MCNS ON MAY 11 REVIEWS SADR CITY AND MOSUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001503 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: MCNS ON MAY 11 REVIEWS SADR CITY AND MOSUL OPERATIONS, FUNDING MOI REF: BAGHDAD 01468 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S REL AS UK) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chaired the May 11 Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS). The committee reviewed military operations in Sadr City (Baghdad) and in Mosul (Ninewa Province). Operations will continue in Sadr City, Maliki declared, until the criminal militias comply with his government,s conditions, despite attempts by militias to delay GOI action. In reviewing the need to provide the Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) with the resources needed to better control the border and make permanent successes against terrorists and militias, the Commanding General of MNF-I, General David Petraeus, and the Deputy Minister of Interior (MOI) spoke out forcefully regarding the Ministry of Finance's (MOF) continued refusal to release funds to the MOI. MOF, MOI, and MNF-I agreed to meet Monday, May 12, to resolve this issue. End Summary. Sadr City Operations Continue -------------- ¶2. (S REL AS UK) Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made it clear those operations in Baghdad's Sadr City against Special Groups and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) criminal elements would continue. (Note: Throughout the discussion, Maliki made no distinction between Special Groups and the JAM fighters. End note.) He stated that the government does not negotiate with militias or with criminals. He reiterated the GOI's demands that the militias disarm, adhere to the rule of law, respect the authority of GOI forces in Sadr City, and acquiesce to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) searching for medium and heavy weapons and IEDs. He characterized delays by Sadr City representatives to identify all IEDs to Iraqi Security Forces as a tactic to put off GOI action, observing that such tactics would allow the militias to remove IEDs and re-emplace them elsewhere at another time. ¶3. (S REL AS UK) Prime Minister Maliki reported that the GOI had relayed to the Sadr City representatives that ISF personnel would remove the IEDs located and identified by the militia. The willingness of the militias to be accompanied by ISF to conduct IED removal this way would reveal the militias' seriousness about laying down their arms and complying with the provisions of the agreement. He made clear that the GOI was willing to open the streets in Sadr City to allow greater freedom of movement of the citizenry, but that the ISF would patrol the streets and conduct rigorous searches for weapons. ¶4. (S REL AS UK) A general discussion ensued on the right of Iraqi citizens to have a weapon in their homes and steps to register or license keeping a weapon at home or carrying it outside the home. Minister of State for National Security (MSNS) Wa'eli observed that the GOI was giving the militia fighters an opportunity to turn in their medium and heavy weapons. The Deputy MOI remarked that if militia weapons were acquired through a "buy-back" program, the militia fighters might only use the money to acquire better arms. He called for confiscating unlicensed weapons. Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdul Qadr cautioned patience, reminding the committee that, since the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority, all Iraqi families were entitled to keep one assault rifle in the home. The Commander of Iragi Ground Forces, Babakir Shawkt, suggested inviting citizens to register their weapons. The PM said that requiring ordinary citizens to register or license weapons kept in their homes should be deferred for the time being - the ISF should concentrate on pursuing the militias to get weapons off the streets. ¶5. (S REL AS UK) General Petraeus solicited clarification from the PM whether operations would continue in Sadr City, noting that Coalition Forces (CF) were prepared to provide support to the ISF. The PM replied that by not pointing out their IEDs to the ISF, the militias were playing with the GOI - yes, operations would continue he said. General Petraeus then stated that the Coalition was fully ready to support Iraqi operations if the militias did not honor their commitments. Intensifying Operation in Mosul -------------- ¶6. (S REL AS UK) The PM expressed some annoyance that word had leaked out on the start of counter-terrorist operations in Mosul. Regardless, it was time to proceed with the operation and clean out the remaining Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) BAGHDAD 00001503 002 OF 002 and other elements. The Minister Qadr noted that 160 terrorist criminals had been arrested to date. ¶7. (S REL AS UK) General Petraeus congratulated the GOI and its leaders on intensifying the operations in Mosul and throughout Ninewa province. He emphasized that this was an intensification, noting that the Mosul operation had been progressing steadily for some time under the competent direction of LTG Riyad. He added that the coordination of joint action of the Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) was going well - the operations had made real progress both in Mosul and against AQI elements controlling lines of infiltration from Syria. The next step will be to cut off AQI access to resources from various criminal activities such as illegal checkpoints, black market fuel schemes and gas stations, and extortion enterprises. ¶8. (S REL AS UK) The PM remarked that the operation in Ninewa would be different than Basra. He assessed that Ninewa required cleaning out pockets of resistance wherever they are, which will take time. He stressed the need to continue cleaning out the pockets and not letting up as the number of targets declined. Part of the ongoing work, he remarked, would be to establish intelligence cells in the police stations. The Director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) presented a chart detailing identified targets and the cells they directed. At General Petraeus, request, he agreed to pass this to the Director of MOI's Counter-Terrorism Bureau. The PM asked that the information be passed as quickly as possible to the Operations Center in Mosul. The Director of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau stated that he would send the targets to General Riyad electronically. General Petraeus offered to have MNF-I transmit the information securely and quickly via electronic mean. Maliki closed his comments with a call for the Ports of Entry (POEs) to be better organized, resourced, and staffed. ¶9. (S REL AS UK) The MOD reported that Army and Police units had done well working together, but that the porosity of the border made it difficult to sustain counter-terrorism success. The INIS Director underlined the support that AQI gets from Syria, and from Iran via Syria. He argued that better border control is of paramount importance. These remarks led to several suggestions on how to better control the border. Undermining improvements was the continued refusal of the Ministry of Finance to release funds to the MOI. The Prime Minister expressed surprise that the $216 million for the Department of Border Enforcement discussed at the previous MCNS had not been disbursed to the MOI. Finance Ministry Must Release MOI Funds -------------- ¶10. (S REL AS UK) General Petraeus stated forcefully that the continued denial of funds to MOI was delaying the acquisition of needed equipment, not only for the DBE, but also for all elements of the MOI. He noted that each week that passes without funds being transferred to the MOI is another week's delay in equipment reaching the MOI. The Deputy MOI seconded General Petraeus' remarks; the MOD later added his voice to theirs. The Minister of Finance protested that he needed signed contracts in hand before he could disburse funds. It was agreed that the MNSTC-I Commanding General, Lieutenant General James Dubik, would meet with the Ministers of Finance and of Interior on Monday, May 12 to resolve the matter. Protecting Pilgrims and Basra Clean up -------------- ¶11. (S REL AS UK) The Committee also heard that planning was beginning for providing protection to pilgrims who will travel to Najaf and Karbala later in the year for major Muslim festivals. The PM also asked what progress was being made on delivering services to people in Basra. The Minister of Finance noted that he could not disburse funds for Basra reconstruction projects until an account for the reconstruction funds was established by someone of ministerial rank. CROCKER