PROVINCIAL POLITICS IN BAGHDAD: ANOTHER KIND OF WAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001299

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL POLITICS IN BAGHDAD: ANOTHER KIND OF WAR

REF: A. BAGHDAD 575 BAGHDAD: RIVARLY HEATS UP AMONG SHIA
PARTIES

B. 2007 BAGHDAD 2040 LEGAL AMBIGUITY IN BAGHDAD
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE

C. 2007 BAGHDAD 2044 STRUCTURES AND CONFLICT IN
BAGHDAD GOVERNANCE

D. BAGHDAD 1094 BAGHDAD SITREP APRIL 8

E. BAGHDAD 1074 IESC MEETING APRIL 4

F. 2007 BAGHDAD 1913 SADR SEEKS TO CONNECT WITH
BAGHDAD'S GOVERNOR

G. BAGHDAD O/I APRIL 1

H. BAGHDAD 562 BAGHDAD: LOCAL COUNCILS AND
ESSENTIAL SERVICES

I. 2007 BAGHDAD 3391 PROVINCIAL POWERS LAW - NOT
QUITE THERE YET

J. BAGHDAD 1276 ISCI/SADRIST CONTEST IN BAGDHAD
LACK OF BAGHDAD LAW A PROBLEM

Classified By: Baghdad PRT Leader Andy Passen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: If we accept the adages that warfare is the
expression of politics by other means, and that all politics
is local -- it is clear why Baghdad's local political scene
is looking more and more like a battlefield. The uneasy
power-sharing agreement between the two major factions
controlling Baghdad's provincial government, the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists, looks like
it is unraveling. Leaders on both sides are ratcheting up
their rhetoric and firing volleys of vitriol against their
political opponents, reflecting the very real flare-ups of
violence in Baghdad's streets. The recent fighting in Sadr
City and Basra between GOI units and JAM militants has been
the catalyst to clarifying where Baghdad's political battle
lines are currently drawn. Many local leaders see the
Amanat, the institution at the heart of Baghdad governance,
as the ultimate prize in this "local" and "political" war.
With provincial elections scheduled to take place by 01
October 2008, campaign season is definitely heating up here
in Baghdad. End summary.

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PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 'FIRES' SADRIST DEPUTY MAYOR
-------------- --


3. (C) On February 19, the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC)
sent word to the three Deputy Mayors ) all top officials
within the Amanat, Baghdad's city hall ) that their services
would no longer be required (ref A). While officially
justified as "house-cleaning" of under-performing managers
responsible for the delivery of essential services to
Baghdad's residents, many provincial and local leaders saw
the move of the ISCI-dominated PC as a frontal assault on
Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby, one of Baghdad's
highest-ranking Sadrist-affiliated politicians.


4. (C) This drama currently unfolding in Baghdad involves not
only political rivalries, but also institutional jealousies
and bureaucratic bickering. The ambiguity in the fundamental
legal architecture defining Baghdad's governance structure,
notably the lack of a 'Baghdad Law' as called for by Article
124 of the Constitution, adds to the potential for violence
to supplant legitimate political discourse (ref B,C). And of
course, like getting to the bottom of any political drama,
you also need to follow the money.


5. (C) The contest pitting Deputy Mayor Naeem against the
ISCI/Badr bloc of the PC continues to play out against the
backdrop of the larger conflict between the parties
supportive of the GOI's recent stance against JAM, and those
in opposition.

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ISCI/BADR LEADERS FEEL THREATENED BY SADRIST CHALLENGE
--------------


6. (C) Baghdad Provincial Council Chairman Mueen al-Khademy,
leader of the majority ISCI/Badr bloc on the Baghdad
Provincial Council (PC),told us April 7 that there is
increasingly "little room left to negotiate with the
Sadrists" (ref D). Chairman Mueen said that the Sadrists and
their militia wing, Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM),have infiltrated
nearly every office of provincial and local government and
utilize this position to re-distribute government resources,
easily amounting to millions of dollars, through their
illicit networks. Sadrists cannot be seen as a legitimate
partner in the political process, Mueen said, as long as this
practice is tolerated - and encouraged - by their leadership.



7. (C) Mayor of Baghdad City, Saber al-Esawi, decries the

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Sadrist infiltration of the Amanat, Baghdad's city hall,
which allows municipal offices, equipment and resources to be
co-opted by a network of militias and criminals with Sadrist
ties. These concerns, related privately to the PRT on April
2 as the crisis in Basra and Sadr City escalated, were echoed
again in the Mayor's public exhortations during the Iraq
Executive Steering Committee (IESC) on April 4 (ref E).


8. (C) Mayor Saber, elected to the Baghdad PC in 2005 on the
ISCI/Badr coalition list, belongs to the Hezbollah Iraq party
and has not always been in lock-step with Chairman Mueen and
other ISCI PC members. However, his recent behavior clearly
cements his loyalty to those supporting the actions of the
GOI against JAM incursions. In no uncertain terms, he has
come out in favor of "eliminating the militia threat" to the
Iraqi nation, and sees Sadrist politics as part of that
threat.

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DEPUTY MAYOR NAEEM SEEN AS SADRIST 'TROJAN HORSE'
-------------- --------------


9. (C) ISCI politicians, mid-level Amanat officials and a
number of Baghdad's local leaders alike tell us that Deputy
Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby uses his position at the Amanat to
serve an illicit Sadrist agenda (ref B). Emplaced through
'official' means, he and others like him are accused of
providing access to the city's resources for militant and
criminal ends. Naeem's relationships with us, and the
Sadrists, are complex. He has proven to be remarkably
cooperative with PRT and other USG efforts at times, and
often says that this puts him at odds with other 'orthodox'
Sadrists.


10. (C) The position of Deputy Mayor for Municipalities
possesses vast authority over hiring and firing of municipal
employees, and the distribution of massive amounts of
municipal funds through contracted work. The Amanat, with
over 15,000 employees and a projected budget upwards of $1
billion USD for 2008, and the power over essential services
for nearly a quarter of Iraq's entire population, is indeed
one of the juiciest pieces of government in the country --
one that Iraq's major political factions will play dirty to
control.

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FOLLOW THE MONEY TO HEART OF ISCI/SADRIST FIGHT
-------------- --


11. (C) Governor Hussein al-Tahan, a former Badr Corps
commander chosen to serve as provincial governor by the PC in
2005, told us in June 2007 that Moqtada al-Sadr approached
him and several other governors to establish better rapport
between provincial governments and the Office of the Martyr
Sadr (OMS) (ref F).


12. (C) Governor Tahan returned a pointed message to Sadr,
requesting that a better relationship might be built if OMS
stopped raking in millions of dollars stolen off the top of
municipal contracts let by Sadrist-affiliated officials at
the Amanat. Skimming up to 30 percent from construction and
repair contracts is standard practice, Tahan explained.
According to several mid-level Amanat employees and a number
of other local officials, OMS continues to get a huge cut of
all monies flowing through the Amanat.


13. (C) However, these sources add that OMS is not the only
beneficiary -- an official close to Governor Tahan told us
that a contract let by the provincial government to build an
apartment complex will line Tahan's pockets due to his
connections to the contracting company. Such allegations
against Iraqi political leaders may be common, but their
frequency does not necessarily negate their truth.

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ISCI LEADERS AT PC USING OFFICIAL POWERS AGAINST SADRISTS
-------------- ---


14. (C) The Baghdad PC is the premiere representative council
in Baghdad; there are over one hundred local councils in
Baghdad's neighborhoods, districts, villages and qadas
(counties) under the authority of the PC. The PC recently
approved bylaws for these local councils which included
several new articles establishing term limits for local
council chairman, and new procedures for the replacement of
council vacancies. PC Legal Committee Chairwoman Khawla
al-Hassani (ISCI) explained these new procedures to us on
March 25, and candidly stated these articles will help
prevent an all-out takeover of Baghdad's local councils by
JAM or Al-Qaeda -- the two major threats to 'legitimate
government' in her eyes.


15. (C) Many of Baghdad's local leaders are also drawing

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battle lines between themselves and the Sadrists. Local
council members attending a session with the PC Council
Affairs Committee on March 22 told us that they are concerned
with what they see as increasing Sadrist influence at the
local level of government in Baghdad, and support any of the
PC's moves to prevent an all-out takeover of their councils
by JAM. These local independents therefore increasingly see
ISCI as a potential political ally.


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SADRISTS CLAIM MORE 'NATIONALIST' APPEAL THAN ISCI
--------------


16. (C) Sadrist Deputy Governor Qassim al-Durraji echoed the
concerns of many Sadrists when he told us April 9 that the
ongoing operations in Basra and Sadr City were "specifically
targeting JAM" despite official GOI and Coalition statements
to the contrary. It is well known that the Badr militia has
infiltrated the ISF, Qassim claimed; therefore by supporting
the GOI in their efforts, the Coalition is merely supporting
one militia group against another, in the eyes of many
Sadrists.


17. (C) Sadrists who engage with us often use rhetoric
painting their movement as more nationalistic and
"authentically" Iraqi than their ISCI rivals. Using this
pro-Iraqi and anti-Iranian language they claim that the U.S.
is seen by the Sadrist rank and file as paradoxically
promoting Tehran's foreign policy objectives by supporting
ISCI's efforts to defeat JAM. Qassim said Sadrists and the
U.S. actually share "common goals" in their desires to
install rule of law and limit Iranian influence in Iraq.


18. (C) When asked about the criminality and violence of
apparently Sadrist-affiliated actors, Qassim acknowledged
that there were many disparate elements seeking to profit
from the chaos, claiming JAM as their banner and Moqtada as
their leader.

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CAMPAIGN SEASON IN BAGHDAD: GET READY FOR A HOT SUMMER
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19. (C) Comment: The political maneuvering of ISCI and the
Sadrists to achieve greater control of the instruments of
power in Baghdad is now entering a new phase. The intensity
of this contest will likely increase as provincial elections
draw near. These domestic political rivals may be defining
their narratives in the context of an international contest
between American and Iranian ambitions, but at the heart of
their struggle lies big-city politics. This is a fight over
who picks up the trash, keeps the sewer pumping and the water
flowing and is as much, if not more, about money and
patronage as it is about ideology and platforms.


20. (C) Comment cont'd: While we must remain firm against
illegal violence, perpetrated by any faction, we must also
seek any and all opportunities to constrain potential
political violence within the confines of civil discourse.
One enabler in this effort will be the Baghdad Law (ref J).
Support to the Iraqi effort to define and enforce the
administrative and legal structure of Baghdad's government
may not be prevent all the violence occurring in the capital,
but its absence all but ensures that local politics will
continue to be fought out, by other means, in Baghdad. End
comment.
CROCKER