(SOUTHERN) POLITICS AS USUAL: IRAN'S PLAN FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001416 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ SUBJECT: (SOUTHERN) POLITICS AS USUAL: IRAN'S PLAN FOR IRAQI ELECTIONS REF: A. HILLAH 00006 ¶B. BAGHDAD 0/I 4/4/08 ¶C. BAGHDAD 01201 ¶D. BAGHDAD O/I 4/30/08 ¶E. BAGHDAD 01262 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) The following is a joint POL, REO Basrah, PRT Diwaniyah, Babil, Wasit, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Karbala and Dhi Qar cable. ¶2. (S) Summary: All indications show that Iran sees the Iraqi provincial elections as an opportunity to advance its goals of continued ties to and influence over the south-central provincial governments and, longer-term, its likely goal of the creation of a nine-state Shi'a region in the south. Iranian support for the holding of elections likely depends on Tehran's assessment of electoral outcomes and their impact on regions formation. Due to continuing uncertainties over election results Iran will probably continue to "play the field" by backing all Shi'a religious parties to some degree. However, Iran likely continues to favor ISCI/Badr over other Shi'a parties and, despite its support for JAM special groups, is unlikely to back a Sadrist political gain at the expense of other Shi'a groups. Given that the Iranians are not going to play by the rules, the Embassy and MNF-I are considering policy options to counter Iranian interference in the upcoming elections campaign. Our goal is to ensure the election results reflect the will of the Iraqi people, not Tehran. End Summary. The Hidden Iranian Hand -------------- ¶3. (S) South-central contacts tend to see an Iranian hand behind almost any significant political or security development in Iraq. However, contacts are often unable to provide concrete examples of Iranian intervention. Although all Shi'a religious parties are linked in the public mind to some degree to Iran, ISCI is considered by many southerners as not only closely tied to Iran but an Iranian party in and of itself. This belief is based in part on ISCI's history, including its formation (as SCIRI) in Iran in 1982 following Saddam's expulsion of many Iraqi Shi'a leaders, among them Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir al-Hakim. A common assertion is that ISCI's current political success dominance of elected offices in the south is in itself irrefutable evidence of the extent of Iranian political influence in Iraq. ¶4. (S) One indisputable fact is that many southern politicians -- particularly those affiliated with ISCI/Badr -- spent a considerable amount of time in Iran prior to the overthrow of the Saddam regime. For instance, the Wasit Governor is married to an Iranian and owns a house in Mehran. The Governor of Karbala (a member of PM Maliki's Da'wa Party) is also married to an Iranian and the Diwaniyah Governor, a former Badr commander, spent almost 20 years in Iran. Basrah's Badr leader and former governor attended the Iranian Staff College, is married to an Iranian, and commutes from his house in Iran. To the extent that their continued travel to Iran and close personal ties with Iranian officials and citizens influence their political decisions, this could be considered as a form of Iranian influence. ¶5. (S) This perception of a ubiquitous Iranian presence coexists with deep-seated antipathy and distrust towards Iran. Iraqi Shi'a made up a significant percentage of the enlisted troops that fought against Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and many Iraqi towns along the border, including Amarah and Basrah, have bitter memories of Iranian occupation. (Note: A large public statue in Amarah is dedicated to a local Iraqi woman who killed herself and her children with a grenade when Iranians entered her house. End Note.) Many Iraqis see Iranians as racists who look down on their Arab neighbors. Iranian Allies and Goals -------------- ¶6. (S) In the short-term, Iran will seek to maintain its influence over the provincial governments of south-central Iraq. Uncertainties over the outcome of upcoming provincial elections mean that Iran is likely "playing the field" and offering a level of support to all Shia parties, including ISCI/Badr, Da'wa, Fadhilah, and the Sadrists, to ensure that it retains a degree of influence in southern Iraq. ISCI/Badr is seen as the party with the closest ties to Iran, and Iran is unlikely to support the political gain of other Shi'a parties at the expense of ISCI/Badr. Fadhilah officials in Diwaniyah and Basrah have been more outspoken in their criticism of Iran, whereas in Dhi Qar, Fadilah is also BAGHDAD 00001416 002 OF 003 believed to be supported by Iran. ¶7. (S) A likely longer-term Iranian goal in Iraq is the fulfillment of ISCI/Badr's stated intention to form a nine-governorate region in southern Iraq. Iran likely sees the creation of a southern Shia-majority region as a means to solidify its influence and increase the security of its western border. In the first months of 2008, ISCI was actively working with local governors to secure the two-thirds vote in PCs necessary to join a region (Ref A). Although the regions law went into effect on April 11, 2008, concerns over the constitutional status of the current provincial councils as well as GOI operations against JAM have delayed any talk of regions formation for the present. ¶8. (S) Iranian support for the religious parties adds yet another barrier to the participation of independent candidates in the election. Qassim Daoud admitted that he had abandoned his ambitions to form an independent slate of candidates after realizing the scale of Iranian support to ISCI/Badr (Ref B). Having concluded that Iran will ensure that ISCI wins the provincial elections, Daoud is now trying to restore his relations with the Hakim family and secure a seat on the ISCI ticket. In an April 23 meeting with Babil PRT, Da'wa Deputy Party Chief Dr. Na'amah made the same allegations, decrying the Iranian support given to religious parties and advocating increased U.S. support for moderate and secular groups. However, other Iraqi contacts, including the Governor of Muthanna, allege that Iran is trying to identify and support nominally "independent" candidates who then become beholden to Tehran once elected (Ref C). Iranian Support for the Sadrists? -------------- ¶9. (S) In the short-term, Iran is unlikely to back Sadrist political gains at the expense of ISCI/Badr. Iran's strategy of "playing the field" may have backfired following the unrest in March. Allegations of Iranian involvement in the recent violence in March have led to an unprecedented rift between Iran and ISCI/Badr and Da'wa. Iraqi officials have publicly criticized Iran, and on April 30 a UIA delegation traveled to Tehran to confront the Iranian government on its support of JAM. A close aide to Hakim confessed that ISCI/Badr feels "betrayed" by what it perceives as Iranian support to their enemies (Ref D). This reaction may have caused Iran to reassess its policy in Iraq and in particular its support for militant strands of the Sadrist movement and provision of lethal aid to JAM special group. According to contacts, Iranian leaders put pressure on Sadr to end the violence, and Iranian officials released a statement praising GOI actions and condemning attacks on the International Zone (IZ) (Ref E). For their part, both national and provincial Sadrists have condemned recent GOI operations as an effort to degrade Sadrist political strength ahead of provincial elections. ¶10. (S) In its present incarnation the mainstream Sadrist Trend does not represent a reliable Iranian surrogate. Sadr does not share the Iranian regime's theological or ideological views, and this may be seen by Iran as a potential threat to Iran's long-term ambitions. Sadrist leaders, including Muqtada himself, have repeatedly and publicly denounced region formation as a plot to divide Iraq along sectarian lines. Finally, the conflict between ISCI and Sadr also reflects a dynastic struggle between the Hakim and Sadr families and, more broadly, the source of ultimate religious authority over Iraq's Shi'a community. Iran would prefer that this battle be won by the Hakim family. ¶11. (S) In the long-term, the possible threat posed by the Sadrists, as well as their enduring grassroots popularity, gives the Iranians an incentive to co-opt the movement. For all of his nationalist rhetoric, Muqtada is not his father, and Tehran may eventually be able to bring him under its wing, especially if he remains isolated from the GOI and Iran helps Muqtada attain mujtahid status. Alternatively, Iran could attempt to isolate Muqtada and promote a special groups leader in his place. Regardless of whether Iran succeeds in co-opting the movement as a whole, it will likely continue to use special groups to bleed the coalition and intimidate and kill moderate Sadrists. ¶12. (S) Comment: Widespread allegations of Iranian interference in Iraq are probably exaggerated by Iraqis due to several factors, including a desire to secure U.S. trust and support; a tendency to favor conspiracy over self-critical analysis; and a particular form of Iraqi-identity politics in which each side portrays itself as nationalist and its opponents as backed by foreign agents. It is also important to note that Iran's policy is not monolithic, and various Iran actors, including the IRGC and BAGHDAD 00001416 003 OF 003 Quds force, the Iranian military, the Qom seminaries, and the "hard-line" and pragmatic conservatives (as represented by Ahmadi-Nejad's and Rafsanjani's political factions),are likely pursuing separate and sometimes contradictory Iraq policies. Nevertheless, we have every reason to believe that Iranian support for Iraqi politicians and parties is widespread and calculated to advance Tehran's interests. We can expect that Iran will continue to offer financial and other forms of support to its political allies. Despite public discontent with government performance in the south, the short-term impact of this Iranian support will be to decrease the already marginal chances of truly independent candidates and strengthen the political status quo in southern Iraq. In conjunction with our MNF-I colleagues, we are weighing policy options for how to best counter Iran's influence and ensure the results of the Iraqi elections reflect the will of Iraqi voters. End Comment. CROCKER