PM MALIKI RECOGNIZES ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001424

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA-I, EEB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018
TAGS: ECON EPET ENRG IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI RECOGNIZES ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY PRIORITIES

REF: BAGHDAD 1381

Classified By: Economic Minister Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
acknowledged several priorities for improving Iraq's energy
infrastructure security at a special May 1 meeting of a newly
formed Infrastructure Protection Committee (IPC). Discussion
of security challenges at the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR) during
the April 27 meeting of the Ministerial Council on National
Security (MCNS) (reftel) prompted Maliki to convoke National
Security Advisor Dr. Mowafuq Rubaie, Minister of Interior
Jawad al-Bulani, Minister of Oil Hussein al-Shahristani, and
representatives from the Ministries of Defense and
Electricity. Top priorities included: improving security for
BOR personnel and facilities; bolstering the Oil Police (OP)
and Electrical Protection and Security Service (EPSS),
including with the employment of tribal "auxiliaries";
completing Ministry of Defense (MOD) construction projects
along the Kirkuk-Bayji Pipeline Exclusion Zone (PEZ);
constructing the Bayji-Baghdad PEZ and restoring the
pipelines and electrical transmission lines along the route;
improving security for the MOE's National Dispatch Center
(NDC) staff and facilities; and allocating funds to achieve
all of the above. END SUMMARY.

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BAGHDAD, WE HAVE A PROBLEM
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2. (C//REL MCFI) Discussion of BOR security at the April 27
MCNS prompted PM Maliki to attend a special May 1 meeting of
the IPC. At the IPC meeting Maliki, Rubaie, Bulani, and
Shahristani acknowledged serious security challenges to
Iraq's energy infrastructure at the BOR and beyond.
Shahristani and OP Major General Hammad noted that BOR
personnel are subject to threats and intimidation by local
insurgents and that the OP needs additional manpower and
resources to address the problem. Maliki supported a
proposal to bolster the OP and transfer it from the MOO to
the MOI. Shahristani suggested that moving security
personnel from inside the refinery to the areas surrounding
it would improve security at the BOR. (COMMENT: Insurgents
do interdict trucks hauling refined product once they leave
the BOR, giving Shahristani's suggestion some appeal, but he
implicitly understated the security challenges inside the
refinery compound itself. END COMMENT.)


3. (C//REL MCFI) Using local tribes to strengthen the OP was
a recurring theme throughout the meeting. Rubaie's advisors
championed the benefits, while Bulani insisted that anybody
involved in oil protection must be vetted and formally
incorporated into the MOI. After some debate, Maliki agreed
that the MOI and OP could contract local tribes as
auxiliaries--rather than fully trained and salaried OP--and
later offer them the opportunity to become formal OP.
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) attendees suggested that
certain Sons of Iraq (SOIs) currently working with
Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) on pipeline security should
be contracted by the MOI, and the GOI attendees agreed.


4. (C//REL MCFI) Maliki agreed that progress on the
Kirkuk-Bayji and Bayji-Baghdad PEZs was essential. Maliki
learned that USG-funded work on the Kirkuk-Bayji PEZ was
nearly complete but that MOD-funded projects to provide troop
accommodations and guard towers along the route were lagging.
Maliki directed the MOD to address the matter forthwith.
Shahristani said that repairing crude and product pipelines
between Bayji and Baghdad is now his highest priority. He
said two new repair teams would start "within a week" but
observed that they would need secure accommodations. (NOTE:
The teams will be using USG-funded equipment. END NOTE.)
Maliki directed the MOD to make space for one of the teams at
Taji. Shahristani also identified as priorities repairs to
the Naft Khana to Daura twelve-inch crude line and the Hamman
al-Aleel Bayji to Mosul sixteen-inch product line. MNF-I
noted that surveys had begun for the USG-funded defensive
works of Bayji-Baghdad PEZ, and the MOD confirmed a plan to
station Iraqi Army troops along the route.


5. (C//REL MCFI) Turning to electricity, the MOE Deputy
Minister requested increased assistance from the MOD to
secure the one functional 400 kilovolt transmission line
running from Bayji to Baghdad; the MOD agreed to review the
matter. The MOE Deputy Minister also raised the security of
personnel working at the NDC, noting that staff there have
also been threatened and intimidated and that insurgents have

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planted IEDs around the NDC to deter staff from going to
work. Maliki agreed that security at the NDC--which is
integral for managing stability of the national electrical
grid--was a top priority and directed the MOD and MOI to
address the issue. The PM also directed that the EPSS be
transferred from the MOE to the MOI.

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COMMENT
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6. (C//REL MCFI) The May 1 IPC meeting mattered most because
the highest levels of the GOI heard firsthand from those
concerned and acknowledged the security challenges Iraq's
energy infrastructure faces. Recognizing a problem is, of
course, a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving
it. PM Maliki recognized that these challenges will require
additional resources, and he directed that a Ministry of
Finance representative attend future IPC meetings. The
Coalition's work on the PEZs will contribute to Iraq's energy
infrastructure security by building durable physical defenses
for the crude and product pipelines, as well as the
electrical and fiber optic cables, which will be essential
for meeting Iraq's energy and other essential services needs.
But, the GOI must ultimately operate, maintain, and staff
these physical defenses if they are to yield their full
utility for the Iraqi people.
CROCKER