IRAQ'S SWIRLING SUNNI STREET: UPCOMING ELECTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001509 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PTER PINR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SWIRLING SUNNI STREET: UPCOMING ELECTIONS SPARK FLURRY OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY REF: A. BAGHDAD 1423 (ELECTIONS UPDATE) ¶B. BAGHDAD 1407 (TAWAFUQ TENSIONS) ¶C. BAGHDAD 1334 (ANBAR MOSQUES' ROLE) ¶D. BAGHDAD 1299 (BAGHDAD PROVINCE) ¶E. BAGHDAD 1242(NOTAL) (SUNNI WAQF CHIEF) ¶F. BAGHDAD 1175(NOTAL) (IIP RAFIE ESSAWI) ¶G. BAGHDAD 1087 (SALEH MUTLAQ) ¶H. BAGHDAD 432 (SUNNIS ON CLCS) ¶I. BAGHDAD 425 (ANBAR THREATS TO IIP) Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) In a particularly encouraging development, the Sunni Arab community appears increasingly reconciled to competing in the formal political process, despite its many misgivings related to that process. Preparations for provincial elections later this year have set in motion a dizzying scramble in the Sunni Arab political community to organize new parties and coalitions to position themselves for maximum impact. For the first time, "Awakening" groups such as the Sahawat al Iraq in Anbar Province have entered the political fray and will greatly impact the direction taken by the Sunni political community. Established political parties, those which chose to participate in earlier elections, are attempting to appropriate newer groupings, cognizant that public opinion is genuinely negative toward the established order. Nonetheless, these parties are the same ones helping to shape the debate on elections legislation and its implementation - presumably as much to their advantage as possible. Within this scramble, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is trying to maintain its pre-eminence among Sunni parties, but is losing key members and is defending against a large number of competitors. Community leaders, such as the Chief of the Sunni Waqf, are working to rally support for candidates who project a nationalist, anti-Iran agenda. Prevention of violence among and between these groups will remain a challenge, as many of them are armed, frustrated, and ready to believe that the deck is stacked against them. It will be crucial to manage their expectations, reminding them that one election will not fix all of Iraq's wrongs; only with sustained party-building and institutional capacity will Iraq's democratic process gain traction and restore stability. End Summary. -------------- Sunni Arab Elections Scramble -------------- ¶2. (S) More so than at any time since 2003, the Sunni Arab political community is alive with debate and positioning, in anticipation of coming provincial elections later this year (REF A). While rejectionist groups still exist and threaten from the margins, it appears clear that a growing number of Iraq's Sunnis are looking to the constitutional political process, vice insurgency as the way forward. The emergence of "Awakening" groups, such as in Anbar province, have helped transform the Sunni's strategic political narrative, particularly among influential tribal communities outside Baghdad. Continued Coalition support for this process, including successful transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remains a critical issue for Sunni leaders (REF H). Political party leaders such as VP Hashimi, Adnan Dulaymi, Saleh Mutlaq, and others are working hard to attract these groups into partnerships for the coming elections. Early indications from the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) suggest that there will be at least 20 parties registered for the elections. The average Iraqi Sunni, disappointed by the current government's lack of effectiveness (including the Tawafuq Front's boycott and continued marginalization),will be looking to these political parties to help restore security, government services, and a sense of national and communal pride to an otherwise dejected Sunni Arab population. -------------- Shaping The Rules Of The Game -------------- ¶3. (S) Despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with the present slate of political parties, these same parties are currently striving to shape the rules of the game for the coming elections. This includes the key Provincial Powers Law passed in March, and the provincial elections legislation currently working its way through Parliament. New parties and independents wanting "in" will have to play by the complicated set of new rules, hoping that the United Nations, foreign embassies, and international organizations will BAGHDAD 00001509 002 OF 004 nonetheless take an active role in fostering the conditions for a level playing field. The expertise and experience of the established parties, combined with their access to state resources and their influence over legislation and implementation may motivate some new parties to seek partnerships with older parties, much as a foreign company might partner with a local one to gain footing in a new market. Contacts confirm that the IIP and other Sunni leaders are actively courting the Sahwa groups, hoping to benefit from their street credibility in predominantly Sunni areas. Threats of violence directed at the IIP earlier in the year by a pair of Anbar sheikhs, while assessed as unlikely to be carried out (REF I),reveal the emotional and volatile nature of the coming competition among Sunni politicians. -------------- Established Sunni Parties/Movements -------------- ¶4. (S) The Iraqi Islamic Party. The IIP, begun in the 1960's in Iraq as the local version of the Egyptian-styled Muslim Brotherhood, was among the earliest groups to join the new, post-war political process, earning the wrath from much of the secular, Baathist resistance, along with more radicalized Islamic groups like Al Qaida which considered participation in the political process as heretical. The IIP is characterized by an urban, educated, and conservative Islamic elite that has provided much of the organizational strength behind the Tawafuq Front coalition of three Sunni political parties (led by Hashimi, Dulaymi, and Allyan). Through its participation in the 2005 provincial elections, the party won a disproportionate number of Anbar's Council seats and, as a result, has been able to ensconce itself in local institutions of governance there. Tribal leaders complain that the IIP has monopolized provincial funding, and has unfairly directed resources to its supporters. The IIP disclaims affiliation with any armed groups, though is accused of having ties to Hamas Iraq, especially in Diyala Province. The IIP's leader, Vice President Tareq al Hashimi, a former Colonel in the Iraqi Army, heads the party's 12-member Politburo, a group that deliberates on major policy-related questions. Hashimi has been the primary negotiator for the Tawafuq Front in talks to draft the August 26 communiqu and the November 26 Statement of Principles associated with the US-Iraq Strategic Framework talks. Despite the party's strong ideological roots and organizational prowess, at least two key IIP figures recently declared their intention to bolt the party (REF F), suggesting internal turmoil. ¶5. (S) Iraqi People's Conference. The IPC, run by Sunni Tawafuq bloc leader Dr. Adnan al-Dulaymi is represented by eight members of Parliament, with a support base located mostly in Northwest Baghdad and Anbar Province. Representing the powerful Dulaymi tribal confederation, Dr. Adnan earlier played an important role in narrowing the gap between acceptance of the political process and the Sunni insurgency. Of late, the septuagenarian has been weakened by the arrest/detention of his son and personal security detail, arrested on terrorism charges late last year. His deputy, CoR Member Thafer al-Ani, told POLOFF on May 13 that Dulaymi may depart permanently for Jordan, fearing threats by CoR Speaker Mashadani that his parliamentary immunity may be lifted. Al-Ani said Dulaymi asked him to assume control over the IPC and its assets. Al-Ani said he was inclined to let the party die, and that he would likely join forces with a new party being organized by a member of Parliament from Fallujah and a group of Iraqi parliamentarians and intellectuals, including the IIP's Rafie al-Essawi. ¶6. (S) The Hewar Movement. Headed by former Baath Party-connected businessman Dr. Saleh Mutlaq (REF G),Hewar and its 11 parliament members represent a wide array of nationalist figures from around the country, the majority of whom seem bent on returning the country to its pre-OIF state. Although Mutlaq himself welcomes dialogue with CF interlocutors, his party faithful are generally hostile toward the USG, seeing OIF as having paved the way for Iranian domination of the country. The party has a very weak organizational structure with few offices, few staff, and no armed wing directly associated with the party (though clearly sympathetic toward the former regime and Baath party). Mutlaq told POLOFF on May 12 that he believed the Baath Party was re-assembling in exile and gaining in strength both inside and outside the country. Mutlaq believes his party retains tremendous street appeal, but lamented that the group has not been able to deliver much to the average citizen over the past years. He has sought CF protection to campaign in places like Fallujah where he owns a home, and where he feels he would be murdered were he to return without protection. Mutlaq is seeking to pair up with Sahwa groups in coming BAGHDAD 00001509 003 OF 004 elections, but appears to be making only modest headway. In any case, with US interlocutors, he has been hesitant to reveal his campaign strategy. ¶7. (S) Arab Independent Bloc. A fairly quiet and diverse group represented by roughly ten members of parliament, the AIB had recently joined forces with Mutlaq's Hewar Movement, only to split on bad terms citing frustration over Mutlaq's management style. It remains to be seen how the group will participate in the coming provincial elections. In any case, its leader, Abd al-Mutlaq, is likely to remain active in Iraqi politics and will continue to attract supporters from his home town of Mosul and elsewhere. ¶8. (S) Other Emerging Groups. CoR Member Salman al-Jumayli shared with POLOFF on May 13 his plans to launch the National Future Gathering, along with the IIP's Dr. Rafie al-Essawi and a multi-ethnic slate of intellectuals from across the country. The party, he said, was formally registered with the IHEC and would run candidates in most provinces. Acknowledging the long road ahead, Jumayli believed his secular, cross-sectarian party and those like it would eventually supplant religious parties that he believed had failed to serve the Iraqi people. He explicitly disavowed linkages to the IIP, despite his earlier cooperation ("not membership") with the group, and his partnership with al-Essawi. Another IIP figure, Tribal Advisor to VP Hashimi, Omar al-Jaboori, also reportedly left the party and plans to organize a party of his own (the Independent National Tribal Authority) to compete in provincial elections. Jaboori earlier told POLOFF that he felt alienated from the IIP and preferred to work alongside his tribal compatriots and Sahwa groups. -------------- Sahwas and Sons of Iraq -------------- ¶9. (S) Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha in Anbar best symbolizes the emergence in the past year of tribal groups which helped fight off Al Qaida to reclaim control of their communities. Ahmed and his group recently confirmed successful completion of the application process to run in upcoming provincial elections. Their ambitions are high, as they seek to earn a stronger role in administering Anbar provincial government and beyond. Ahmed earlier offered PM Maliki to provide replacement ministers for the Tawafuq bloc that departed government last summer, signaling his desire to play politics beyond the confines of Anbar. ¶10. (S) The emergence of Sahwa groups in Anbar, Salah ad Din, Diyala, Baghdad and elsewhere and the restoration of security has prompted many of their leaders to enter the political fold. For example, Abu Azzam, a former field commander for the Islamic Army, has reportedly formed a political party and intends to contest provincial elections this year. Abu Abid, another well-known street-tough from Baghdad, also has political ambitions, and is rumored to be organizing a party of his own. It is not clear how reports that arrest warrants have been recently issued by the GOI on both of them will impact their candidacies or political futures. -------------- The Sunni Waqf, Religious Influences -------------- ¶11. (S) The head of the Sunni Endowment (or, "Waqf"),Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samaraie, is working to organize Sahwa leaders, tribal leaders, and religious figures into support blocs to promote a nationalist, cross-sectarian agenda (Ref E). These groups, he says, will be encouraged to support political leaders who commit to these principles. The most important motivating factor, he explains, is to challenge malign Iranian influence in Iraq. His efforts, while couched in acceptable language, are viewed with suspicion by many Shia. Samaraie's connections in many neighboring Arab states are also of concern to the Shia-dominated government. Nevertheless, the role of religious leaders like Samaraie to defeat extremist Islamic groups like al-Qaida, though not well understood, has been a critical step in restoring security to many Sunni communities (REF C). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) Expectations run high among Sunni contacts (perhaps unrealistically) that the coming elections will redress many of the pent-up frustrations and problems that have accumulated over the past few years in Sunni areas. Our consistent message in the coming period should warn against BAGHDAD 00001509 004 OF 004 violent competition, and counsel that building democratic institutions will take many years and many elections. The various power centers of the Sunni community are still widely divided (secularists, Baathists, Islamists, insurgents, etc), but continue to move closer together in terms of growing acceptance of the political process as the proper avenue of competition for power and influence. End Comment. CROCKER