PRT WASIT: SADRIST PC MEMBER PREDICTS CHANGE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001455 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PRT WASIT: SADRIST PC MEMBER PREDICTS CHANGE REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 1383 ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 367 ¶C. C. BAGHDAD 748 ¶D. D. BAGHDAD 1040 Classified By: Acting PRT Team Leader Rob Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable. ¶2. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Summary: In a May 5 meeting Sadrist Trend Provincial Council (PC) member Ahmed Hasan Ebrah told the PRT that it is a "dangerous time" for the Sadrist movement and predicted that Muqtada al-Sadr's inner circle advisors would change. Ebrah's primary purpose for the meeting was to discuss the current political situation in Wasit and complain about an Al Kut IP unit commander. Ebrah reiterated protests about the GOI's recent operations but admitted that there are mixed signals coming from Muqtada. PRT will arrange a meeting with Ebrah, and possibly ONE or two other Sadrist Trend political officials, and 3ID Deputy Commanding General BG Cardon during the week of May 11. End summary. ¶3. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ebrah began by noting that he was meeting despite "the red line" that prohibits Sadrist officials from engaging with Americans. He later noted, however, that the details of the meeting would be communicated back through Sadrist Trend channels. He expressed his thanks for a recent PRT project and repeated his earlier advice that "an American fingerprint needs to be on more of what you do so the people know." (Background: On May 1, at the request of Ebrah, PRT contributed 3,000 blood storage bags to the Al Kut Blood Bank in order to respond to a critical HEALTH sector need. The donation also served the PRT's Sadrist Engagement plan by reinforcing a moderate Sadrist official (ref A). Ebrah said he had been unable to attend the press conference marking the event due to a prior commitment with security guards protesting the MOI's recent decision to fire them. End background.) The Internal Situation -------------- ¶4. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ebrah said there is ongoing discussion in Baghdad but no answer yet from Najaf about Sadrist participation in provincial elections. He insisted that there was no "link-up" between the Sadrist Movement and Iran but admitted that only 75 percent of the movement's Wasit members obey Muqtada. (Note: Other sources have given the PRT the same estimate. End Note.) Ebrah named Iraqi National Gathering (ING) leader Adnan al-Shahmani as an �0A;example of the "evidence of disloyalty to the Sadrist Trend" and predicted changes in Muqtada's inner circle soon. ¶5. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ebrah described himself as a follower of Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr who had switched to the Sadrist Trend from Fadilah due to disagreements with that party's leadership. He said none of the four Sadrist Trend members currently on the Provincial Council (Jawad Maktoof Abbas, Ahmed Shihab Hamad, Mudh'hir Khalif Numa, and himself) planned to stand for reelection. He said that although several moderates were pressuring him to stay, there is "no real power" for the political members of the Sadrist movement in Wasit. He complained that the PC did not work for the public good and that a "Dictatorship of Independents" and list 555 candidates (ISCI/Badr, independents, and Dawa) dominated the PC for the worse. Despite the poor performance of the PC and the grassroots strength of the Sadrist brand (due to Mohammad Sadiq) he predicted that the Sadrist Trend would gain only 7-10 seats in the next provincial elections. (Note: Under the guidelines of the new Provincial Powers Law, the number of members on the Wasit PC will decrease from 41 to 27 or 28. Currently, 31 of 41 are independent or associated with List 555. End note.) Reiteration of Common Sadrist Themes -------------- ¶6. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ebrah said the Prime Minister's office was using the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to persecute the Sadrist Trend movement, protesting that "even if we obey the government, they will not leave us alone, they want to devastate the movement completely." He said that "they want us to give up our weapons and give us orders not to fight but then they attack us," adding "we are the victims." But Ebrah also stressed, as he has in all past meetings, that there are "bad guys" associated with JAM who are committing criminal acts. He acknowledged that "bad JAM with ties to old leaders" should be arrested. ¶7. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Ebrah was clear that reason for the meeting was to communicate his concerns about the actions of CPT Aziz Latif Abdel Ammarah and Al Kut's IP SWAT (KSWAT). BAGHDAD 00001455 002 OF 002 He claimed that Aziz was arresting low-level JAM criminals and pressing them to falsely testify against Sadrist Trend political leaders. Ebrah said he understands that the United States is not involved directly, but that everyone knows KSWAT is "controlled by the Americans." (Note: Ebrah indicated that he is aware that KSWAT is tasked by MOI, however, he believes ultimate authority over KSWAT remains with CF. End note.) IPAO informed Ebrah that the PRT had no involvement with KSWAT but suggested a meeting with a military contact who is better positioned to hear his perspective. Although in all previous meetings to date, Sadrist Trend contacts have insisted on meeting only with Department of State officers with no CF military presence, Ebrah agreed to a future meeting with U.S. military representatives to discuss the issues. Muqtada's Guidance: "Confusing to Us" -------------- ¶8. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) When pressed on his claims of limited political control of the military wing of the Sadrist Trend in Wasit, Ebrah claimed not to know most of the local Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) leadership, asserting that the military leaders report directly to Najaf. He then contradicted himself somewhat by alleging that Najaf solicited, and followed, advice from the political wing on several issues. ¶9. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) When IPAO noted that the recent messages from Muqtada have been confusing, making it difficult for CF to understand his intentions, Ebrah immediately declared that "it's confusing for us." When asked if reconciliation between Muqtada and the GOI was possible, Ebrah was evasive; he noted that it is a "dangerous time" for the Sadrist Trend and Ebrah expects that "change (in the Sadrist Trend) will start from the top and will take place in Najaf." ¶10. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Comment: While we assess a lack of control by the political wing over the military in Wasit, Ebrah's claim that he has no contact with JAM leadership is not credible. It does appear however, that he feels threatened enough to risk asking CF for assistance. KSWAT's tactics, techniques, and procedures have apparently been successful at intimidating Sadrist Trend political officials. But its operations also bolster the argument that the Prime Minister is using the MOI to attack his political enemies. MOI-directed KSWAT has a reputation in Al Kut as the most effective counter-JAM unit. Its claimed targeting of legitimate Sadrist Trend political leaders may present PRT and CF with leverage to elicit additional information on the Sadrist Trend and exploit fractures in the movement. End comment. CROCKER