DE MISTURA PLANS MAY 22 DIB ANNOUNCEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001489

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN IZ
SUBJECT: DE MISTURA PLANS MAY 22 DIB ANNOUNCEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. SUMMARY: In a May 10 meeting, Special Representative
Staffan de Mistura told Ambassador Crocker and Senior Advisor
Krajeski that he planned to announce UNAMI recommendations
regarding the first four internal disputed boundary (DIB)
districts (Makhmour, al Hamdaniyah, Amre and Mandali) as soon
as May 22nd, although he may opt to wait until after the
Stockholm meeting on May 29. De Mistura specifically asked
if MNF-I would be able to intervene if anticipated Peshmerga
withdrawals or increased AQI activity threatened Christian
populations, particularly in Hamdaniyah. De Mistura was
concerned that the timing of the announcement not impact the
Stockholm International Compact with Iraq (ICI) conference.
On election issues, De Mistura said UNAMI was particularly
concerned about staggered elections and the hybrid system
currently in the draft law. Senior Jordanian officials told
De Mistura that the USD 8 million refugee pledge affair was
an insult to Jordan, but also confided they were thinking of
inviting Prime Minister Maliki to Amman.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- Rumors of SRSG Departure
Exaggerated


2. (C) Stressing that Sunni buy-in was particularly
important, Ambassador Crocker noted that in their most recent
meeting, Vice President Hashimi remained apprehensive, going
so far as to call for the entire Article 140 process to be
postponed. SRSG said he had heard the same and added that
the Vice President worried that on DIBs, UNAMI would simply
make "a few announcements then leave town." De Mistura
observed this was probably linked to rumors of his departure,
which he dismissed. Underscoring the growing strength of the
common endeavor, de Mistura assured the Ambassador he
intended to remain in Baghdad as long as Ambassador Crocker
did. Ambassador Crocker emphasized that USG and UNAMI
boundary proposals must be perceived by stakeholders as
responsive to their concerns. SRSG agreed and added that the
time and momentum built by addressing less contentious (but
still knotty) districts would leave the parties more leeway
to tackle the really complex areas, especially Kirkuk.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- Senior Advisor Trip


3. (C) Ambassador Krajeski said that during his recent trip
to Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, Kirkuki Sunnis emphasized their
Kirkuki identity and were apprehensive about being cut off
from the rest of Iraq and falling under Kurdish control. The
Kurds invariably took a hard line, underscoring Kurdish
historical claims and de facto Kurdish control of the city.
Senior Advisor Krajeski assessed that the Kurds were running
"roughshod" over other Kirkuki communities, and this type of
behavior was commonplace in many areas in the North.
ISCI-supported Shebbak Shi'a in Mosul, for example, refused
to join the KRG because of Kurdish excesses in their area.
Northern Christians wanted an autonomous region, but unlike
the Shi'a and the Sunnis, were not overly concerned whether
it fell under GOI or KRG control -- although they favored the
KRG. In Erbil meetings, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani
and KRG Head of Security Masrur Barzani made the right noises
about political compromises on disputed territories issues
generally, but refused to budge on the status of the city of
Kirkuk, which they maintained must fall within the KRG's
territorial boundaries.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- UNAMI Proposal -- No Deadlines


4. (C) SRSG said this assessment agreed with his own.
Postponing the December referendum, he continued, had been an
exercise in "preventive diplomacy." It was also a gamble
that UNAMI and the USG could convince the parties that rapid
compromise on disputed boundaries, and especially Kirkuk, was
possible. Kurdish demands for a June referendum had abated
-- a major achievement but one that had to go unadvertised
for fear of inflaming Kurdish public opinion -- but
short-term progress on "small fish" was essential to ensure
the stakeholders remained focused on the need for a political
settlement encompassing more complex areas. De Mistura
stressed the need to get away from deadlines, but also
thought failure to produce deliverables quickly could
jeopardize the process and lead to violence, possibly civil
war.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- Sunnis Inclined to Take the
Hard Line


5. (C) The Kurdish DIB position, the SRSG continued, was
well-known and he assessed that Iraq's Shi'a, beginning with
Prime Minister Maliki, would largely follow UNAMI's
recommendations. The Sunnis posed a more serious problem.
Vice President Hashimi, no longer the sole leader of the
Sunni community, faced powerful challenges to his leadership
role (including from AQI) and had every incentive to espouse

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a hard line as a defender of Arab lands and Sunni rights
generally. The SRSG's message to Hashimi had been that
UNAMI's efforts to avoid a referendum and possible violence
over Kirkuk played to Sunni interests. Key regional players,
including Prime Minister Dahabi of Jordan, backed de
Mistura's analysis. UNAMI understood deep-seated Sunni
ambivalence about Kurdish actions in the North, but Iraqi
Sunnis appeared determined to play a long game, reasoning
that with Turkey and other Sunni neighbors' backing they
could distance themselves from the initial surrender of Arab
lands, and in the long run overwhelm the Kurds.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- May 22 Announcement?


6. (C) Ambassador Crocker asked how UNAMI planned to
reverse the facts on the ground and alluded to Massud
Barzani's quote about the size of the KRG: "fifty seven
thousand square kilometers now, ninety seven thousand after
Article 140." De Mistura revealed that he planned to
announce UNAMI recommendations regarding the first four
internal disputed boundary areas (Makhmour, al Hamdaniyah,
Amre and Balad Ruz/Mandali) on May 22, but was concerned that
the timing not impact the Stockholm ICI meeting, which he
wanted "clean and happy." He preferred to wait until after
Stockholm if the parties agreed. A number of
recommendations, including striking KRG flags in some areas,
gradual withdrawal of Peshmerga, and civil and linguistic
rights guarantees for minorities, might irk the Kurds. In
the run-up to the announcement, de Mistura would first,
"intensely" engage the Sunnis, and second, pressure the Kurds
to make the compromises he sought.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- Challenges -- Makhmour and Al
Hamdaniyah


7. (C) De Mistura explained that facts in Makhmour were
clear: going back to 1931, local records indicated the area
was overwhelmingly (93 percent) Kurdish. This evidence,
however, did not relieve Kurds of the obligation to provide
linguistic, representational, budgetary and civil rights
guarantees to Makhmour's minority communities. Al
Hamdaniyah was more complex because Christians, not Kurds,
formed the majority. (Note. De Mistura appeared certain
that during his recent trip to the United States, Pope
Benedict XVI raised the plight of Iraq's Christians with
POTUS. De Mistura added that he was a practicing Christian
and Iraq's Christians were also a particular concern to his.
End Note.) Christian communities largely aspired to autonomy
under the KRG security umbrella, but a large number of
autonomous, "balkanized" Christian communities increased the
risk of conflict, both among themselves and with their
Kurdish and Arab neighbors.

Disputed Internal Boundaries -- Christian Communities
Particularly Vulnerable


8. (C) In de Mistura's opinion, security was overwhelmingly
the common concern of the non-Kurdish communities caught up
in the Article 140 process and withdrawal of Peshmerga
elements or an increase in AQI activity posed real threats.
De Mistura concluded that Christian communities required
special status and the right to raise their own security
organizations modeled on Concerned Local Citizen programs.
Even more importantly, De Mistura asked for MNF-I to protect,
as required, vulnerable Christian communities. Ambassador
Crocker said Christian CLCs were feasible, provided they did
not become magnets for insurgent infiltration. He cautioned
that MNF-I was already stretched thin but remarked that from
a public relations standpoint, having credible Christian
representatives saying the Article 140 arrangements
jeopardized their communities' security would be unhelpful.
De Mistura asked the Ambassador to consult General Petraeus
about this issue in the run-up to a possible May 22
announcement and added he would stress the GOI also had to
provide more than lip service to UNAMI's recommendations.
Ambassador Crocker remarked that 3 plus 2 buy-in would be
difficult to secure because several of the members would be
traveling. De Mistura suggested USG and UNAMI focus on
Kurdish leadership then decide if it was better to make the
announcement before or after Stockholm.

Elections -- Staggered


9. (C) After noting that the Provincial Elections Law had
its second reading on Sunday, May 11th, de Mistura added
several provisions worried UNAMI, but none more so than a
provision for rolling elections. This clause, de Mistura
cautioned, increased logistical demands and the opportunity
for fraud. He added that from a security standpoint, it
would be better to lock down the entire country for a single
day. Ambassador Crocker observed security was the reason the
GOI favored rolling elections -- the ISF did not have the
assets necessary to cover the entire country on a single day.

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De Mistura acknowledged that holding elections was the
primary objective; UNAMI would not pressure the GOI to change
the law, but would warn the Prime Minister about negative
fallout should a rolling ballot trigger irregularities.

Elections -- Dates


10. (C) De Mistura was also concerned that Iraqi High
Electoral Commission funding delays had pushed back the start
of voter registration. SRSG worried that if the registration
process dragged into July, elections would not be held before
December. Ambassador Crocker emphasized that the delays were
part of the normal course of business in Iraq. The process,
not the dates, should be our primary focus; the average Iraqi
did not care if the elections occurred in December or
October, provided they occurred this year. De Mistura
remarked that powerful forces were arrayed against these
elections, and worried that without a date certain we would
be sending a message that the process was open ended and
subject to deferral. Ambassador Crocker countered that
setting a date certain that we might miss carried its own
risks and de Mistura suggested that the parties allow the
timing requirements in the laws to dictate our references to
an elections date.

Elections -- Hybrid (Open/Closed Lists) System


11. (C) Both Ambassador Crocker and the SRSG agreed that
hybrid lists were unsatisfactory and De Mistura wondered if
there was a conscious wish in the PMO to implement a bad
system. Ambassador Crocker remarked that the Council of
Representatives (CoR) had a greater say than the Prime
Minister about the content of the law, which still stood a
chance of being modified in the course of normal legislative
give-and-take. De Mistura advocated intervening jointly with
the Prime Minister if the hybrid system made it into the
final bill and Ambassador Crocker noted that the Embassy was
already working with senior CoR leadership on the issue. De
Mistura complained that the Prime Minister was not conveying
adequate enthusiasm about elections and repeated his
suggestion that he and the Ambassador speak to Maliki
together on this and other issues.

Refugees


12. (C) SRSG related that in recent Amman meetings, senior
GOJ officials, including Foreign Minister Al Bashir,
emphasized that GOI failure to deliver on its USD 8 million
refugee pledge was an insult, and the GOJ would now refuse
the sum if tendered. De Mistura's message was that rather
than use this issue as a pretext to withdraw, Jordan should
engage Iraq if it wished to move forward on other key
concerns like trade and Iranian influence. De Mistura also
mentioned that the Jordanians were thinking of inviting
Maliki to Amman. Turning to the hoped-for USD 200 million
GOI UNHCR pledge, Ambassador Crocker explained that the
Embassy had prepared presentations for the Prime Minister and
his staff. SRSG explained that Maliki was now opposed to
providing refugee support through the UN because he believed
that the UN focused on permanent resettlement. De Mistura
attributed this confusion (and emphasized that UNHCR focused
on repatriation) to the fact that Maliki was only familiar
with the Palestinian situation, which the SRSG described as
chronic and unlike the Iraqi crisis.

Sadr City


13. (C) Ambassador Crocker confided that the GOI did not
appear fully aware of scope of the humanitarian relief
projects UNAMI was conducting in Sadr City. It was
important, he stressed, that the GOI be brought in to avoid
possible charges later on that the relief work benefited
militias. UNAMI's Guy Siri said UNAMI coordinated daily with
the GOI through the National Operations Center (NOC) in the
Iraqi Government Building, and liaised with MNF-I through an
operations cell in Sadr City. Siri complained that the NOC
meetings were often delayed and subject to other disruption.
Ambassador Crocker observed that whatever information the
parties were exchanging was not moving up the GOI chain of
command and de Mistura asked Siri to provide written updates
UNAMI could pass directly to PM Chief of Staff Tariq
Abdullah. Ambassador Crocker added we would encourage Dr.
Tariq to regularize the NOC meetings.

UNAMI Compound


14. (C) De Mistura confessed that he had been surprised by
GOI resistance to UNAMI's request for the Al Sijud palace
grounds. He explained to the GOI that the plan was
attractive, in part, because it significantly reduced
anticipated GOI contributions. De Mistura noted that there
was still a short time-window before the next UN Budgetary
Committee meeting for the GOI to decide. Ambassador Crocker

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suggested jointly engaging the Prime Minister and preparing
for PMO review an IZ map with all IZ sites that met UNAMI
requirements.
CROCKER