THE AMBASSADOR'S MAY 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001426 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MAY 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TALABANI Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: President Talabani, accompanied by DPM Barham Saleh, told the Ambassador that he had advised PM Maliki to wait and see whether Iran implemented its promises to not support Shi'a militants before deciding whether to visit Tehran. Talabani said he warned Iranian Ambassador Qomi earlier in the day that Iran was in danger of alienating the Iraqi public. Talabani said he had also advised Maliki to close the deal on Tawafuq's return to the cabinet by accepting VP Hashimi's proposed slate of ministers; acknowledging the split within Tawafuq, Talabani gave the Ambassador a copy of a letter he received from six MPs who are breaking with Khalaf Allyan to remain in Tawafuq. Talabani provided details on a positive phone call he had May 5 with Turkish President Gul, which gave the Ambassador an opportunity to lay down a marker on KGK threats against U.S. soldiers. Talabani also touched on relations with France, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as the status of the hydrocarbons law. End summary. Iran -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador met May 6 with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Talabani, who was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, Presidency Chief of Staff Naseer al-Ani, and media mogul Fakhri Kareem, began by reviewing the recent UIA delegation visit to Iran. The first day of talks was tough, he said. The second day's talks were somewhat friendlier, although both sides criticized the other's position. The Iranians accused the Iraqis of "listening to (Ambassador) Crocker." The third day of discussions produced "agreement on some points" that stood a "good chance" of being implemented (an apparent reference to Iranian assurances that they were not sending weapons into Iraq). ¶3. (S) Talabani then noted that Iranian Ambassador Qomi had visited him earlier in the day, and had berated the GOI for attacking Shi'a extremists in cooperation with the Coalition, rather than conducting an Iraqi-only operation. Talabani brushed aside this criticism, noting that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) do not have helicopters and therefore must rely upon Coalition close air support. In the end, he said, Qomi seemed to accept the idea that the GOI will assert control over Sadr City and Shula. However, he noted that the Iranians are insisting that PM Maliki visit Tehran in the near future to finish the discussions begun by the UIA delegation. Talabani, who said he had a very good meeting with Maliki on May 5, said the Iraqi PM has not yet decided whether to travel to Iran. Talabani counseled him to wait and see whether the Iranians implement their promises. In addition, Talabani told Qomi that if the Iranians want Maliki to visit Tehran, they need to give him a suitable inducement. ¶4. (S) Talabani warned Qomi that the Iranians were likely to alienate Iraqi Shi'a if they continued their interference. "If you lose the Shi'a, then you will isolate yourselves from all of the Iraqi people," Talabani said he told Qomi, adding that the Kurds would not allow a wedge to be driven between themselves and the Shi'a. "Although the Sunnis are praying to see that day," Talabani chuckled. ¶5. (S) Referring to a point that DPM Saleh made at Sunday's Ministerial Council on National Security, the Ambassador said it was time for the Iraqis to develop a common policy with respect to Iran. Talabani agreed that the current situation -- in which the Iranians heard inconsistent messages from a wide range of parties and individuals -- was too chaotic, and said that PM Maliki was therefore insisting that Iran deal with the GOI rather than with individual political parties. The Ambassador observed that the recent UIA delegation to Tehran was a case in point, especially since the delegation's primary interlocutor was IRGC-Quds Force Chief Qassem Solimani. The Ambassador emphasized that this was not a normal channel for state-to-state relations. Tawafuq's Return -------------- ¶6. (S) Talabani pointed out that Iraq would be in a much stronger position with respect to Iran if the Iraqis could present a united front by brining Tawafuq back into the government. He noted that Maliki was trying to meet that same day with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi to finalize an agreement on Hashimi's ministerial nominees. Talabani said he advised Maliki to accept Hashimi's proposal, pointing out that it would be easier to address any problematic figures (e.g., Thafer al-Ani) a year or so down the road than to continue haggling now and thereby risk losing the opportunity to bring the Sunnis back into the Cabinet. Maliki reportedly BAGHDAD 00001426 002 OF 003 agreed, and said he would accept Hashimi's list. (DPM Saleh said the PM told him the same thing earlier May 6; Saleh stressed to Maliki that it was imperative to nail down Tawafuq's return before the Stockholm ICI conference.) As for Khalaf Allyan, Talabani shared with the Ambassador a letter he received from six of Allyan's MPs (Taha Khadr al-Hibi, Ahmed Suleiman al-Alwani, Amhed Radi, Adnan Thiab al-Jiburi, Naef Jasim al-Jiburi, and Hasan Dikan al-Jiburi), in which they announced that they were breaking with Khalaf and would stay within Tawafuq. "Khalaf is isolated now," Talabani said contentedly. Turkey -------------- ¶7. (S) Talabani said that he received a phone call on May 5 from Turkish President Gul, who conveyed his personal concern about the attack earlier that day on the motorcade of Talabani's wife, Hero. (Note: It was evident that this personal gesture on Gul's part had made a positive impression on both Talabani and DPM Saleh.) Gul made three substantive points. First, Gul said that the Turks would send a delegation to Baghdad as soon as possible to form the agreed upon High Committee. Second, he said that PM Erdogan was prepared to visit Iraq; Talabani assured him that he would receive a warm welcome. Third, Gul said Turkey was prepared to follow through on its promise to supply the GOI with helicopters and provide the ISF with training. (NB: This was particularly welcome news, because Talabani had just heard from the Russians that Moscow is reluctant to provide the GOI with helicopters while U.S. forces remain in Iraq.) In addition, Gul said that the Turks have decided to improve their relations with the KRG. ¶8. (S) Talabani said it appeared that VP Hashimi had done a good job of advancing Iraqi interests during his visit to Turkey, and noted that PM Erdogan's Special Advisor, Ambassador Ahmet Davutoglu, seemed satisfied with his recent discussions with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani. He noted that the Turks were bothered by reports that 200 PKK members had infiltrated through Erbil International Airport to attend a PKK conference in the mountains; Talabani admitted that this was partially true, but said the 200 had transited through Iran, not Erbil. KGK Marker -------------- ¶9. (S) The Ambassador used this opening to put down an important marker on the KGK (i.e., the PKK). Noting that a May 5 statement by a KGK spokesperson had threatened a future decision to launch suicide attacks against U.S. forces, the Ambassador said he had discussed this threat with MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus and they had agreed that were this to happen, the U.S. response would be devastating. "They won't live to regret it," the Ambassador said meaningfully. Talabani hastily agreed, noting that the KGK wants to improve its relations with the U.S. and adding that it would be truly suicidal for the KGK to attack U.S. forces, since such attacks would earn them enmity from America and from the Kurdish people as well. France -------------- ¶10. (S) Turning to relations with France, Talabani said he spoke May 5 with FM Bernard Kouchner, who had also called to check on the well being of Madame Talabani. Talabani seized the opportunity to remind Kouchner of his promise to help the ISF, including through weapons sales. In response to Talabani's pointed request for helicopters, Kouchner indicated that France was prepared to supply them and said he would raise it with the Minister of Defense. Talabani suggested that the French convey their decision to PM Maliki at the ICI conference in Stockholm. Saudi Arabia/Egypt -------------- ¶11. (S) Clearly pleased with himself, Talabani said that he had just extended an invitation to Saudi Prince Talal bin AbdelAziz al-Saud to visit Iraq. Prince Talal replied that he was ready to do so if given an official invitation, so Talabani had promptly sent him a letter of invitation. The Ambassador agreed that a visit by Prince Talal would be a signficant step forward for Saudi-Iraqi relations. Turning to Egypt, Talabani mentioned that he recently sent a telegram to President Mubarak congratulating him on his birthday. Hydrocarbons -------------- BAGHDAD 00001426 003 OF 003 ¶12. (S) Talabani mentioned that PM Maliki had asked for his help in bringing the hydrocarbons law to a vote. Talabani promised to do so. The Ambassador expressed some disappointment that Nechirvan is not returning to Baghdad as promised before departing for the U.S. to receive an honorary degree. Talabani joked that "the Americans are making trouble for us by inviting Nechirvan to the U.S.," but added that he would meet with KRG President Massoud Barzani later that evening, and promised to press Massoud on the need for progress. He reaffirmed that the two agreed on the need to accept the February 2007 draft of the law. CROCKER