PROVINCIAL POLITICS IN BAGHDAD: ANOTHER KIND OF WAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001299 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IR IZ SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL POLITICS IN BAGHDAD: ANOTHER KIND OF WAR REF: A. BAGHDAD 575 BAGHDAD: RIVARLY HEATS UP AMONG SHIA PARTIES ¶B. 2007 BAGHDAD 2040 LEGAL AMBIGUITY IN BAGHDAD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE ¶C. 2007 BAGHDAD 2044 STRUCTURES AND CONFLICT IN BAGHDAD GOVERNANCE ¶D. BAGHDAD 1094 BAGHDAD SITREP APRIL 8 ¶E. BAGHDAD 1074 IESC MEETING APRIL 4 ¶F. 2007 BAGHDAD 1913 SADR SEEKS TO CONNECT WITH BAGHDAD'S GOVERNOR ¶G. BAGHDAD O/I APRIL 1 ¶H. BAGHDAD 562 BAGHDAD: LOCAL COUNCILS AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES ¶I. 2007 BAGHDAD 3391 PROVINCIAL POWERS LAW - NOT QUITE THERE YET ¶J. BAGHDAD 1276 ISCI/SADRIST CONTEST IN BAGDHAD LACK OF BAGHDAD LAW A PROBLEM Classified By: Baghdad PRT Leader Andy Passen for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: If we accept the adages that warfare is the expression of politics by other means, and that all politics is local -- it is clear why Baghdad's local political scene is looking more and more like a battlefield. The uneasy power-sharing agreement between the two major factions controlling Baghdad's provincial government, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists, looks like it is unraveling. Leaders on both sides are ratcheting up their rhetoric and firing volleys of vitriol against their political opponents, reflecting the very real flare-ups of violence in Baghdad's streets. The recent fighting in Sadr City and Basra between GOI units and JAM militants has been the catalyst to clarifying where Baghdad's political battle lines are currently drawn. Many local leaders see the Amanat, the institution at the heart of Baghdad governance, as the ultimate prize in this "local" and "political" war. With provincial elections scheduled to take place by 01 October 2008, campaign season is definitely heating up here in Baghdad. End summary. -------------- -- PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 'FIRES' SADRIST DEPUTY MAYOR -------------- -- ¶3. (C) On February 19, the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) sent word to the three Deputy Mayors ) all top officials within the Amanat, Baghdad's city hall ) that their services would no longer be required (ref A). While officially justified as "house-cleaning" of under-performing managers responsible for the delivery of essential services to Baghdad's residents, many provincial and local leaders saw the move of the ISCI-dominated PC as a frontal assault on Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby, one of Baghdad's highest-ranking Sadrist-affiliated politicians. ¶4. (C) This drama currently unfolding in Baghdad involves not only political rivalries, but also institutional jealousies and bureaucratic bickering. The ambiguity in the fundamental legal architecture defining Baghdad's governance structure, notably the lack of a 'Baghdad Law' as called for by Article 124 of the Constitution, adds to the potential for violence to supplant legitimate political discourse (ref B,C). And of course, like getting to the bottom of any political drama, you also need to follow the money. ¶5. (C) The contest pitting Deputy Mayor Naeem against the ISCI/Badr bloc of the PC continues to play out against the backdrop of the larger conflict between the parties supportive of the GOI's recent stance against JAM, and those in opposition. -------------- ISCI/BADR LEADERS FEEL THREATENED BY SADRIST CHALLENGE -------------- ¶6. (C) Baghdad Provincial Council Chairman Mueen al-Khademy, leader of the majority ISCI/Badr bloc on the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC),told us April 7 that there is increasingly "little room left to negotiate with the Sadrists" (ref D). Chairman Mueen said that the Sadrists and their militia wing, Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM),have infiltrated nearly every office of provincial and local government and utilize this position to re-distribute government resources, easily amounting to millions of dollars, through their illicit networks. Sadrists cannot be seen as a legitimate partner in the political process, Mueen said, as long as this practice is tolerated - and encouraged - by their leadership. ¶7. (C) Mayor of Baghdad City, Saber al-Esawi, decries the BAGHDAD 00001299 002 OF 003 Sadrist infiltration of the Amanat, Baghdad's city hall, which allows municipal offices, equipment and resources to be co-opted by a network of militias and criminals with Sadrist ties. These concerns, related privately to the PRT on April 2 as the crisis in Basra and Sadr City escalated, were echoed again in the Mayor's public exhortations during the Iraq Executive Steering Committee (IESC) on April 4 (ref E). ¶8. (C) Mayor Saber, elected to the Baghdad PC in 2005 on the ISCI/Badr coalition list, belongs to the Hezbollah Iraq party and has not always been in lock-step with Chairman Mueen and other ISCI PC members. However, his recent behavior clearly cements his loyalty to those supporting the actions of the GOI against JAM incursions. In no uncertain terms, he has come out in favor of "eliminating the militia threat" to the Iraqi nation, and sees Sadrist politics as part of that threat. -------------- -------------- DEPUTY MAYOR NAEEM SEEN AS SADRIST 'TROJAN HORSE' -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) ISCI politicians, mid-level Amanat officials and a number of Baghdad's local leaders alike tell us that Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby uses his position at the Amanat to serve an illicit Sadrist agenda (ref B). Emplaced through 'official' means, he and others like him are accused of providing access to the city's resources for militant and criminal ends. Naeem's relationships with us, and the Sadrists, are complex. He has proven to be remarkably cooperative with PRT and other USG efforts at times, and often says that this puts him at odds with other 'orthodox' Sadrists. ¶10. (C) The position of Deputy Mayor for Municipalities possesses vast authority over hiring and firing of municipal employees, and the distribution of massive amounts of municipal funds through contracted work. The Amanat, with over 15,000 employees and a projected budget upwards of $1 billion USD for 2008, and the power over essential services for nearly a quarter of Iraq's entire population, is indeed one of the juiciest pieces of government in the country -- one that Iraq's major political factions will play dirty to control. -------------- -- FOLLOW THE MONEY TO HEART OF ISCI/SADRIST FIGHT -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Governor Hussein al-Tahan, a former Badr Corps commander chosen to serve as provincial governor by the PC in 2005, told us in June 2007 that Moqtada al-Sadr approached him and several other governors to establish better rapport between provincial governments and the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) (ref F). ¶12. (C) Governor Tahan returned a pointed message to Sadr, requesting that a better relationship might be built if OMS stopped raking in millions of dollars stolen off the top of municipal contracts let by Sadrist-affiliated officials at the Amanat. Skimming up to 30 percent from construction and repair contracts is standard practice, Tahan explained. According to several mid-level Amanat employees and a number of other local officials, OMS continues to get a huge cut of all monies flowing through the Amanat. ¶13. (C) However, these sources add that OMS is not the only beneficiary -- an official close to Governor Tahan told us that a contract let by the provincial government to build an apartment complex will line Tahan's pockets due to his connections to the contracting company. Such allegations against Iraqi political leaders may be common, but their frequency does not necessarily negate their truth. -------------- --- ISCI LEADERS AT PC USING OFFICIAL POWERS AGAINST SADRISTS -------------- --- ¶14. (C) The Baghdad PC is the premiere representative council in Baghdad; there are over one hundred local councils in Baghdad's neighborhoods, districts, villages and qadas (counties) under the authority of the PC. The PC recently approved bylaws for these local councils which included several new articles establishing term limits for local council chairman, and new procedures for the replacement of council vacancies. PC Legal Committee Chairwoman Khawla al-Hassani (ISCI) explained these new procedures to us on March 25, and candidly stated these articles will help prevent an all-out takeover of Baghdad's local councils by JAM or Al-Qaeda -- the two major threats to 'legitimate government' in her eyes. ¶15. (C) Many of Baghdad's local leaders are also drawing BAGHDAD 00001299 003 OF 003 battle lines between themselves and the Sadrists. Local council members attending a session with the PC Council Affairs Committee on March 22 told us that they are concerned with what they see as increasing Sadrist influence at the local level of government in Baghdad, and support any of the PC's moves to prevent an all-out takeover of their councils by JAM. These local independents therefore increasingly see ISCI as a potential political ally. -------------- SADRISTS CLAIM MORE 'NATIONALIST' APPEAL THAN ISCI -------------- ¶16. (C) Sadrist Deputy Governor Qassim al-Durraji echoed the concerns of many Sadrists when he told us April 9 that the ongoing operations in Basra and Sadr City were "specifically targeting JAM" despite official GOI and Coalition statements to the contrary. It is well known that the Badr militia has infiltrated the ISF, Qassim claimed; therefore by supporting the GOI in their efforts, the Coalition is merely supporting one militia group against another, in the eyes of many Sadrists. ¶17. (C) Sadrists who engage with us often use rhetoric painting their movement as more nationalistic and "authentically" Iraqi than their ISCI rivals. Using this pro-Iraqi and anti-Iranian language they claim that the U.S. is seen by the Sadrist rank and file as paradoxically promoting Tehran's foreign policy objectives by supporting ISCI's efforts to defeat JAM. Qassim said Sadrists and the U.S. actually share "common goals" in their desires to install rule of law and limit Iranian influence in Iraq. ¶18. (C) When asked about the criminality and violence of apparently Sadrist-affiliated actors, Qassim acknowledged that there were many disparate elements seeking to profit from the chaos, claiming JAM as their banner and Moqtada as their leader. -------------- -- CAMPAIGN SEASON IN BAGHDAD: GET READY FOR A HOT SUMMER -------------- -- ¶19. (C) Comment: The political maneuvering of ISCI and the Sadrists to achieve greater control of the instruments of power in Baghdad is now entering a new phase. The intensity of this contest will likely increase as provincial elections draw near. These domestic political rivals may be defining their narratives in the context of an international contest between American and Iranian ambitions, but at the heart of their struggle lies big-city politics. This is a fight over who picks up the trash, keeps the sewer pumping and the water flowing and is as much, if not more, about money and patronage as it is about ideology and platforms. ¶20. (C) Comment cont'd: While we must remain firm against illegal violence, perpetrated by any faction, we must also seek any and all opportunities to constrain potential political violence within the confines of civil discourse. One enabler in this effort will be the Baghdad Law (ref J). Support to the Iraqi effort to define and enforce the administrative and legal structure of Baghdad's government may not be prevent all the violence occurring in the capital, but its absence all but ensures that local politics will continue to be fought out, by other means, in Baghdad. End comment. CROCKER