PM MALIKI RECOGNIZES ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001424 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA-I, EEB E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018 TAGS: ECON EPET ENRG IZ SUBJECT: PM MALIKI RECOGNIZES ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY PRIORITIES REF: BAGHDAD 1381 Classified By: Economic Minister Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (C//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki acknowledged several priorities for improving Iraq's energy infrastructure security at a special May 1 meeting of a newly formed Infrastructure Protection Committee (IPC). Discussion of security challenges at the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR) during the April 27 meeting of the Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS) (reftel) prompted Maliki to convoke National Security Advisor Dr. Mowafuq Rubaie, Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani, Minister of Oil Hussein al-Shahristani, and representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Electricity. Top priorities included: improving security for BOR personnel and facilities; bolstering the Oil Police (OP) and Electrical Protection and Security Service (EPSS), including with the employment of tribal "auxiliaries"; completing Ministry of Defense (MOD) construction projects along the Kirkuk-Bayji Pipeline Exclusion Zone (PEZ); constructing the Bayji-Baghdad PEZ and restoring the pipelines and electrical transmission lines along the route; improving security for the MOE's National Dispatch Center (NDC) staff and facilities; and allocating funds to achieve all of the above. END SUMMARY. -------------- BAGHDAD, WE HAVE A PROBLEM -------------- ¶2. (C//REL MCFI) Discussion of BOR security at the April 27 MCNS prompted PM Maliki to attend a special May 1 meeting of the IPC. At the IPC meeting Maliki, Rubaie, Bulani, and Shahristani acknowledged serious security challenges to Iraq's energy infrastructure at the BOR and beyond. Shahristani and OP Major General Hammad noted that BOR personnel are subject to threats and intimidation by local insurgents and that the OP needs additional manpower and resources to address the problem. Maliki supported a proposal to bolster the OP and transfer it from the MOO to the MOI. Shahristani suggested that moving security personnel from inside the refinery to the areas surrounding it would improve security at the BOR. (COMMENT: Insurgents do interdict trucks hauling refined product once they leave the BOR, giving Shahristani's suggestion some appeal, but he implicitly understated the security challenges inside the refinery compound itself. END COMMENT.) ¶3. (C//REL MCFI) Using local tribes to strengthen the OP was a recurring theme throughout the meeting. Rubaie's advisors championed the benefits, while Bulani insisted that anybody involved in oil protection must be vetted and formally incorporated into the MOI. After some debate, Maliki agreed that the MOI and OP could contract local tribes as auxiliaries--rather than fully trained and salaried OP--and later offer them the opportunity to become formal OP. Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) attendees suggested that certain Sons of Iraq (SOIs) currently working with Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) on pipeline security should be contracted by the MOI, and the GOI attendees agreed. ¶4. (C//REL MCFI) Maliki agreed that progress on the Kirkuk-Bayji and Bayji-Baghdad PEZs was essential. Maliki learned that USG-funded work on the Kirkuk-Bayji PEZ was nearly complete but that MOD-funded projects to provide troop accommodations and guard towers along the route were lagging. Maliki directed the MOD to address the matter forthwith. Shahristani said that repairing crude and product pipelines between Bayji and Baghdad is now his highest priority. He said two new repair teams would start "within a week" but observed that they would need secure accommodations. (NOTE: The teams will be using USG-funded equipment. END NOTE.) Maliki directed the MOD to make space for one of the teams at Taji. Shahristani also identified as priorities repairs to the Naft Khana to Daura twelve-inch crude line and the Hamman al-Aleel Bayji to Mosul sixteen-inch product line. MNF-I noted that surveys had begun for the USG-funded defensive works of Bayji-Baghdad PEZ, and the MOD confirmed a plan to station Iraqi Army troops along the route. ¶5. (C//REL MCFI) Turning to electricity, the MOE Deputy Minister requested increased assistance from the MOD to secure the one functional 400 kilovolt transmission line running from Bayji to Baghdad; the MOD agreed to review the matter. The MOE Deputy Minister also raised the security of personnel working at the NDC, noting that staff there have also been threatened and intimidated and that insurgents have BAGHDAD 00001424 002 OF 002 planted IEDs around the NDC to deter staff from going to work. Maliki agreed that security at the NDC--which is integral for managing stability of the national electrical grid--was a top priority and directed the MOD and MOI to address the issue. The PM also directed that the EPSS be transferred from the MOE to the MOI. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C//REL MCFI) The May 1 IPC meeting mattered most because the highest levels of the GOI heard firsthand from those concerned and acknowledged the security challenges Iraq's energy infrastructure faces. Recognizing a problem is, of course, a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving it. PM Maliki recognized that these challenges will require additional resources, and he directed that a Ministry of Finance representative attend future IPC meetings. The Coalition's work on the PEZs will contribute to Iraq's energy infrastructure security by building durable physical defenses for the crude and product pipelines, as well as the electrical and fiber optic cables, which will be essential for meeting Iraq's energy and other essential services needs. But, the GOI must ultimately operate, maintain, and staff these physical defenses if they are to yield their full utility for the Iraqi people. CROCKER