IT'S TRIBAL TIES THAT BIND IN NORTHERN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001558 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IR IZ SUBJECT: IT'S TRIBAL TIES THAT BIND IN NORTHERN BAGHDAD PROVINCE REF: BAGHDAD 1005 Classified By: PRT Baghdad Leader Andy Passen for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Baghdad and e-PRT 5 reporting cable. ¶2. (SBU) Introduction: Reconciliation in Baghdad takes many shapes: it can mean dialogue between sects and tribes, acceptance of the Government of Iraq (GOI),and/or cooperation with Coalition Forces. The role of tribal leaders in all of these types of reconciliation is significant and necessitates a full understanding of the complex tribal dynamics in play. This is especially true in the rural "qadas" (counties) of Baghdad province where efforts to further reconciliation have progressed slowly, but steadily over the past year. Traditionally, a tribal sheikh's power is based on lineage, loyalty, and religious authority yet is strengthened primarily through acts of largesse and patronage. In Baghdad today, this traditional role extends to potential control over GOI and USG contracts and newly-established local governing entities. In rural Baghdad communities, reconciliation has brought security and opportunities for political and economic gain, more essential services, and formal recognition by the GOI -- all under the auspices of tribal management. This is the second in a series of cables that examines the evolution of reconciliation in Baghdad province, offering a case study of its development in Tarmiya Qada. End Introduction. ¶3. (C) Summary: A strong tribal reconciliation effort is beginning to have an impact on the political and economic scene in Baghdad Province's Tarmiya Qada -- once a dangerous al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni insurgent stronghold. Since fall 2007, Tarmiya sheikhs and newly-elected local government officials worked in close coordination with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team 25th Infantry Division and its embedded PRT (ePRT-5) to bring reconciliation to the area. However, the lack of any credible GOI involvement failed to facilitate these efforts until very recently. Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) Rural Services Committee (RSC) Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani (reftel) led a delegation of provincial officials to Tarmiya in March 2008 to strengthen the ties between the provincial and local governments and facilitate improved essential services. It was a successful public exchange of information on provincial and local government initiatives to improve services; the visit also made clear the overall strength of tribal influences on fellow tribesman Chairman Mashhedani and in local government. ¶4. (C) Summary Continued. The provincial delegation's visit built on the momentum created by Tarmiya's senior Sunni Sheikh Said Jasim al Mashhedani's recent release from an Iraqi prison and his vow to reunite the sheikhs, join neighboring tribes against AQI, and open Tarmiya to the GOI to provide more essential services. Sheikh Jasim's sway among the tribal sheikhs and his autocratic (almost "Sopranos"-like) control over local government illustrates the need to secure and retain key tribal leaders, cooperation. Yet it also presents a complex problem for the GOI at all levels of government: how to set the conditions to empower sheikhs, influence and control over their tribes to further reconciliation, while working to legitimize the GOI in the eyes of those same tribesmen through some modicum of improvements in services. End Summary. -------------- Tribal Authority Co-Opts Political and Economic Power, But Brings Security -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Tarmiya is an agricultural area 20 miles north of Baghdad City in the heart of the Fertile Crescent along the Tigris River. Almost exclusively Sunni, the qada is home to many former well-to-do Baathists and ousted Iraqi army members. It is primarily populated by the Mashhedani tribe, and intra-tribal rivalries are commonplace. There is considerable influence from Wahhabists, Salafists, and other Sunni religious figures that practice in the area. In 2006, Tarmiya became a safe haven for religious extremists and AQI affiliates, as demonstrated by the Tarmiyah Mujahedeen Shura Council's declaration of independence from the "Shia-dominated central government." In September 2007, AQI brutality and the strict enforcement of Sharia law prompted local sheikhs to commence reconciliation efforts with Coalition Forces. This initiative culminated with the GOI release of an influential sheikh, Said Jasim al Mashhedani, in March 2008. ¶6. (C) Sheikhs from the Mashhedani tribe dominate Tarmiya, and Sheikh Said Jasim - recently released after 11 months in a notorious Ministry of Interior prison - is clearly the most powerful. Jasim (and his sons in his absence) preside over BAGHDAD 00001558 002 OF 003 the Tarmiya Tribal Support Council, which has exerted considerable influence over local government for some time. This council is not the same as the Tribal Support Councils backed by the GOI Implementation and Follow-Up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR). In addition, Jasim and his family control several of the local Sons of Iraq (SOIs) security contracts as well as the local gas station, newspaper, and several businesses in the qada capital. ¶7. (C) The Brigade and ePRT-5 also report that Jasim and his network have attempted, unsuccessfully, to dominate local USG contracts. This security and economic control has now transitioned to political power. Upon his release, Jasim pushed aside the current qada council chairman and established himself in the position, a move that effectively merged the local government with his Tribal Support Council. The local government shortly thereafter voted Jasim into the position officially. Chairman Mashhedani acknowledged to PRTOff that Jasim exerts "too much power," hinting at intimidation. However, Chairman Mashhedani made clear that Jasim is the legitimate, duly-elected Tarmiya Qada Council representative, noting that his actions may not be "perfectly democratic," but are tribally-speaking "quite normal." Though strong arm tactics at first glance, Jasim's authoritarian control has increased security and brought relative peace to Tarmiya. He is now emerging as an entrenched leader who can either bring local tribes and community leaders together or quickly become a thorn in the side of the GOI and Coalition Forces. -------------- -------------- Official Government Attempts to Partner with Tribal Authority -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Prior to Sheikh Jasim's return, the relationship was weak between the provincial government and the Tarmiya Tribal Support Council and local government. The March visit by the provincial delegation to Tarmiya served to bring together key elements of government, yet it also reinforced Sheikh Jasim as the premier leader in the area. The March event oscillated between official government business and tribal obligations. More than a hundred tribal and community leaders attended with Jasim presiding. Rife with tribal symbolism, the Tribal Support Council/local government council meeting began with Jasim's strong speech encouraging all to join together to secure Tarmiya for the good of the community and all of Iraq. He encouraged provincial representatives to take advantage of security to bring projects that improve quality of life and create jobs. Several other tribal leaders echoed Jasim's message. Chairman Mashhedani gave an impassioned plea for unity, reconciliation, and security. Mashhedani explained how the Provincial Council is organized to meet the needs of the people outside of Baghdad City. ¶9. (C) The provincial delegation educated community leaders about the process for identifying, nominating, and approving projects by the Provincial Council, as well as the mechanism for project funding and execution. Chairman Mashhedani emphasized that it is critical for people in the local communities to work through their governing councils to identify critical needs in each area and coordinate project development and execution. Mashhedani commented publicly that the intent of his visit was strictly to assess Tarmiya's needs. Privately, however, he admitted that tribal elders had pressured him to go. In addition to fulfilling his tribal obligations, Chairman Mashhedani informed PRTOff that he relayed to Jasim the importance of shoring up power through legitimate means. Though positive about Jasim's public comments, Chairman Mashhedani hinted that Jasim's reign might not endure long if he does not show himself to be a competent government official and tribal leader. -------------- --- Feelings of Isolation Persist Among Sunni Locals -------------- --- ¶10. (C) The tension between GOI attention and tribal strength was also evident in the provincial delegation's stroll through the Tarmiya market and visit to one boys' and one girls' school. Locals lined up to meet the visiting officials. An enthusiastic street vendor commented: "this is the first time we have seen an official in this area since the fall of the old regime." Children lined up to get a glimpse of the VIPs. Yet overall, locals did not voice much faith in the current GOI. Some tribal leaders commented that "words are nice, but we'll believe it once we see action from the government on projects in Tarmiya." One Iraqi police officer expressed frustration after he and several other former Intelligence officers in the area approached GOI officials about getting their jobs back and were rejected even though they have clean records. He added that "only BAGHDAD 00001558 003 OF 003 connected people are getting these positions." ¶11. (C) Comment: In Baghdad, shoring up tribal support, particularly that of key sheikhs, must run concurrent to efforts to legitimize the local government through improving essential services. Tribal rivalries in Tarmiya and other areas of Baghdad do present real challenges. As some tribal elements move into the political sphere, differences between competing groups are now emerging in anticipation of elections this fall. The Brigade and ePRT-5 report that a major Sunni backlash will ensue if elections do not occur this fall. Expectations are high and any move by the GOI to delay elections will be met by a strong Sunni reaction. ¶12. (C) Comment Continued: Appropriate USG support to tribal elements is not the issue; it is GOI support. In the past, the GOI has not provided essential services to Tarmiya because it was an AQI safe haven. With the onset of reconciliation and security, the GOI is still reluctant to visit these Sunni areas without direct Coalition Force involvement in the meetings. Consequently, the GOI has little credibility in predominantly Sunni areas such as Tarmiya Qada. In addition, there is a precarious balance between Tarmiya's Mashhedani tribes and neighboring tribes primarily as a result of competition over lucrative contracts for SOIs and essential services projects. The Brigade and ePRT-5 continue to engage Jasim as an important part of the Tarmiya political landscape, while reinforcing the importance of the legitimately elected and appointed government as the vehicle through which government services and funding flows. Tribal attempts to strong-arm those elements at the provincial level of government run the risk of back-firing. It remains to be seen what general effect on stability and progress the marriage of the Tarmiya Tribal Support Council and local government will have. One possibility is that the consolidation among tribal leaders and their allies of political and economic power and influence over security comes at the expense of smaller, more peripheral groups. Furthermore, potential corruption and extortion by SOIs and other locals could push some Tarmiya residents to revert to other power brokers such as Coalition Forces or AQI. If effectively engaged, monitored, and watched, Jasim's influence could be leveraged to accomplish many GOI and USG security, essential services, and economic goals. Jasim will first have to prove his credibility as a GOI official in the eyes of his people. End Comment. CROCKER