TALABANI CHARACTERISTICALLY ROSY ON CABINET,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001292

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI CHARACTERISTICALLY ROSY ON CABINET,
NEIGHBORS, CONFRONTING IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Iraqi President Jalal Talabani on April 23 met with
the Ambassador and S/I Satterfield. Talabani was
characteristically upbeat on engaging Iraq,s moderate
neighbors, specifically Kuwait, Turkey, and Egypt, and
likewise on bringing Fadilah, Iraqiyya, and Tawafuq back into
government. He said the GOI has discussed sending a
delegation to Tehran, led by Prime Minister Maliki but
including members of all major political parties, to present
evidence of Iranian meddling in Iraq directly to the Supreme
Leader, but said the idea at this moment remains
hypothetical. Less encouragingly, Talabani seemed to accept
at face-value reports that American snipers are executing
children in Sadr City and asked that the Coalition pull them
back; the Ambassador emphatically rejected this accusation.
End summary.

All Parties Returning to Cabinet?
--------------


2. (C) Talabani offered a characteristically rosy assessment
of progress toward reuniting the national unity government.
He claimed to have persuaded Fadilah earlier that day to
return to the cabinet, but clarified that Fadilah has not yet
discussed ministerial posts with the Prime Minister,
suggesting more work remains. He spoke also to Iraqiya
representatives, who said their only demand before rejoining
the cabinet is that Maliki renounce the accusation that
Iraqiya leader Iyad Allawi has ties to Shia militant group
Jund al-Sama. Talabani remains upbeat on Tawafuq,s return
as well, though he noted the front,s internal discord over
who will assume the vacant Deputy Premiership and Khalaf
Ulayan,s threat to part ways unless he gets the job.

Plans to Engage Neighbors and Confront Iran
--------------


3. (C) The President was similarly sanguine on improving
relations with Iraq,s neighbors. First, Talabani said
Maliki held an amicable meeting with Kuwaiti Amir Sabah
during last week,s Neighbors, Conference. Second, he said
Turkey had agreed that day to staff the bilateral High
Committee agreed upon during Talabani,s March visit to
Ankara, and proposed that Turkey could reprise its long
history of counterbalancing Iran. Third, Talabani said Egypt
is preparing to activate a parallel committee, similarly
agreed upon during Talabani,s November trip to Cairo.
Finally, the President said that morning,s Presidency
Council meeting had agreed Maliki should visit Amman, a
recommendation the Ambassador endorsed. The Ambassador
further encouraged the GOI to fast-track the confirmation
process for Iraq,s ambassadors to Arab countries, many of
whom are stuck in a backlog of nominees for ministerial and
other posts.


4. (C) The Ambassador condemned Iran,s conduct of bilateral
relations with Iraq via the Qods Force, instead of through
normal diplomatic channels, and encouraged the GOI to
pronounce this unacceptable. Talabani suggested a four-part
strategy to exploit growing frustration with Iranian
intervention in Iraq: a) wean a succession of Shia groups
from the Iranian umbrella; b) align all parties behind the
GOI and against the Sadrists; c) mobilize the population and
Shia clerics against Iran, and d) court Turkey as a
counterweight. Excepting this last, he gave no particulars
on how to realize these ambitious goals, but did say
unspecified GOI leaders are discussing a Maliki-led
delegation to Tehran, comprising members of all major
parties, to present the Supreme Leader damning evidence of
Iranian lethal aid. Talabani noted, however, that this idea
remains in its infancy.

Concurrence on How to Negotiate SFA
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador praised Maliki,s plan for Muhammad
Hajj Hammoud, Iraq,s chief SOFA negotiator, to coordinate
regularly with the five deputies of the Executive Council
principals who will negotiate much of the SFA. The
Ambassador noted that Hammoud,s team is not suited to handle
political (vice technical) negotiations, but such cooperation
would benefit both teams. He added that the Secretary had
agreed with Maliki in Kuwait that negotiations would proceed
on two tracks, with two negotiating teams, but culminate in a
single document per the PM,s wishes. Talabani said this
arrangement reflected Presidency Council thinking, and noted
that Maliki planned to be personally engaged in the SFA
negotiations, rather than relying on a deputy. Maliki,s
briefings, he said, will be the Executive Council,s primary
means of tracking progress. Finally, he advised the
Ambassador to focus on getting Vice President Tariq

BAGHDAD 00001292 002 OF 002


al-Hashemi,s support for the SFA, which would come with
greater difficulty than Maliki,s.

Crediting Reported U.S. Atrocities in Sadr City
-------------- --


6. (C) Talabani credulously relayed reports from a
parliamentary delegation to Sadr City -- of which his niece
Ala Talabani was a member -- that U.S. military snipers are
killing children, and asked that the Coalition pull its
snipers back. The Ambassador responded that U.S. soldiers
definitely were not responsible, stressing that our snipers
are among our most careful and highly-trained soldiers.
(Note: these rumors have emerged from Sadr City through a
variety of channels in recent weeks.)
CROCKER