CHALABI'S PROVISION OF SERVICES COMMITTEE - APRIL 22 and 29

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 001396 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREL ECPS IZ SUBJECT: CHALABI'S PROVISION OF SERVICES COMMITTEE - APRIL 22 and 29 Ref: A. 08 Baghdad 1245 ¶B. 08 Baghdad 1150 ¶C. 08 Baghdad 1091 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 22 meeting and for a third straight week the Ministry of Trade complained that some of their trucks carrying needed food rations for Sadr City were turned away at checkpoints by the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). The Amanat also blamed the BOC's strict checkpoint policy, which they claim prohibits laborers from exiting Sadr City, for significantly limited trash collection services across all Baghdad. The BOC had strong words for both the Ministry of Trade and Amanat's accusations - reporting that food rations were possibly poisoned and claiming that Amanat employees do not show up for work because of threats, not checkpoint delays. Dr. Chalabi was visibly annoyed by both reports given his committee's previous recommendations to alleviate the checkpoint "choke points". (Ref A and B) ¶2. (SBU) Also at the April 22 meeting, the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) and brick factory owners from Nahrawan accused ONE another of corruption and fraud. The brick factories are suspected of selling Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) - the fuel used to operate the brick factories, on the black market, rather than using it to operate the factories. The factory owners claimed that HFO distribution charts were being falsified by government employees, making it appear as though factory owners were receiving larger quantities of HFO. Chalabi refereed the dispute and later determined that he would send a memo to the National Security Advisor (NSA),strongly suggesting that Nahrawan brick factories be supplied with HFO from the Bayji refinery. ¶3. (SBU) Attending the meeting for the first time, the General Director (GD) of Rail Services for the Iraq Ministry of Transportation hailed rail capabilities in Iraq. He pled for increased utilization from other Iraqi ministries, particularly Trade and Oil. Initially expressing reluctance to increase reliance upon rail due to external threats, the Deputy Minister of Trade softened her tone and agreed to meet privately with the GD. The Ministry of Oil (MoO) was not in attendance; therefore their opinion regarding greater rail utilization remains unknown. ¶4. (SBU) The Baghdad Water Authority (BWA) reviewed short and long term solutions to expected summer water shortages, including water distribution via tankers and dredging the Tigris near the Karkh Water Treatment Plant. (Ref C) At the conclusion of the April 22 meeting, the Ministry of Electricity (MoE) reported that summer electricity production levels (5400 MW) were only attainable if the security situation improved. ¶5. (SBU) Water scarcity, the impact on Sadr City services due to ongoing kinetic activities and transportation needs were on the April 29 agenda, with little new news to report and fewer new resolutions or recommendations offered. Interestingly, after the Amanat proudly reported its activities to address water scarcity, including tanking water, Deputy Mayor Naem crumbled under questioning from Dr. Chalabi. He threw up his hands in disgust and said that the tankers wouldn't even temporarily solve expected water shortages. The Deputy Minister of Trade told of the same problems discussed at the April 22 meeting with little progress to report on previous recommendations. FAQ spokesperson, Mr. Tahseen al Shekhli painted a grim picture of education in Sadr City, although Dr. Chalabi chastised him for spreading propaganda. The Deputy Minister of HEALTH was in attendance for the first time in over 3 weeks. He provided a brief, but upbeat report on HEALTH services in Sadr City. The meeting ended with a report on likely repercussions of an ongoing dispute between Zain, the largest cell phone provider in Iraq, and a security firm providing security for cell phone towers throughout the country. According to the briefer, if the dispute is not resolved immediately, cell phone service will be disrupted, dealing a significant blow to intelligence and infrastructure programs. End Summary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sadr City Services Show No Apparent Improvement: 4/22-4/29 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) At the April 22 meeting, the Deputy Minister of Trade reported that some staple ration items, including sugar, cooking oil and detergents have been provided to the residents of Sadr City for the month of May despite checkpoint delays and overall ration shortages. Six other items though, including milk, flour, wheat, soap and tea, still need to be provided. Reported first on April 8, milk has not yet reached the requisite testing centers due to violence. (Ref B) There are overall shortages of wheat and soap and some of the other supplies are late because they cannot be delivered to Sadr City, again because of checkpoint procedures. Chalabi was not able to mask his discontent - and in fact reminded the committee that they have done their part to alleviate checkpoint delays, sending three memos to the BOC towards that end. (Ref A and B) A representative from the National Security Advisor's (NSA) office and BAGHDAD 00001396 002 OF 005 Iraq-Executive Steering Committee (I-ESC) Secretariat, Mr. Sayid, suggested that this issue be elevated to the I-ESC, a weekly meeting hosted by Prime Minister Maliki and attended by Iraqi Ministers and Baghdad local government officials, including the Mayor, Governor and Provincial Council Chairman. The committee did not object so the Ministry of Trade is expected to provide a detailed report for an upcoming I-ESC. ¶7. At the April 29 meeting, the Ministry of Trade reported that 78 tons of children's milk was finally distributed, but another 23 tons is needed. Deputy Minister Soiba announced that 19 containers, or 350,000 tons of wheat were at Umm Qasr port in Basrah, waiting to be unloaded. This sparked a larger conversation about the current supply chain management system for Iraq's Trade Ministry. Dr. Chalabi was outraged to learn that the current supply chain system takes on average 3 months to unload 1 month's worth of supplies. Chalabi demanded a 6 month forecast of wheat purchase, delivery and distribution. ¶8. (SBU) Trash continues to pile up not only in Sadr City, but throughout all of Bagdhad, reported Baghdad Deputy Mayor Naem, a Sadrist, at the April 22 meeting. Because the vast majority of the Amanat's laborers are from Sadr City and cannot get through the checkpoints, the Deputy Mayor estimated that less than 50% of trash produced daily is removed daily. The BOC, in an agitated voice countered, saying that they "...are not preventing people from getting to work". In fact, the General in attendance said that many of his soldiers are from Sadr City themselves. He pointedly blamed militias for intimidating Amanat employees. He claimed that the Iraqi Army faces similar threats. ¶9. (SBU) (The Deputy Minister of Defense said that the Iraqi Army and police are being treated as criminals and narrated an attack on an Iraqi soldier and his family in the Ghazaliya area simply because of his affiliation with the Iraqi Army. Dr. Chalabi expressed sympathy, but stuck to his task, improving services in Bagdhad. This issue was not ONE the committee neither could nor would address.) - - - - - - - - - - Sadr City Check-Up - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) At the April 29 meeting, the Deputy Minister of HEALTH said that since April 28, 2,605 people have been wounded in action during the ongoing conflict in Sadr City. Another 925 people have been killed in action. Approximately 80% of medication needs are currently met and ambulance movement in and out of Sadr City has improved since last report, over three weeks ago. The Deputy Minister said that ONE hospital, Martyr Sadr Hospital, has been without power for over 10 days, but its current status is good due to generators. Dr. Chalabi complemented the Ministry's efforts and said he intends to provide incentive awards to the doctors working over time for Sadr City. - - - - - - - - - Fueling Sadr City - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Fuel delivery for Sadr City was briefly discussed at the April 29 meeting. According to Dr. Chalabi the Prime Minister (PM) stopped most fuel delivery into Sadr City, with the exception of kerosene. However, 400 containers of LPG, 8 oil trucks and 6 trucks carrying diesel have supposedly been delivered. Another 55 trucks, containing various fuel products await entry via the checkpoints to Sadr City, according to the NSA. Dr. Chalabi will send a committee representative to Modafar Square to assist Coalition and Iraqi Army with fuel movement into Sadr City. - - - - - - - - - - - Learning in Sadr City - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Mr. Tahseen al Shekhli, the FAQ spokesperson, claimed that ongoing kinetic activity and insurgent activity in Sadr City has prevented many children from attending classes. The rapidly approaching June high school diploma tests will be devastating for many students because many are ill prepared due to their inability to attend class. Chalabi suggested that the test be postponed, but Tahseen pushed further, arguing that the students did not receive enough education throughout the year and there simply wasn't enough catch up time before Chalabi's proposed testing date. Tahseen suggested that seats be set aside for former Sadr City students to attend universities. After a brief discussion, Dr. Chalabi asked his staff to invite the Ministry of Education to attend the May 6th meeting for further discussion on this issue. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO): Black Market vs Brick Factories - an April 22 Report - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BAGHDAD 00001396 003 OF 005 ¶13. (SBU) Acting as mediator between a representative from the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) and several Nahrawan brick factory owners over HFO distribution, Dr. Chalabi will send a letter to the NSA recommending that the Nahrawan brick factories be supplied with HFO from Bayji. ¶14. (SBU) According to the Deputy General (DG) of Industry and Development from MIM, of 410 brick factories, 133 are operational and all 133 have consistently received HFO under MIM's authority. When asked about capacity, the DG said that if all 410 factories were operational, then 8 billion bricks could be produced in a year, employing a significant amount of laborers. Nahrawan alone can produce 30 million bricks at full capacity. When probed about fuel shortage, the DG conceded that at least 50,000 jobs are lost because of it. ¶15. (SBU) The brick factory owners defended themselves against accusations of selling HFO to the black market instead of using it to operate their facilities. (Note: The sale of HFO is more profitable than the sale of bricks. End Note) They countercharged the Ministry of Oil (MoO) with falsifying records, claiming that the owners picked up larger quantities of HFO than actual reality. In one example, the brick factory owner said that his factory was legally authorized 16 tankers of HFO from Bayji, but after picking up that allotment, he was issued a receipt totaling 24 tankers, an additional 8 tankers he claimed never to have received. The owners asked Dr. Chalabi to sequester HFO distribution charts from June 2007 to March 2008 from the MoO to prove this point. ¶16. (SBU) According to the brick factory owners, SOMO sent a memo stating that they would supply only registered facilities with HFO. They strongly criticized MIM for not doing their due diligence to adhere to that request and to provide the factories with adequate fuel. The NSA representative suggested that MIM conduct a needs assessment or allow the factories to get their own supplies at Bayji. There were security concerns regarding the latter suggestion, but Dr. Chalabi decided to pursue that option primarily because it will be the quickest solution. Quick fixes are not unusual for Dr. Chalabi in his ombudsman role. ¶17. (SBU) Frustrated by the politics, the brick factory owners asked the committee to remove political parties from their Industries Union. Adhering to his committee's mandate, Chalabi ever so politely told them that was not within his jurisdiction. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Little Engine that Could? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶18. (SBU) The rail from Basrah to Baghdad is and has been working for some time reported the General Director of Rail Service from the Ministry of Transportation at the April 22 meeting. While acknowledging that security is currently more problematic, he pled for greater utilization, particularly for commodities and oil movement. Primarily lobbying the Ministry of Trade, likely because the Deputy Minister complained earlier of transportation problems, he offered rail as a viable alternative to move food ration supplies from Um Qasr port in Basrah to Baghdad. Dr. Chalabi noted that Trade has been threatened by some criminal elements against using rail. (Note: Rumors have circulated that there is a "mafia-like" organization controlling the trucking industry. End Note) Dr. Chalabi questioned Transportation's loading and offloading capabilities, which the GD admitted was limited. Nonetheless, the Deputy Minister of Trade invited the GD to visit with she and the Director General of Ration Cards to discuss greater use of rail within her ministry. ¶19. (SBU) Dr. Chalabi commended the Ministry of Transportation for their continued commitment to move 1 million liters of kerosene per day. The GD seized that opportunity to lobby for an additional 1 million liters of kerosene per day, which he claims the rails can handle, including on and offloading. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Oil was not represented at the meeting to respond. - - - - - - - - - - - - Water Water Everywhere - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶20. (SBU) At the April 22 meeting, the BWA expressed serious concerns of a drought this summer, which will lower the Tigris River water levels and possibly halt the use of the Karkh Water Treatment Plant, a major supplier of potable water to Baghdad. If Turkey builds new dams, which is rumored, the BWA warned of grave consequences to water levels throughout all of Iraq, not just Baghdad. ¶21. After several meetings, the committee has attempted to plan and prepare for water shortages during Iraq's hottest months. (Ref A, B and C) In the short term, the Amanat plans to distribute water to areas expected to face shortages over the summer months (July-September). The Deputy Mayor asked for a representative from BAGHDAD 00001396 004 OF 005 the Provision of Services Committee to participate in future planning sessions to ensure coordination. The committee also reviewed some of the previously suggested longer-term solutions, including dredging the river near the Karkh Water Treatment Plant, and building a temporary dam. (Ref B and C) The BWA announced the formation of a committee/department to address the Tigris River dredging issues. Prepping for the planned dredging site around the plant is underway. ONE of the dredgers previously mentioned for use on this project could not be repaired, but a new dredger has been purchased. ¶22. (SBU) The BWA also discussed on April 22 their trip with Multi National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) to several proposed Reverse Osmosis (RO) sites. MND-B plans to lend several of these water purifying devices to the Amanat to help curb expected potable water shortages. Most importantly, the Mayor of Baghdad, recently assured BWA of their commitment to provide necessary resources to ensure adequate, clean water production and delivery. No details were offered so it's difficult to ascertain the level of commitment at this time. ¶23. (SBU) Violations, mainly theft, against water pipelines continues to burden the potable water system. Violations must be stopped the BWA argued, but they also contended that part of the solution involved alternative resources for both drinking and irrigation water. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is supposedly creating a "violations department" to address these issues. Dr. Chalabi suggested that the Amanat hire guards to be available 24/7 to protect the major water lines running from the east to the west. He intends to send a memo to the Mayor of Baghdad to that end. The BWA seemed somewhat frustrated by Chalabi's proposal and reiterated that security alone will not resolve the issue. He pushed for alternatives and outright improvements to the irrigation water system. However, at that time no such solutions were offered. ¶24. (SBU) At the following meeting, April 29, Baghdad Deputy Mayor Naem proudly delivered a report on water conditions in Baghdad. Municipal offices are currently looking into their needs and available resources, specifically available tankers for the summer months. He said the Rashid area is expected to face shortages and will need at least 349 tankers to compensate for those shortages. Nine sectors in Sadr City will require two shifts of potable water tankers per day. Each tanker will cost approximately 100,000 dinar, costing more than the Amanat claims to have. They are seeking assistance from the Mayor. ¶25. After throwing darts at the wall to determine the number of tankers needed and the people served, Chalabi declared that the Amanat's plan would not meet estimated need. (Note: Need has never really been determined. End Note) Naem said the ministries were supposed to lend trucks to the Amanat. He asked the Ministry of Trade for the 150 tankers previously promised, but the Deputy Minister corrected his figures with a mere 30 tankers. Naem then said that the municipal offices could not be forced to lease vehicles. Chalabi scolded him for going into unnecessary details and reminded him of his task to provide potable water to the people. Feeling cornered, Naem then said that there were not enough sources of potable water to meet this demand - the tankers were not going to work. Clearly frustrated with Naem's tap dance, Chalabi took the lead, stating that he will send a memo to the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers asking for funding to supply 120 days worth of potable water. Chalabi ordered his staff to pull together the municipal offices to develop a coordinating distribution plan. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Will Electricity Meet its Production Goals this Summer? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶26. (SBU) On April 22, the Deputy Minister of Electricity said that previous electricity production projections, 5,400MW, 1,400MW of which are for Baghdad, are attainable only if the security situation improves. The Deputy Minister submitted a report of damages from kinetic activity in Sadr City. Several transformers are leaking oil and several low pressure cables have been damaged. The Ministry is sending repair crews to accessible areas, but some areas are still not safe enough to enter. It's not clear, if and when those areas will in fact become accessible. - - - - - - - - Zain Gone Zany? - - - - - - - - ¶27. (SBU) Concluding the April 29 meeting, a cellular phone consultant provided a doomsday report on an ongoing rift between Zain cellular phone provider and its former/current security provider. Over $15 million is owed to the more than 7,000 security forces protecting Zain's cellular network throughout the country. According to the briefer, if the money is not paid by May 13, the security forces are threatening to walk which will make the network vulnerable to looting and insurgent attacks. This will disturb not only the primary communications network, but also intelligence BAGHDAD 00001396 005 OF 005 operations, essential service delivery and repair, etc. The briefer urged the Government of Iraq, Multi National Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy to intervene on the matter. The U.S. Embassy maintains that this is a matter between two private sector entities - no place for the U.S. Embassy. Dr. Chalabi intends to send a memo to the Prime Minister on the matter. (Note: Dr. Chalabi owns some portion, if not all, of the security firm. End Note) Crocker