TRIBAL AWAKENINGS: SOUTHERNERS STILL HALF-ASLEEP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000159 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: TRIBAL AWAKENINGS: SOUTHERNERS STILL HALF-ASLEEP REF: A. BASRAH 000115 ¶B. BAGHDAD 00008 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint Baghdad POL - PRT Maysan, Muthanna, Karbala, Najaf, Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Babil, Wasit and REO Basrah cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: There is no "Shi'a awakening" in southern Iraq comparable to the ar-Ramadi based Sunni Awakening. There is a plethora of independent tribal movements of unknown influence, including groups in Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan and more clandestine groups in Karbala and Najaf. Individual sheikhs in many southern governorates have also approached U.S. REOs and PRTs in hopes of securing U.S. support for a southern awakening movement. Independent tribal movements and sheikhs currently lack real power and influence, although they could pose a future political threat to the religious parties if they are able to capitalize on growing popular resentment over provincial government performance. The establishment, both the Supreme Council (ISCI) and Dawa, are watching with concern. In the meantime, the southern tribes are no longer asleep, but not yet fully awake. End Summary. Independent Shi'a Awakenings -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) In an echo of the "awakenings" by Sunni tribes in Anbar and elsewhere, several independent tribal movements have also emerged in the south. The Independent National Iraqi Tribal Assembly was started in Basrah by technocrats, local NGOs, and sheikhs from 33 tribes. The group's stated goals are to end sectarianism and the rule of religious parties and to support a unified Iraq. The group is slowly expanding into Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna. ¶4. (S/NF) A second group, the Maysan Tribal Council, is led by Sheikh Muhammad Hassan Sajar al-Fartusi. Some 500 tribal members from Maysan, Wasit and Basrah reportedly attended the last council conference held in December 2007. The conference culminated in the release of a 10 point statement that featured the rejection of any armed groups, statements supporting national unity and federalism, and calls for parties to sign an honor document to maintain security. ¶5. (C) In addition to the Maysan Tribal Council, two other tribal groups are reportedly based in Maysan. Both were founded by Kareem Mahmoud al-Muhammedewi (Abu Hatim). The first, the Maysan Nobles Council, was founded in March 2006 to lobby the provincial government and eventually field candidates in provincial elections. Mahmoud subsequently founded the second, the National Front for the Salvation of the South, to combat Iranian activity. No further information is available on either group. ¶6. (S/NF) There are rumors of Shi'a awakening councils being established in Karbala, especially in the al-Husseiniya sub-district in response to al-Qaeda activity in nearby North Babil. These councils do not enjoy a large degree of popular support because the public considers Karbala relatively safe and sees no need for additional armed groups. Separate reporting indicates that senior sheikhs in Najaf have founded a secret Shi'a awakening movement with CDR of the 5th Border Patrol Unit MG Ghazali in order to combat Iranian influence. Finally, individual sheikhs from Basrah, Karbala, Dhi Qar, Maysan and Babil have approached the Regional Embassy Offices in Basrah and Hillah in hopes of receiving U.S. support for an Anbar-style awakening movement against Iran. ¶7. (S/NF) The exact influence and strength of these independent movements is unclear, but at present the tribes appear unwilling or unable to meaningfully influence politics without U.S. support. However, some sheikhs are tentatively beginning to seek alliances with political independents and other civil society groups. If they are able to form a common political front, they could in theory capitalize on resentment towards religious parties to compete in the next round of provincial elections. Iranian, Sadrist, and GOI opposition -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Provincial governments in the south are uniformly hostile to these independent movements. Abd al-Aziz Hakim and other ISCI heavyweights have expressed concern over what they admit are unsubstantiated rumors of USG support to southern tribal awakening groups. In meetings with U.S. officials, the ISCI and Da'wa governors of Babil, Najaf, Karbala, and Diwaniyah have repeatedly warned that the absence of al-Qaeda and the presence of ISF and strong BAGHDAD 00000159 002 OF 002 provincial governments make any attempt to replicate the Anbar awakening unnecessary and dangerous. ¶9. (S/NF) Iran opposes any tribal awakening movement and is pursuing its own strategy of tribal engagement. Iran's al-A'lam satellite channel regularly condemns tribal awakening as a U.S. government plot to divide Iraq and undermine the GOI. In a meeting with the REO, Basrah sheiks warned that Iran was recruiting tribal leaders to preempt any U.S. policy of tribal engagement (reftel A). In November, Iran invited 60 sheikhs and family members from Wasit for a 15-day tour of the country that included visits to holy sites and anti-American lectures (reftel B). Reporting suggests that the Sadr movement is likewise opposed to these movements and is trying to infiltrate or suppress movements in Basrah and Maysan. Comment -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Many of the south's tribal leaders are not content with their political and economic circumstances, although the amount of frustration depends on the degree to which political power mirrors tribal power in the south. In the majority of the south the political dominance of the religious parties has marginalized the sheikhs while their tribesmen have become entangled in militia fighting. The sheikhs are also envious of U.S. support for their Sunni counterparts. ¶11. (S/NF) This frustration and envy has led to the appearance of several independent tribal movements throughout the south. It is unclear how much influence and power these movements have, if any, but most seem limited at present to an advocacy and civil service role. The U.S. would likely be aware of any substantial tribal movement, if only because provincial government officials would immediately accuse us of providing the movement support. Many of these leaders are mimicking the organization and rhetoric of the Anbar awakening, albeit against Iran rather than AQI, in hopes of gaining U.S. support. Southern tribes could in theory mobilize against Iranian and militia influence in the same way their Sunni cousins banded together against al-Qaeda. However, as Dawa member and advisor to the Prime Minister Sami al-Askari admitted to us, this would be actively opposed by the GOI and the major religious parties. Absent a radical change in U.S. policy, which would trigger a major confrontation with the government, there is little to no chance of a spontaneous tribal awakening in the south. A slightly more likely possibility is a "political awakening" of tribal leaders participating in the next round of provincial elections. To succeed, a political awakening would have to contend with the considerable organizational and militia strength of the religious parties, who much prefer the tribes continue their slumber. End Comment. CROCKER