RIKABI STUMPED BY TAWAFUQ SPLIT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001403 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: RIKABI STUMPED BY TAWAFUQ SPLIT? Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a May 5 meeting, Sadiq Rikabi professed to be unsure of how PM Maliki should play the splintering of the Tawafuq Front, but finally indicated that Maliki would likely press Vice President Hashimi to submit a new list of ministerial nominees representing the entire Front and not just the IIP. Touching on the UIA delegation's visit to Iran, Rikabi said that the Iranians want to exact a price before ending their support of Shi'a militants; the puzzle, said Rikabi, is figuring out whether the Iranians want the GOI or the USG to pay that price. Rikabi reacted coolly to the suggestion that the PMO move expeditiously on nominations for ambassadorial positions, but agreed with the need to quickly appoint the new commissioners for the High Commission for Accountability and Justice. Turning to other issues, Rikabi claimed not to know whether Dr. Safa al-Safi is still the Acting Minister of Justice (but said it was time for Safa to return to Baghdad) and denied any knowledge of plans to combine the PMO and the Council of Ministers Secretariat (Comsec). End summary. Tawafuq Splits: What's a PM to Do? -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) In a May 5 meeting at the PMO, Sadiq Rikabi (PM Maliki's political advisor) confirmed that the Prime Minister has received two competing slates of potential Sunni ministerial nominees: one IIP-centric list from Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who remains allied with Adnan Dulaymi; and a second list from Khalaf Allyan, who appears to be bolting the Tawafuq Front and allying himself with Saleh Mutlaq (reftel). Rikabi professed to be unsure of how Maliki should proceed in light of Tawafuq's apparent split. If the PM accepts one list and rejects the other, he creates political enemies at a time when he needs all the friends he can get in order to keep the Sadrists isolated. If the PM tries to amalgamate the two lists, Hashimi and Allyan would likely reject the resultant compromise. Finally, if the PM asks Hashimi and Allyan to work out a compromise between themselves, he will likely discover (said Rikabi) that they are incapable of resolving their differences. Nevertheless, the PM will probably opt for this final option (the path of least resistance) and ask Hashimi to come back with a more balanced list that represents Tawafuq in its entirety. Rikabi declined to hazard a guess about the potential timeline, and did not seem to believe that a deal is at hand. Who Will Pay Iran's Price? -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Turning to the May 3 return of the UIA delegation to Iran, Rikabi deemed the delegation ineffectual and said that only higher level intervention (i.e., the Prime Minister's) would produce results. He assessed that the Iranians want to exact a price before ending their support of militants. The question, he continued, is whether they want the GOI or the USG to pay that price. ¶4. (S/NF) On a related note, Rikabi said Maliki is contemplating a visit to Najaf to get the marja'iyya (especially Grand Ayatollah Sistani) more firmly in the PM's corner with regard to the crackdown on Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). Asked whether Sistani's studied neutrality suggested that the marja'iyya may see some value in preserving the Sadrist Trend as a counterweight to ISCI/Badr, Rikabi laughed in delight but carefully avoided any direct comment. Progress on Appointments? -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Rikabi declared himself pleased with the elections law currently under consideration in the Council of Representatives, and praised the law's ban on using religious symbolism for election purposes. When Poloff noted that the law also requires candidates to be vetted by an as-yet-nonexistent High Commission for Accountability and Justice, Rikabi agreed that it was time to rapidly nominate the seven commissioners and made a note to flag this for the PM. Rikabi dryly noted that it would "perhaps be better" if Ahmed Chalabi (head of the current De-Ba'athification Commission) were not given an opportunity to meddle in the candidate vetting process. He pledged that the new High Commission would feature "new personalities and new policies," and would not include Chalabi. Asked about how the prohibition on parties affiliated with militias participating in elections would be enforced, Rikabi indicated that parties such as OMS would need to publicly accept the need for disarmament, keep their armed followers off the streets, not interfere with ISF operations, and BAGHDAD 00001403 002 OF 002 recognize that arrests of armed elements violating the ban on militias are legitimate. ¶6. (S/NF) Rikabi reacted coolly to a proposal that PM Maliki expedite the process of nominating and confirming ambassadorial appointees by fast-tracking six or seven names. (NB: The current crop of ambassadorial nominees is buried in a much longer list of government-wide nominations that need to be approved by the Council of Representatives; all appear to be on indefinite hold.) Rikabi promised, rather unconvincingly, to consider the idea. ¶7. (S/NF) Rikabi feigned not to know whether Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Dr. Safa al-Safi (who is currently in Basrah, where he is tasked with overseeing the rapid allocation of GOI reconstruction and assistance funds in the wake of Operation Charge of the Knights) is still the Acting Minister of Justice, although he did say it was time for Dr. Safa to return to Baghdad. By the same token, Rikabi pleaded ignorance of rumored plans to combine the PMO and the Comsec into a new office known as the Prime Minister's Diwan. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) We take Rikabi's professed perplexity on the Tawafuq cleavage with a grain of salt. While the deepening divisions within the Front certainly make it trickier for Maliki to bring the Sunnis back into the government, it is also fair to say that Maliki and his advisors have never seemed particularly anxious to accelerate that return. So long as he remains on good terms with both camps -- and has the opportunity to play them off of each other -- Maliki would appear to have the Sunnis right where he wants them. CROCKER