KARBALA PRT MEETS WITH SADRIST PC MEMBERS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001592

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: KARBALA PRT MEETS WITH SADRIST PC MEMBERS

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Don Cooke for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This a PRT Karbala reporting cable.


2. (S) SUMMARY: On May 8, PRT met two Sadrist members of the
Karbala Provincial Council (PC). The Sadrists had only
recently returned to the Council after warrants for their
arrests were withdrawn. The Sadrists warned of Iranian
influence in south-central Iraq; described the Karbala
political structure; deflected to all others in the region
blame for JAM related violence; offered excuses for Muqtada
al-Sadr's presence in Iran; requested U.S. assistance in the
empowerment of the moderate wing of the Sadrist movement; and
asked for U.S. financial support. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) On May 8, PRT met at the REO Hillah with two Sadrist
members of the Karbala PC: Ali Abbas Gzawi (Strictly Protect)
and Ahmed Redha Gareeb (Strictly Protect) to discuss matters
related to the Provincial Council Tourism Committee and a
potential QRF project. Ali Abbas has met with the PRT on
previous occasions but only to discuss Council matters. In a
surprise turn of events, the meeting was devoted almost
entirely to a discussion of the Sadr party and related issues.

BACKGROUND: SADRIST HISTORY ON THE PC
--------------


4. (S) There are three Sadrist members currently active on
the Karbala Provincial Council: Ali, Ahmed, and Jasim Wahab
Mohammed. Five Sadrists were seated in the last provincial
elections and one of the five, Jawad Kadhum Husain
Al-Hasnawi, was elevated to Deputy Governor. After the
Shabania attacks in Karbala at the end of August 2007, arrest
warrants were issued by the Higher Judicial Council for all
five of the Sadrist PC members in Karbala. One member, Hamid
Ganoosh Jasim, was arrested and the other four fled. GOI
officials in Baghdad later determined that the warrants had
been "fraudulently" obtained. Ali Abbas and Ahmed report
that Hamid Ganoosh remains in detention, the other three PC
members have now returned to Karbala while the Deputy
Governor remains in Baghdad. The PRT had previously been
informed that the PC had requested a ruling from the Higher
Juridical Council as to whether the PC could elect a new
Deputy Governor given Jawad Kadhum Husain Al-Hasnawi's
prolonged absence from Karbala Province.

WARNINGS OF IRANIAN PLOTS
--------------


5. (S) Ali and Ahmed said they wanted the U.S. to be aware
of Iranian plots to control south-central Iraq. They
cautioned that Iran is very dangerous and the cause for the
violence in Iraq. Ali and Ahmed claim that they want to be
rid of Iran so Iraq can be ruled by Arabs, emphasizing that
Iraq is Arab and has no ethnic or historic ties to Iran.
They said that Iran's immediate objective in Karbala is to
control the two shrines in the city center. Ali and Ahmed
described an array of alleged Iranian sympathizers in Karbala
who are allegedly involved in this plot, including: the
Himaiatt al Harmain (protectors of the two shrines in
Karbala) who are said to hold stockpiles of weapons in the
shrines, and the tourism companies and hotel owners that
cater to Iranian pilgrims. (Note: In a May 7 meeting, the
head of a Karbala-based trade association of hotels,
restaurants, and tourism complained that his industry was
suffering severely due to an Iranian-imposed limit of only
1,500 visitors per month to Karbala. End Note.)

A SADRIST VIEW OF THE KARBALA POLITICAL STRUCTURE
-------------- --------------


6. (S) The Sadrists divided the Karbala political powers
into two groups. The first group, the "power holders" occupy
21 seats on the Provincial Council and hold most high offices
in the Province. The core of this group is Karbala residents
with long ties to the area and links to Iran, including
members of the marja'iyya, Da'wa, and ISCI. The second
group, identified as the "independents" (as in independent of
Iran),is comprised of the tribal Arabs who moved to Karbala
in the past 50 years and who now support the Sadrists,
Fadhila, and other groups.


7. (S) The Sadrists claim that the power holders comprise
only ten percent of the population but through the influence
of the marja'iyya and the closed election lists were able to
manipulate the election results to take a majority of the
Council seats. The Sadrists see the Da'wa governor as one
of the power holders but consider the council chairman an
independent. The Sadrists called the good relationship
between the governor and the chairman a "mystery." (Note: The
relationship of the governor and the chairman is sometimes
strained but both appear committed to a unified public image.
The chairman is a skilled conciliator who has survived a

BAGHDAD 00001592 002 OF 003


number of challenges to his chairmanship. End Note.)

EXCUSES OFFERED FOR MUQTADA AL SADR'S ABSENCE
--------------


8. (S) PRToffs pointed out the inconsistency between the
Sadrist condemnation of Iran and Muqtada al Sadr's residence
in Iran. They agreed that Sadr's presence in Iran is very
harmful to the Sadrist cause in Iraq, but insisted that Sadr
has no choice in the matter, claiming that Da'wa, ISCI, and
others excluded Sadr from the Iraqi political scene and
forced him to take refuge in Iran. They said that Iran
decides when and if Sadr can leave Iran.


9. (S) Asked to define the Sadrist political agenda, Ali and
Ahmed responded with several frank admissions: first, they
confided that even "good Sadrists" are of two camps, the
well-educated with open minds and the uneducated with closed
minds. The second group controls the party leadership. They
also confided that the Sadrists were not prepared for the
past elections as they did not understand the concepts of
democracy or freedom and they lacked the party leadership to
develop a proper platform. They claim to enjoy popular
support on the streets and believe that the moderates can
pursue a positive agenda if they are not driven from the
party by the rogues. Ali and Ahmed claim that their party
leadership is improving and moving beyond a focus on raw
power to consider larger social issues. They identified the
current party leadership in Karbala as Sheikh Muhaned
Al-Assadi, who they state was designated for this position by
the Sadrist officials in Najaf. (Note: Karbala media have
identified Sheik Abdul-Hadi Al-Mohammadawi as the head of the
Al-Sadr office in Karbala. End Note.)

GOI, IRAN, and U.S. RESPONSIBLE FOR JAM VIOLENCE
-------------- ---


10. (S) Ali and Ahmed said they are displeased with the
violence in Baghdad and Basra but insisted that the
Government of Iraq, the U.S., and the rogue Sadrists elements
all share the blame for the present situation. They
explained that Sadr's two freezes on armed conflict were
intended by Sadr to highlight the rogue elements in his
movement. The loyal Sadrists expected that Iraqi and
Coalition forces would help the Sadrist cause by eliminating
those rogue elements. Instead, they claim, the Iraq and
Coalition forces used the freeze to attack all Sadrists, good
and bad alike, as part of a politically motivated campaign to
destroy the Sadr party. Ali and Ahmed contend that the Iraqi
and Coalition forces were baited in this matter by Iran who
supplies considerable arms to the rogue Sadrist elements to
heighten the tensions between the Sadrists and the GOI. They
claimed that acts of violence and intimidation directed
against the moderate Sadrists (including the attempted arrest
of the five elected Sadrists in Karbala) only serve to
legitimize and strengthen the rogue elements of the Sadrist
party and undermine the moderate Sadrists and their calls for
peace and dialogue.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FROM THE U.S.
--------------


11. (S) Ali and Ahmed want the U.S. to act to ensure the
"independents," i.e. moderate Sadrists, are not excluded from
the political process. They warned that excluding the
Sadrists would open the door for total Iranian control in
Karbala and all Iraq. They asked the U.S. to intervene to
stop an alleged GOI campaign of harassment and intimidation
intended to prevent Sadrists from effective participation in
the provincial election process. They claim the Sadrist
offices are under Iraqi guard, citizens are discouraged from
attending the Sadrist political gatherings, and moderate
Sadrists are publicly labeled as criminals and harassed. As
evidence, they cited a recent bombing in Karbala which they
claim resulted in the unjustified, mass arrest and detention
of 180 Sadrists. Ali and Ahmed suggested that U.S.
intervention should include empowerment of the tribes in
south central Iraq. (Note: The Karbala Governor, whom the
Sadrists claim is a puppet of Iran, is willing to engage the
tribes in political dialogue but is adamantly opposed to
using the tribes in any security role. End Note.)

PM'S THREAT TO EXCLUDE SADRISTS FROM PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


12. (S) PRToffs asked Ali and Ahmed about the Prime
Minister's threat to exclude the Sadrists party from the
election process. They responded that the PM is motivated by
his personal desire to strengthen the Da'wa party and that
any attempt to exclude the Sadrists from the election process
would result in the fall of the Maliki government. PRToffs
explained their desire to reach out to all groups to
encourage broad participation in the Iraqi political process,

BAGHDAD 00001592 003 OF 003


agreeing that the exclusion of groups from that process will
only serve to undermine the very democracy the Iraqis are
trying to build. Ali and Ahmed stated in response that "in
the name of God" they encourage the U.S. to reach out to the
Sadrists to empower the moderate wing of the party.

REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
--------------


13. (S) The Sadrist requested QRF funding for an NGO, "The
Iraqi Social Association," which was registered with the GOI
in June 2006. They said the NGO is nonpartisan and provides
a variety of social services to the poor, women, orphans, and
other marginalized groups. They said the group's rent had
previously been paid by Ahmed Chalabi, but Chalabi will no
longer cover the rent for their building because the NGO
would not support Chalabi's political demands. The PRT will
consider this project as a candidate for QRF funding and will
hold further meetings with the Sadrists to discuss this
matter, among others.


14. (S) Comment: This first engagement with Sadrists
officials was remarkably free of polemics. While Ali and
Ahmed represent the smaller, intellectual (and anti-Iranian)
wing of the party, we see this as an excellent foot in the
door for the PRT. We will also give serious consideration to
a QRF project, presuming it meets all the requirements and is
truly apolitical, as a way of building confidence and
demonstrating our desire that the Sadrists find legitimate
ways to express their aspirations in the political process.
End Comment.
CROCKER