deputy Governor and the Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs, accompanied on occasion by SaD Provincial Council members, and the DGs of Municipalities, Water, Sewerage, and Electricity. These officials meet with local councils, mayors, and local directors. While the trips are generally well received by district officials, the goodwill generated by the visits typically evaporates when promises of assistance are not kept. Lack of Bureaucratic Capacity Trumps Political Will -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Provincial leaders make promises to local leaders with the best of intentions. However, their ability to fulfill their promises is limited by a sclerotic bureaucracy. Local leaders and the people they serve blame provincial leadership, unaware of the challenges that those provincial leaders face in dealing with a bureaucracy that ultimately does not answer to them. ¶5. (C) Examples of unfulfilled promises are legion. During an early March roadshow to Samarra, a SaD Provincial Council (PC) member promised the new mayor of Samarra that the PC was ready to provide assistance. Days after the meeting, the newly-renovated courthouse in Samarra opened (a US-funded project); however, the court's judges discovered that there was inadequate furniture. The SaD Provincial Council quickly approved $12,000 to provide furniture. However, it took months and constant PRT prodding for the furniture to arrive, owing to difficulties transferring funds to complete the purchase. ¶6. (C) In another example in Balad district in southern Salah ad Din, it took five months for a promised electrical transformer to arrive that would boost the power supply to one neighborhood. In Dulu'iyah, also in the Balad district, a water project remains half finished. According to a local official, the contractor was forced to purchase and install inferior water pumps from Syria because he had not been paid for months. The Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs had promised to take action on this issue two months ago but there has still been no follow-through. In Baiji, promised specialized equipment to clean sewers remained undelivered until the U.S. military accompanied Baiji city officials to Erbil to take possession. ¶7. (C) More problematic is that there is no systematic effort to examine and improve the process that would deliver on these promises. While the Province has begun in earnest to integrate its capital planning strategy with its vision for the Province, there is no complementary strategy for improving the ability of provincial and local ministry representatives to actually execute the projects envisioned in the strategy. Ministries have significant challenges at the Baghdad level that limit their ability to train and supervise their provincial and local employees. ¶8. (C) These failures are particularly stark in the face of the increasing influence and operational capacity of the provincial and local councils. The Provincial Council has been particularly effective in removing non-performing mayors and local council members from their positions. District councils and mayors, particularly in Balad district, have been working together to address cross-cutting issues and have even discussed forming a southern bloc with neighboring Dujail district for the upcoming elections to counter the power currently held by the northern cities of Tikrit and Baiji. ¶9. (C) Comment: The inability of the provincial-level BAGHDAD 00001617 002 OF 002 bureaucracy to deliver on what appear to be reasonable promises/commitments made by provincial politicians has dire consequences. Salah ad Din residents are clearly frustrated by the provincial government's failure to improve basic services. However, they are excited about the prospect of elections and look forward to holding the next group of elected provincial officials more accountable. The clear danger is that a defective provincial-level bureaucracy will prevent new provincial officials from delivering on their promises, especially with respect to basic services, leaving the population even more disillusioned and questioning whether a democratic system can ever meet their most basic needs. USAID intends to roll out programs that explicitly address this issue early in FY09. End Comment. CROCKER