SCENESETTER FOR NECHIRVAN BARZANI'S VISIT TO

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001526

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NECHIRVAN BARZANI'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON MAY 17-21

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani is visiting Washington on May
17-21 after receiving an honorary degree from Washington and
Jefferson University. His meetings will include the Vice
President, the Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary.
Nechirvan has spearheaded promising economic growth in the
KRG, worked for productive Kurdish relationships with the
Iraqi and neighboring governments, and been a voice of
moderation compared to his sometimes cantankerous uncle, KRG
President Massoud Barzani. The KRG in recent months has
improved its relations with the Maliki government and Turkey,
due largely to Nechirvan,s diplomatic skills and willingness
to compromise, although Kurdish leaders remain reluctant to
take public steps against the PKK or compromise on the final
status of Kirkuk. End summary.

Talking Points For the Vice President's Meeting With
Nechirvan Barzani
-------------- --------------


2. (S) Meeting with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is an opportunity to give a
tough message on passing hydrocarbons legislation. Encourage
him also to regularize KRG talks with Turkey, support the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI) efforts
to resolve disputed internal boundaries, and protect
Christian and other minority communities in KDP-controlled
areas in the North.

National Hydrocarbons Legislation:

- Resolution of the hydrocarbons law is critically important
to achieving our common goal of economic prosperity in Iraq.
When next you meet with PM Maliki, you should be prepared to
reach a complete and written agreement with him on the
hydrocarbons framework law, as well as its companion bills on
revenue sharing, re-organization of the Ministry of Oil, and
re-establishment of the Iraq National Oil Company. All of
this must be on the basis of the February 2007 draft, which
Kurdish ministers approved in the Cabinet and which you
agreed with Prime Minister Maliki was the basis for
negotiation in your meetings with him last month.

- These laws will put Iraq and the KRG on a stable economic
course, and help assure Iraq can take its rightful place as a
major oil-producing country. Your vision for bringing
market-based principles to the oil sector has been sabotaged
and sidetracked too many times before. You need to help the
central government by firmly insisting on concluding an
agreement now, while oil prices are high and political
momentum is behind you. We would like to see the package of
laws ready for submission to the Council of Representatives
by this June, and are willing to help you complete what we
know would be a monumental achievement in any way within our
power.

PKK and Turkey:

- The KRG must continue to improve its relationship and
coordination with Turkey. We welcome your recent meeting
with Turkish Special Advisor Davutoglu and Iraq Envoy Ozcelik
in Baghdad and hope additional meetings will follow,
including between President Massoud Barzani and Turkish
interlocutors. We welcome the steps you have taken to
contain PKK activities, although we encourage more stringent
enforcement. We have also asked the GOT to refrain from
strong public statements and to do more to reach out to KRG
leaders. Ankara and Baghdad are working to institutionalize
a high-level dialogue, which would start with visits by PM
Erdogan and/or President Gul to Iraq in the coming weeks.

Disputed Internal Boundaries:

- Resolution of disputed internal boundaries between the KRG
and GOI, especially the future status of Kirkuk, is
critically important to achieving our common goal of
stability and security in Iraq. UNAMI has been fully engaged
with all concerned parties, and SRSG Staffan de Mistura plans
to brief Iraqi and KRG leadership on his recommendations this
month. (Note: Schedule of meetings with 3 2 will begin on
May 22.) For this plan to work all parties need to be
flexible and willing to compromise; none will get their first
choice.

Protecting Minority Communities in Ninewa:

- The KRG bears heavy responsibility for Christian, Yazidi,
Shabak, and other minority communities because of your
current security and administrative dominance in many of the
disputed areas. You must demonstrate clearly and forcefully

in your public statements and your actions on the ground that
you are willing and able to protect the rights of all
minorities under your control as the transition from GOI to
KRG authority, and vice versa, occurs.

Talking Points for the Secretary's and Deputy's Meetings
With Nechirvan Barzani
-------------- --


3. (S) Meeting with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is an opportunity to give a
tough message on protecting Christians and other religious
minorities in areas bordering the KRG. Nechirvan also should
hear the need for quick passage of hydrocarbons legislation,
more KRG talks with Turkey, and KRG support for the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI) efforts to
resolve disputed internal boundaries.

Protecting Minority Communities in Ninewa:

- The KRG bears heavy responsibility for Christian, Yazidi,
Shabak, and other minority communities because of your
current security and administrative dominance in many of the
DIBs. You must demonstrate clearly and forcefully in your
public statements and your actions on the ground that you are
willing and able to protect the rights of all minorities
under your control as the transition from GOI to KRG
authority, and vice versa, occurs

- We are especially troubled by repeated, multiple complaints
from minority communities currently bordering the KRG that
local KRG officials and security forces are denying
minorities jobs, preventing them from participating in their
own security, confiscating property, and forcibly displacing
them from their homes. You must order local KRG officials to
stop these abuses. They are harming people who have a stake
and who must have a say in the future, in addition to the
KRG,s image in Iraq and internationally. They make it all
the more difficult for UNAMI,s recommendations to be
acceptable to others, especially Sunni and Shia leaders in
Baghdad.

- Especially worrisome are the security of the Christian,
Shabak, and Yazidi communities in Ninawa province. The KRG
has a responsibility to work together with GOI and local
security to guarantee the safety of these embattled
minorities.

National Hydrocarbons Legislation:

- Resolution of the hydrocarbons law is critically important
to achieving our common goal of economic prosperity in Iraq.
When next you meet with PM Maliki, you should be prepared to
reach a complete and written agreement with him on the
hydrocarbons framework law, as well as its companion bills on
revenue sharing, re-organization of the Ministry of Oil, and
re-establishment of the Iraq National Oil Company. We would
like to see the package of laws ready for submission to the
Council of Representatives by this June, and are willing to
help you complete what we know would be a monumental
achievement in any way within our power.

PKK and Turkey:

- The KRG must continue to improve its relationship and
coordination with Turkey. We welcome your recent meeting
with Turkish Special Advisor Davutoglu and Iraq Envoy Ozcelik
in Baghdad and hope additional meetings will follow,
including between President Massoud Barzani and Turkish
interlocutors. We welcome the steps you have taken to
contain PKK activities, although we encourage more stringent
enforcement. We have also asked the GOT to refrain from
strong public statements and to do more to reach out to KRG
leaders. Ankara and Baghdad are working to institutionalize
a high-level dialogue, which would start with visits by PM
Erdogan and/or President Gul to Iraq in the coming weeks.

Disputed Boundaries:

- Resolution of disputed internal boundaries between the KRG
and GOI, especially the future status of Kirkuk, is
critically important to achieving our common goal of
stability and security in Iraq. UNAMI has been fully engaged
with all concerned parties, and SRSG Staffan de Mistura plans
to brief Iraqi and KRG leadership on his recommendations this
month. (Note: Schedule of meetings with 3 2 will begin on
May 22.) For this plan to work all parties need to be
flexible and willing to compromise; none will get their first
choice.

Background on Nechirvan Barzani
--------------



4. (C) Nechirvan Barzani is a young, pragmatic, generally
effective Iraqi leader. He is in his third year as KRG Prime
Minister -- he was due to cede the position in December under
a political agreement between the two major Kurdish parties,
but near-universal acclaim for his performance in power
helped him keep the job. Long service in the Peshmerga, the
Kurdish security force which for decades fought Saddah
Hussein, gives him credibility with the Kurdish public, and
his intelligence is palpable despite his limited formal
schooling. Nechirvan has overseen a largely successful KRG
economic policy, which has begun to transform the KRG capital
of Erbil into a cosmopolitan business hub, and claims to
oppose Kurdish separatism because of the economic benefits of
remaining part of Iraq. An affinity for Turkey distinguishes
the Prime Minister among Kurdish leaders -- he considers the
lucrative trade relationship with his northern neighbor one
of the Kurdish region,s greatest potential assets, their
rocky political relationship notwithstanding. Nechirvan
speaks good English but usually conducts the bulk of his
meetings in Kurdish with a translator.

Hydrocarbon Talks Restart As KRG-GOI Ties Improve
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Kurds and GOI have restarted progress on
hydrocarbon legislation, but are in danger of losing
political momentum. Nechirvan,s visit to Baghdad last month
produced an agreement to negotiate based on the February 2007
draft of the legislation, and the Kurds subsequently claim to
have distilled their dozens of objections to that draft down
to just a few key points. We were disappointed Nechirvan did
not revisit Baghdad to continue talks before his Washington
trip, however, and it is important he do so as soon as
possible while the KRG,s relationship with Maliki is good
and both sides express willingness to work for a
breakthrough. Nechirvan says he currently plans to visit
Baghdad in early June and hopes to present the Kurds,
revision of the February draft to the Prime Minister
personally, for fear that Maliki,s aides (whom he suspects
of opposing hydrocarbon legislation altogether) will
otherwise prejudice him against it.


6. (C) Relations between the GOI and KRG have improved
significantly since late March. The Kurds in late 2007 were
frustrated with Maliki to the point of trying to remove him
from office, but enthusiastically supported Maliki,s Basrah
operation as the kind of decisive leadership they had
demanded for months. Massoud Barzani called Maliki to
support him during the uncertain early days of the operation,
their first personal contact after a year of increasingly
antagonistic relations. Maliki reciprocated by spending a
night at Barzani,s compound in early April, resulting in a
far warmer climate during Nechirvan,s mid-April visit to
Baghdad than during his similar visit in December.

KRG and Turkey Mending Fences
--------------


7. (C) Nechirvan has led the way on warming relations with
Turkey, including on the key issue of combating the
Turkish-Kurdish terrorist group PKK. Attacks on Turkish
soldiers by PKK fighters based in the northern Iraqi
mountains set off months of Turkish airstrikes and one major
ground operation which infuriated Massoud Barzani and have
strained GOT-KRG relations. The KRG took a few measures in
late 2007 to contain the PKK -- checkpoints on roads into the
mountains, enhanced airport screening, financial
interdictions -- which demonstrated good faith, although we
urge the KRG to implement them more strenuously. More
recently, Nechirvan met in Baghdad with Turkey,s special
envoy for Iraq Murat Ozcelik -- the first ever high-level
meeting between Turkish and KRG leaders. This has already
led to tentative information sharing against the PKK. We
urge both sides to institutionalize this dialogue; Nechirvan
is an optimist on mending fences with Turkey and will be
receptive to this message.

KRG Obstinate On Kirkuk and Disputed Territories
-------------- ---


8. (C) The KRG remains generally rigid on the disputed
territories designated for resolution under Article 140. On
the positive side, the KRG has accepted UN assistance to
resolve disputed territories, acknowledged that resolving
Kirkuk will take months or years, and stated publicly that a
political agreement might be a viable means of resolving
these disputes, as opposed to insisting on a contentious and
logistically grueling referendum. On the other hand, even
Nechirvan and other moderate Kurdish leaders refuse
compromise on the KRG ultimately annexing Kirkuk, a
proposition the city,s other ethnic communities oppose with

equal fervor. We encourage the KRG and all other groups to
accept that none of them will get their first choice on such
contentious issues, and all must be willing to compromise.


9. (C) Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, and other minority groups
on the Ninewa plain complain of mistreatment by officials
from Nechirvan,s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The
districts in which these groups are concentrated -- notably
Hamdaniya, Telkaif, and Sinjar -- are among the Article 140
disputed areas, and the Kurds exert heavy influence over them
in part to maximize their leverage as negotiations unfold.
Christians in Hamdaniya, for example, have complained
repeatedly of intimidation and opaque arrests by Kurdish
intelligence and military officers, and economic
discrimination by the disproportionately Kurdish provincial
government. Many now vehemently oppose joining the KRG.
Nechirvan and other Kurdish leaders do not necessarily
condone their subordinates, excesses, but they need to hear
that they are unacceptable and make KRG annexation of these
territories less, not more, likely.
CROCKER