THE TAWAFUQ COALITION: A PORTRQT OF SUNNI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001407

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE TAWAFUQ COALITION: A PORTRQT OF SUNNI
FRATRICIDE

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) The largest bloc of Sunni political parties, the
"Tawafuq Front," is likely to fracture over internal feuding
between its three senior leaders, tensions created by the
prolonged negotiations to return Tawafuq to government, and
positioning in the run-up to provincial elections. Relations
between the bloc's most prominent figure, Vice President
Tariq al-Hashimi, and his colleague Khallaf Allyan, an Anbar
tribal sheikh who heads the National Dialogue Council, have
deteriorated to the point where further cooperation and
conciliation are unlikely. According to Embassy contacts,
the PM's office has fueled the rift by encouraging each side
with offers of cabinet positions and other incentives.
Allyan tells us that the damage is irreparable and that he is
prepared to leave the Front soon. The just-begun
registration period for political entities/parties to compete
in upcoming provinvial elections, he says, offers the
opportunity to formalize the break-up. Iraqi Islamic Party
contacts say they will not miss Allyan, and are confident
that the PM has committed to returning the IIP along with
Adnan Dulaymi's Iraqi People's Conference, as soon as
negotiations on cabinet seats are concluded. In the interim,
the Maliki government continues to function without an
organized Sunni partner among its ranks. End summary.

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Tawafuq to Finally Split?
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2. (S) During a May 4 meeting with Poloff, Sheikh Khallaf
Allyan confirmed reports that he was seriously considering
departing from the Tawafuq Coalition of Sunni political
parties, and joining forces with Saleh Mutlaq's Iraqi Front
for National Dialogue and possibly others. He launched into
a detailed tirade against his Tawafuq Partner Tareq
al-Hashimi and the latter's Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),saying
that his previous support and assistance to Hashimi had been
betrayed. Hashimi, he said, made alliances with the Kurds
and the Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) without consulting
him, and made numerous pronouncements on behalf of the
Tawafuq coalition absent his consent. A long pattern of
deception and double-dealing, he complained, marked the IIP
and its dealings with its Tawafuq partners. Such behavior,
he said, only resulted in the evaporation of popular support
for the IIP -- an assertion he said could be validated by any
survey or "fair" election. Hashimi, he said, had conspired
with the Kurds and ISCI to bring down Maliki, while he and
Mutlaq had recently pledged their support to Maliki in a
private meeting with him. Entreaties by POLOFF to repair the
rift with Hashimi and form a united negotiating bloc with his
Tawafuq partners to deal with PM Maliki appeared futile.

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Negotiations With the PM
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3. (S) According to a senior IIP political advisor to VP
Hashimi, a list of nominations for nine cabinet positions was
presented within the past week to PM Maliki by the IIP and
its allies from Dulaymi's group. Once Hashimi returns to
Baghdad, he said, on or about May 5, talks with Maliki will
put the final touches on these "near-concluded" negotiations.
Allyan, he said, was a "thug" with no vision and no ability,
who wanted only to use his position for his own personal gain
(Note: an Advisor to Parliament Speaker Mashadani told POLOFF
that Allyan was privately auctioning to the highest bidder
his two Ambassadorial nominations, apportioned within
Tawafuq, and was interested in gaining cabinet positions to
"steal as much as he can." End note). Allyan told POLOFF
that he had presented his own list of proposed cabinet
nominees to Maliki's advisors Sadiq Rikabi and Mohamed Salman
on May 3, proposing a selection of three names for each of
six cabinet seats, consisting of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
nominees. Among that list, he said, was the nomination of
Saleh Mutlaq for Deputy Prime Minister. The separate list of
names (for nine cabinet seats) recently presented to the PM
by the IIP and Dulaymi, he complained, had not been approved
by him and did not contain his nominations (Note: PM staffer
Ahmed Shames told POLOFF on May 3 that the PM could not agree
to cabinet positions for the "Tawafuq Coalition" since there
were two separate lists of names. There would have to be one
agreed list, he said, signed by Hashimi, Dulaymi, and Allyan
before the PM could decide. End note).

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New Registration Rules for Political Parties
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4. (S) Allyan said that newly announced rules on
registration of political parties would commence on May 5.
The Tawafuq Front, even as an established bloc, was required
to re-register in order to compete in upcoming provincial
elections. This process, he noted, would provide the
opportunity to reconfigure the Tawafuq bloc and allow him and
his group to part ways from the IIP and to join a new
coalition with other groups. (Note: some of his
parliamentarian group have indicated privately that they
would not depart the coalition and follow Allyan. End Note).
There are groups within the Parliament, he said, which are
quietly studying formation of new coalitions and blocs to
compete in coming elections. His vision for a new political
entity, he said, was for a non-secular, non-religious party,
dedicated to national unity, friendly relations with Iraq's
neighbors, and a professional military not infested with
militia members and manipulated by Iran. Salah Mutlaq's
Hewar party was pressing a similar platform, and was reaching
out to the Sadrists and other "nationalist" groupings to
combine energies (Note: Mutlaq told POLOFF on May 2,
following a visit to his home town of Fallujah the day
before, that he was interested in "splitting" the Sadrist
camp and attracting to his side the non-violent,
non-Iranian-supported wing of the Trend. He requested
Embassy support for his bid to become Deputy Prime Minister,
hinting that Iran was busy courting disaffected Sunnis,
including Adnan Dulaymi, himself, and others. End Note.)

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Comment
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5. (S) A break-up of the Tawafuq Front, in and of itself, is
not necessarily a bad thing, particularly if Allyan (the
least productive and most obstreperous of the three leaders)
is the one who departs. Agreement between Hashimi and Maliki
on the return of ministers to the cabinet would also be a
step forward, and we are working to facilitate this. More
broadly, this intra-Sunni wrangling serves to highlight the
growing acceptance among the Sunni political class of the
constitutional political process -- a huge shift from their
largely self-defeating boycott of the January 2005 elections.
Presuming that their expectations are managed, that the
election process is ostensibly fair, and that the useful
competition over ideas/ideology does not turn violent, this
trend should continue as we move toward national elections at
the end of 2009. Iran, we can assume, will do all it can to
sow discord and keep the Sunni groups feuding and weak. End
comment.

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Bio Addendum
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6. (S) Sheikh Khallaf Allyan Khalaf al-Dulaimi al-Khirbett,
a tribal leader from the city of Ramadi in Anbar Province,
claims to have previously been a Colonel in the Iraqi Army.
In 1980, he told Poloff, he abandoned the military after
being discovered among a group of soldiers plotting against
Saddam Hussein. He claims that were he still in the Iraqi
Army, his rank would be Lieutenant General.
CROCKER