SCENESETTER FOR NECHIRVAN BARZANI'S VISIT TO

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001526 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NECHIRVAN BARZANI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON MAY 17-21 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is visiting Washington on May 17-21 after receiving an honorary degree from Washington and Jefferson University. His meetings will include the Vice President, the Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary. Nechirvan has spearheaded promising economic growth in the KRG, worked for productive Kurdish relationships with the Iraqi and neighboring governments, and been a voice of moderation compared to his sometimes cantankerous uncle, KRG President Massoud Barzani. The KRG in recent months has improved its relations with the Maliki government and Turkey, due largely to Nechirvan,s diplomatic skills and willingness to compromise, although Kurdish leaders remain reluctant to take public steps against the PKK or compromise on the final status of Kirkuk. End summary. Talking Points For the Vice President's Meeting With Nechirvan Barzani -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Meeting with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is an opportunity to give a tough message on passing hydrocarbons legislation. Encourage him also to regularize KRG talks with Turkey, support the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI) efforts to resolve disputed internal boundaries, and protect Christian and other minority communities in KDP-controlled areas in the North. National Hydrocarbons Legislation: - Resolution of the hydrocarbons law is critically important to achieving our common goal of economic prosperity in Iraq. When next you meet with PM Maliki, you should be prepared to reach a complete and written agreement with him on the hydrocarbons framework law, as well as its companion bills on revenue sharing, re-organization of the Ministry of Oil, and re-establishment of the Iraq National Oil Company. All of this must be on the basis of the February 2007 draft, which Kurdish ministers approved in the Cabinet and which you agreed with Prime Minister Maliki was the basis for negotiation in your meetings with him last month. - These laws will put Iraq and the KRG on a stable economic course, and help assure Iraq can take its rightful place as a major oil-producing country. Your vision for bringing market-based principles to the oil sector has been sabotaged and sidetracked too many times before. You need to help the central government by firmly insisting on concluding an agreement now, while oil prices are high and political momentum is behind you. We would like to see the package of laws ready for submission to the Council of Representatives by this June, and are willing to help you complete what we know would be a monumental achievement in any way within our power. PKK and Turkey: - The KRG must continue to improve its relationship and coordination with Turkey. We welcome your recent meeting with Turkish Special Advisor Davutoglu and Iraq Envoy Ozcelik in Baghdad and hope additional meetings will follow, including between President Massoud Barzani and Turkish interlocutors. We welcome the steps you have taken to contain PKK activities, although we encourage more stringent enforcement. We have also asked the GOT to refrain from strong public statements and to do more to reach out to KRG leaders. Ankara and Baghdad are working to institutionalize a high-level dialogue, which would start with visits by PM Erdogan and/or President Gul to Iraq in the coming weeks. Disputed Internal Boundaries: - Resolution of disputed internal boundaries between the KRG and GOI, especially the future status of Kirkuk, is critically important to achieving our common goal of stability and security in Iraq. UNAMI has been fully engaged with all concerned parties, and SRSG Staffan de Mistura plans to brief Iraqi and KRG leadership on his recommendations this month. (Note: Schedule of meetings with 3 2 will begin on May 22.) For this plan to work all parties need to be flexible and willing to compromise; none will get their first choice. Protecting Minority Communities in Ninewa: - The KRG bears heavy responsibility for Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, and other minority communities because of your current security and administrative dominance in many of the disputed areas. You must demonstrate clearly and forcefully in your public statements and your actions on the ground that you are willing and able to protect the rights of all minorities under your control as the transition from GOI to KRG authority, and vice versa, occurs. Talking Points for the Secretary's and Deputy's Meetings With Nechirvan Barzani -------------- -- ¶3. (S) Meeting with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is an opportunity to give a tough message on protecting Christians and other religious minorities in areas bordering the KRG. Nechirvan also should hear the need for quick passage of hydrocarbons legislation, more KRG talks with Turkey, and KRG support for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI) efforts to resolve disputed internal boundaries. Protecting Minority Communities in Ninewa: - The KRG bears heavy responsibility for Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, and other minority communities because of your current security and administrative dominance in many of the DIBs. You must demonstrate clearly and forcefully in your public statements and your actions on the ground that you are willing and able to protect the rights of all minorities under your control as the transition from GOI to KRG authority, and vice versa, occurs - We are especially troubled by repeated, multiple complaints from minority communities currently bordering the KRG that local KRG officials and security forces are denying minorities jobs, preventing them from participating in their own security, confiscating property, and forcibly displacing them from their homes. You must order local KRG officials to stop these abuses. They are harming people who have a stake and who must have a say in the future, in addition to the KRG,s image in Iraq and internationally. They make it all the more difficult for UNAMI,s recommendations to be acceptable to others, especially Sunni and Shia leaders in Baghdad. - Especially worrisome are the security of the Christian, Shabak, and Yazidi communities in Ninawa province. The KRG has a responsibility to work together with GOI and local security to guarantee the safety of these embattled minorities. National Hydrocarbons Legislation: - Resolution of the hydrocarbons law is critically important to achieving our common goal of economic prosperity in Iraq. When next you meet with PM Maliki, you should be prepared to reach a complete and written agreement with him on the hydrocarbons framework law, as well as its companion bills on revenue sharing, re-organization of the Ministry of Oil, and re-establishment of the Iraq National Oil Company. We would like to see the package of laws ready for submission to the Council of Representatives by this June, and are willing to help you complete what we know would be a monumental achievement in any way within our power. PKK and Turkey: - The KRG must continue to improve its relationship and coordination with Turkey. We welcome your recent meeting with Turkish Special Advisor Davutoglu and Iraq Envoy Ozcelik in Baghdad and hope additional meetings will follow, including between President Massoud Barzani and Turkish interlocutors. We welcome the steps you have taken to contain PKK activities, although we encourage more stringent enforcement. We have also asked the GOT to refrain from strong public statements and to do more to reach out to KRG leaders. Ankara and Baghdad are working to institutionalize a high-level dialogue, which would start with visits by PM Erdogan and/or President Gul to Iraq in the coming weeks. Disputed Boundaries: - Resolution of disputed internal boundaries between the KRG and GOI, especially the future status of Kirkuk, is critically important to achieving our common goal of stability and security in Iraq. UNAMI has been fully engaged with all concerned parties, and SRSG Staffan de Mistura plans to brief Iraqi and KRG leadership on his recommendations this month. (Note: Schedule of meetings with 3 2 will begin on May 22.) For this plan to work all parties need to be flexible and willing to compromise; none will get their first choice. Background on Nechirvan Barzani -------------- ¶4. (C) Nechirvan Barzani is a young, pragmatic, generally effective Iraqi leader. He is in his third year as KRG Prime Minister -- he was due to cede the position in December under a political agreement between the two major Kurdish parties, but near-universal acclaim for his performance in power helped him keep the job. Long service in the Peshmerga, the Kurdish security force which for decades fought Saddah Hussein, gives him credibility with the Kurdish public, and his intelligence is palpable despite his limited formal schooling. Nechirvan has overseen a largely successful KRG economic policy, which has begun to transform the KRG capital of Erbil into a cosmopolitan business hub, and claims to oppose Kurdish separatism because of the economic benefits of remaining part of Iraq. An affinity for Turkey distinguishes the Prime Minister among Kurdish leaders -- he considers the lucrative trade relationship with his northern neighbor one of the Kurdish region,s greatest potential assets, their rocky political relationship notwithstanding. Nechirvan speaks good English but usually conducts the bulk of his meetings in Kurdish with a translator. Hydrocarbon Talks Restart As KRG-GOI Ties Improve -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Kurds and GOI have restarted progress on hydrocarbon legislation, but are in danger of losing political momentum. Nechirvan,s visit to Baghdad last month produced an agreement to negotiate based on the February 2007 draft of the legislation, and the Kurds subsequently claim to have distilled their dozens of objections to that draft down to just a few key points. We were disappointed Nechirvan did not revisit Baghdad to continue talks before his Washington trip, however, and it is important he do so as soon as possible while the KRG,s relationship with Maliki is good and both sides express willingness to work for a breakthrough. Nechirvan says he currently plans to visit Baghdad in early June and hopes to present the Kurds, revision of the February draft to the Prime Minister personally, for fear that Maliki,s aides (whom he suspects of opposing hydrocarbon legislation altogether) will otherwise prejudice him against it. ¶6. (C) Relations between the GOI and KRG have improved significantly since late March. The Kurds in late 2007 were frustrated with Maliki to the point of trying to remove him from office, but enthusiastically supported Maliki,s Basrah operation as the kind of decisive leadership they had demanded for months. Massoud Barzani called Maliki to support him during the uncertain early days of the operation, their first personal contact after a year of increasingly antagonistic relations. Maliki reciprocated by spending a night at Barzani,s compound in early April, resulting in a far warmer climate during Nechirvan,s mid-April visit to Baghdad than during his similar visit in December. KRG and Turkey Mending Fences -------------- ¶7. (C) Nechirvan has led the way on warming relations with Turkey, including on the key issue of combating the Turkish-Kurdish terrorist group PKK. Attacks on Turkish soldiers by PKK fighters based in the northern Iraqi mountains set off months of Turkish airstrikes and one major ground operation which infuriated Massoud Barzani and have strained GOT-KRG relations. The KRG took a few measures in late 2007 to contain the PKK -- checkpoints on roads into the mountains, enhanced airport screening, financial interdictions -- which demonstrated good faith, although we urge the KRG to implement them more strenuously. More recently, Nechirvan met in Baghdad with Turkey,s special envoy for Iraq Murat Ozcelik -- the first ever high-level meeting between Turkish and KRG leaders. This has already led to tentative information sharing against the PKK. We urge both sides to institutionalize this dialogue; Nechirvan is an optimist on mending fences with Turkey and will be receptive to this message. KRG Obstinate On Kirkuk and Disputed Territories -------------- --- ¶8. (C) The KRG remains generally rigid on the disputed territories designated for resolution under Article 140. On the positive side, the KRG has accepted UN assistance to resolve disputed territories, acknowledged that resolving Kirkuk will take months or years, and stated publicly that a political agreement might be a viable means of resolving these disputes, as opposed to insisting on a contentious and logistically grueling referendum. On the other hand, even Nechirvan and other moderate Kurdish leaders refuse compromise on the KRG ultimately annexing Kirkuk, a proposition the city,s other ethnic communities oppose with equal fervor. We encourage the KRG and all other groups to accept that none of them will get their first choice on such contentious issues, and all must be willing to compromise. ¶9. (C) Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, and other minority groups on the Ninewa plain complain of mistreatment by officials from Nechirvan,s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The districts in which these groups are concentrated -- notably Hamdaniya, Telkaif, and Sinjar -- are among the Article 140 disputed areas, and the Kurds exert heavy influence over them in part to maximize their leverage as negotiations unfold. Christians in Hamdaniya, for example, have complained repeatedly of intimidation and opaque arrests by Kurdish intelligence and military officers, and economic discrimination by the disproportionately Kurdish provincial government. Many now vehemently oppose joining the KRG. Nechirvan and other Kurdish leaders do not necessarily condone their subordinates, excesses, but they need to hear that they are unacceptable and make KRG annexation of these territories less, not more, likely. CROCKER