RIKABI STUMPED BY TAWAFUQ SPLIT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001403

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: RIKABI STUMPED BY TAWAFUQ SPLIT?

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4
(b, d).



1. (S/NF) Summary: In a May 5 meeting, Sadiq Rikabi professed
to be unsure of how PM Maliki should play the splintering of
the Tawafuq Front, but finally indicated that Maliki would
likely press Vice President Hashimi to submit a new list of
ministerial nominees representing the entire Front and not
just the IIP. Touching on the UIA delegation's visit to
Iran, Rikabi said that the Iranians want to exact a price
before ending their support of Shi'a militants; the puzzle,
said Rikabi, is figuring out whether the Iranians want the
GOI or the USG to pay that price. Rikabi reacted coolly to
the suggestion that the PMO move expeditiously on nominations
for ambassadorial positions, but agreed with the need to
quickly appoint the new commissioners for the High Commission
for Accountability and Justice. Turning to other issues,
Rikabi claimed not to know whether Dr. Safa al-Safi is still
the Acting Minister of Justice (but said it was time for Safa
to return to Baghdad) and denied any knowledge of plans to
combine the PMO and the Council of Ministers Secretariat
(Comsec). End summary.

Tawafuq Splits: What's a PM to Do?
--------------


2. (S/NF) In a May 5 meeting at the PMO, Sadiq Rikabi (PM
Maliki's political advisor) confirmed that the Prime Minister
has received two competing slates of potential Sunni
ministerial nominees: one IIP-centric list from Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi, who remains allied with Adnan
Dulaymi; and a second list from Khalaf Allyan, who appears to
be bolting the Tawafuq Front and allying himself with Saleh
Mutlaq (reftel). Rikabi professed to be unsure of how Maliki
should proceed in light of Tawafuq's apparent split. If the
PM accepts one list and rejects the other, he creates
political enemies at a time when he needs all the friends he
can get in order to keep the Sadrists isolated. If the PM
tries to amalgamate the two lists, Hashimi and Allyan would
likely reject the resultant compromise. Finally, if the PM
asks Hashimi and Allyan to work out a compromise between
themselves, he will likely discover (said Rikabi) that they
are incapable of resolving their differences. Nevertheless,
the PM will probably opt for this final option (the path of
least resistance) and ask Hashimi to come back with a more
balanced list that represents Tawafuq in its entirety.
Rikabi declined to hazard a guess about the potential
timeline, and did not seem to believe that a deal is at hand.

Who Will Pay Iran's Price?
--------------


3. (S/NF) Turning to the May 3 return of the UIA delegation
to Iran, Rikabi deemed the delegation ineffectual and said
that only higher level intervention (i.e., the Prime
Minister's) would produce results. He assessed that the
Iranians want to exact a price before ending their support of
militants. The question, he continued, is whether they want
the GOI or the USG to pay that price.


4. (S/NF) On a related note, Rikabi said Maliki is
contemplating a visit to Najaf to get the marja'iyya
(especially Grand Ayatollah Sistani) more firmly in the PM's
corner with regard to the crackdown on Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).
Asked whether Sistani's studied neutrality suggested that the
marja'iyya may see some value in preserving the Sadrist Trend
as a counterweight to ISCI/Badr, Rikabi laughed in delight
but carefully avoided any direct comment.

Progress on Appointments?
--------------


5. (S/NF) Rikabi declared himself pleased with the elections
law currently under consideration in the Council of
Representatives, and praised the law's ban on using religious
symbolism for election purposes. When POLOFF noted that the
law also requires candidates to be vetted by an
as-yet-nonexistent High Commission for Accountability and
Justice, Rikabi agreed that it was time to rapidly nominate
the seven commissioners and made a note to flag this for the
PM. Rikabi dryly noted that it would "perhaps be better" if
Ahmed Chalabi (head of the current De-Ba'athification
Commission) were not given an opportunity to meddle in the
candidate vetting process. He pledged that the new High
Commission would feature "new personalities and new
policies," and would not include Chalabi. Asked about how
the prohibition on parties affiliated with militias
participating in elections would be enforced, Rikabi
indicated that parties such as OMS would need to publicly
accept the need for disarmament, keep their armed followers
off the streets, not interfere with ISF operations, and

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recognize that arrests of armed elements violating the ban on
militias are legitimate.


6. (S/NF) Rikabi reacted coolly to a proposal that PM Maliki
expedite the process of nominating and confirming
ambassadorial appointees by fast-tracking six or seven names.
(NB: The current crop of ambassadorial nominees is buried in
a much longer list of government-wide nominations that need
to be approved by the Council of Representatives; all appear
to be on indefinite hold.) Rikabi promised, rather
unconvincingly, to consider the idea.


7. (S/NF) Rikabi feigned not to know whether Minister of
Parliamentary Affairs Dr. Safa al-Safi (who is currently in
Basrah, where he is tasked with overseeing the rapid
allocation of GOI reconstruction and assistance funds in the
wake of Operation Charge of the Knights) is still the Acting
Minister of Justice, although he did say it was time for Dr.
Safa to return to Baghdad. By the same token, Rikabi pleaded
ignorance of rumored plans to combine the PMO and the Comsec
into a new office known as the Prime Minister's Diwan.

Comment
--------------


8. (S/NF) We take Rikabi's professed perplexity on the
Tawafuq cleavage with a grain of salt. While the deepening
divisions within the Front certainly make it trickier for
Maliki to bring the Sunnis back into the government, it is
also fair to say that Maliki and his advisors have never
seemed particularly anxious to accelerate that return. So
long as he remains on good terms with both camps -- and has
the opportunity to play them off of each other -- Maliki
would appear to have the Sunnis right where he wants them.



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