APRIL 27 MCNS: SADR CITY, MOSUL, BASRAH, DEFENSE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001381 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS IR IZ PINR MCAP MARR SUBJECT: APRIL 27 MCNS: SADR CITY, MOSUL, BASRAH, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT Classified By: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (S REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: Topics covered at the April 27 MCNS session included preparation for operations in Sadr City and Mosul; opportunities to boost the role and capabilities of the Department of Border Enforcement and Iraqi Navy, particularly around Basrah; the future of the Facilities Protection Service; and proposed improvements to the military fuel supply system. The centerpiece of the session was a comprehensive MNSTC-I briefing on the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which demonstrated that the Ministry of Defense needs to make faster decisions and the Ministry of Interior requires FMS financing from the Ministry of Finance. The Prime Minister directed the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior to confer with MNSTC-I and resolve the problem in order to get FMS procurement moving. END SUMMARY. SADR CITY - FIGHTING CRIMINALS, NOT THE POPULACE -------------- --- ¶2. (S REL AUS UK) PM Maliki opened the April 27 session of the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by calling on the Committee to place priority on the humanitarian situation in Sadr City. Opponents of the government, including elements of the former regime, were scoring points in the media by asserting that Sadr City was "under siege." The PM said it was untrue that the GoI and Coalition were taking extreme measures inflicting hardship on the general populace in Sadr City. Rather, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces (CF) were vigilantly maintaining checkpoints around Sadr City to check for illegal weapons. The GoI/ISF were doing their duty in standing up to the criminals who had launched rockets into the city. The people of Sadr City, the PM said, were coming forward to say that they had had enough of the gangs and were pleased to see the GoI taking firm action. ¶3. (S REL AUS UK) MNF-I Commanding General GEN Petraeus said that he flew over Sadr City daily and saw that the streets were full of activity. U.S. troops had moved into the southern reaches of Sadr City to disrupt Jaysh al Mahdi and Special Groups rocket teams, and would continue to operate in Sadr City against people who posed a threat. Amb. Crocker praised the PM for an interview on al-Arabiya regarding the true situation in Sadr City. The Ambassador noted that more was needed and that opponents of the government were ahead in the media, and the GOI needed a media strategy, including a program to send reporters to Sadr City traffic control points to dispel the myth that Sadr City was locked down. Beyond information operations, the GOI needed to demonstrate that life improved in Sadr City neighborhoods once JAM was no longer in charge. MOSUL - SHAPING THE BATTLEFIELD -------------- ¶4. (S REL AUS UK) Addressing upcoming military operations in Mosul, the PM said that it was important to execute "shock operations" and to focus on intelligence gathering, which he called a key to the success of Operation Charge of the Knights. He believed the operation in Mosul would prove easier to conduct than Charge of the Knights. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Babakir Zebari briefed the resupply of ammunition to the Iraqi Army divisions in Ninewa, the establishment of a joint interagency intelligence cell established at Mosul, and the dispatch of a tank company and air coordination elements to the area. ¶5. (S REL AUS UK) Minister of State for National Security Al-Waeli and INIS Director Al-Shawani chimed in to describe the structure and capabilities of the interagency intel cell, which the latter said were already developing 80 targeting packages. Intel was looking for IED factories and caches to develop information for arrest warrants and judicial proceedings. INIS said that AQI sought to deepen the inter-ethnic cleavages in Ninevah. While some AQI emirs had fled to Syria, reinforcements had come to Mosul BAGHDAD 00001381 002 OF 003 from Baghdad, Diyala, and Syria, and AQI was negotiating with former regime elements in Syria for their support in the coming struggle. ¶6. (S REL AUS UK) The director of the Counterterrorism Bureau added that his organization had mapped 34 terrorist cells and leaders in Mosul, and suggested that judges from outside the province (and less subject to local intimidation) be dispatched to sign warrants. GEN Petraeus echoed the view that intelligence would be the key to success in Mosul. He noted that planning for Mosul should consider additional National Police (NP) and Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF). He also noted the importance of expediting police hiring for Mosul; he observed that hiring packets were being vetted through the PM's Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR) even though none of the candidates were coming out of the Sons of Iraq program. Minister of Interior Bulani said that he gave approval a few days earlier for an additional 2000 IPs and 800 NPs for Mosul. BASRAH - DRAMATIC PROGRESS -------------- ¶7. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus said he had been in Basrah the day before, observed that the situation had been transformed and that the change was dramatic. Units that had suffered losses from desertion and attrition were being remanned and retrained. He stated it was vitally important for the forces in Basrah to stay on the offensive and not settle into a pattern that adversaries could still exploit. He noted that MG Mohammed was ready to assume command of the Basra Operations Center and that the commanders of the 1st and 14th Iraqi Army Divisions were doing well. He asserted Basrah Airport was technically in good shape but security was not adequate - a condition similar to that at Baghdad International Airport 12 to 18 months earlier - and would need help to be brought up to ICAO standards. Umm Qasr port was Iraq's vital lifeline and needed a major investment in infrastructure and maintenance. BORDER ENFORCEMENT - STRENGTHENING THE SOUTH -------------- ¶8. (S REL AUS UK) Department of Border Enforcement General Moshan detailed the resources he needed to establish reasonable control of the border with Iran around Basrah - e.g. 10 new floating border forts to supplement the existing five, human intelligence teams, and reward programs to develop sources among the Marsh Arabs and other locals along the border. MoI Bulani interjected that some border crossings were effectively controlled by the Iranians, but when British or other MNF-I troops go into an area they pull out. General Moshan proposed to invite the Iraqi Navy to extend its presence northward along the Shatt al-Arab into areas currently patrolled by Iraqi Coast Guard riverine units. General Babakir endorsed this proposal. He called for more ISF joint operations along the border. Bulani suggested the creation of a riverine police unit in Basrah under the Coast Guard and asked if the Italian Carbinieri would help MOI train border forces in Basrah. ¶9. (S REL AUS UK) Finance Minister Jabbar said he had $5 billion in unallocated funds and invited Border Enforcement to develop a comprehensive procurement plan. Foreign Minister Zebari commented that border control is a challenge for all countries (which brought nods from many Americans in the room). The key to controlling the borders (especially with Iran and Syria, and the river borders of the Shatt al-Arab) lay with having trained people out there, not necessarily infrastructure. FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE - CONSOLIDATING IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR -------------- -------------- BAGHDAD 00001381 003 OF 003 ¶10. (S REL AUS UK) MoI Bulani opened discussion on the new law on the Facilities Protection Service (FPS),which after a year of discussion would soon permit FPS to be reassigned from disparate ministries to the MoI, the original home of FPS. Other ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, had provided valuable input into the drafting of the law. The Minister of Finance confirmed that many FPS were still being paid by their "old" ministries, not MoI. General Babakir commented that if the FPS was properly organized, trained, and paid then the overall numbers could be reduced, perhaps by as much as 2/3, leaving a more effective force. Maliki noted that the Cabinet had already endorsed the law, so there was no need to discuss the topic further. MILITARY FUEL SUPPLIES - IMPROVING LOGISTICS, PROTECTING SUPPLIES -------------- -------------- ¶11. (S REL AUS UK) Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr al-Mufriji said the MoD was working with the Ministry of Oil to streamline fuel procurement for the military. The present system relied on each unit having contracts with suppliers in its own home region. If the unit was transferred to another part of the country, it was still required to obtain fuel from its original suppliers, who might now be hundreds of kilometers away, resulting in inefficiencies. He wished to move to a more flexible system in which units could procure fuel locally. MoI Bulani cited shortages of fuel for the Police. Those points sparked discussion of the need to improve fuel distribution from the Bayji refinery and to speed work on the Bayji-Kirkuk Pipeline Exclusion Zone. GEN Petraeus noted that repairs were needed between Baghdad and Bayji, where not a single pipeline was open. The PM directed concerned ministers to meet with MNF-I senior leaders and technical experts to develop a complete plan to replace all the old pipelines. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES - BREAKING THROUGH THE LOGJAM -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S REL AUS UK) The centerpiece of the meeting was a comprehensive briefing by MNSTC-I CG LTG Dubik and MNSTC-I staff on "What is Going Well and What is Not" with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The brief detailed the nature of the program, its processes, and its success in procuring high-quality equipment appropriate to Iraq's needs. The MNSTC-I brief zeroed in on two issues: MoI's need for a procurement budget, and the MoD's months-long failure to act on $806 million in Letters of Offer and Acceptance sitting in the MoD bureaucracy. MNSTC-I explained that responsibility for delays in provision of these arms through FMS lay with the MoD. ¶13. (S REL AUS UK) Minister Al-Mufraji reacted sharply, pointing fingers at the Ministry of Finance rep within MoD for engendering delays in processing (with which Finance Minister Bayan Jabr took issue),and asserting that the LOA's could not be signed without extensive study as to their relevance to the ISF's needs and decisions on both the Iraqi and U.S. sides. CG Petraeus reminded the Minister that by the time a proposed procurement action reached the LOA stage it had already been subject to extensive consultation among interested Iraqi and U.S. agencies and military organizations as well as potential suppliers. It had already been pre-approved by the MoD. The CG added that the Defense Minister had signed off on hundreds of millions in LOA's, but Iraq's aggressive procurement plan required additional action now. General Babakir chimed in with his endorsement of the FMS process, which he said had brought Iraq quality equipment at good value without the headaches that had accompanied procurement from other countries, e.g., Serbia. After additional energetic discussion, the PM accepted CG Petraeus's offer to have concerned ministers sit down with MNF-I to break the logjam. The CG expressed confidence that the problems could be resolved. CROCKER