VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI ON SFA, IRAN, AND CRACKDOWN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ABDEL MEHDI ON SFA, IRAN, AND CRACKDOWN ON
SADR'S MILITIA

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Just back from a meeting with Prime Minister
Maliki, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador
on April 23 that Maliki agrees with the USG vision of a
two-track negotiation process that will yield a single
SOFA/Strategic Framework Agreement. He said Maliki had
recounted a tense meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister
Mottaki on the margins of the April 22 Neighbors Conference,
claiming he had complained of Iranian provision of arms and
training to Iraqi militias. The Ambassador urged Adel and
other top GOI leaders to send a clear message directly to
Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei that Iran's destabilizing
actions must stop. Adel replied that, above all, the
Iranians do not want the Maliki government to fail and this
gives the GOI a "strong card to play." Adel asserted that
Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mehdi (JAM) had exhausted the bulk
of its fighting ability in Basrah, adding that "this is a
good moment for the GOI to gain control over Sadr City." The
Ambassador cautioned that a decisive security operation in
Sadr City must be accompanied with a GOI-led economic
assistance plan to win the populace away from JAM. End
Summary.

Agreement on SOFA/SFA Modalities
--------------


2. (C) Adel explained to the Ambassador and S/I Satterfield
that he had just come from an extended meeting with Prime
Minister Maliki and President Talabani. Adel said the group
had discussed ongoing bilateral negotiations of a SOFA and
Strategic Framework Agreement, adding that Maliki said he
agreed with the USG proposal of a two-track negotiation
process that will yield a single agreement. While GOI
technical experts will continue SOFA talks, deputies of the
Executive Committee members (Maliki, Talabani and the two
Vice Presidents) and a representative of Masoud Barzani will
negotiate the Strategic Framework portion. They will be
joined by Deputy Foreign Minister Hamoud, who is the GOI's
chief SOFA negotiator, and together the negotiators will
regularly apprise their bosses and the GOI Political
Committee for National Security of progress. Adel said
fellow Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was also in agreement
with this approach. Adel stated he will likely depute ISCI
CoR chief Humam Hamoudi and Badr supremo Hadi al-Amri to
represent him in negotiations. The Ambassador stressed the
importance that all deputed negotiators be fully empowered to
negotiate and remain in close contact with their bosses,
recalling that problems and delay arose when the deputies
negotiated the August 2007 "Leaders' Communique."

Iranian Intervention
--------------


3. (C) In further reference to his meeting with Maliki, Adel
said the PM had briefed on a tense meeting with Iranian
Foreign Minister Mottaki on the margins of the April 22
Neighbors Conference, claiming Maliki had complained of
Iranian provision of arms and training to Iraqi militias.
Furthermore, Maliki reportedly told Mottaki he would present
a formal report containing proof to back up these
accusations. He said Maliki had also sounded a strong
message when he met with Syrian Foreign Minister Mu'allam.
The Ambassador mentioned that MNF-I was preparing a public
presentation of evidence it has obtained of direct Iranian
arms supply and training to JAM militants. Adel cautioned
that MNF-I presentation might "escalate" tensions and
suggested that the GOI make the case instead, particularly as
it might fit in well with the report Maliki is building to
present to the Iranian government. The Ambassador said he
would raise the matter at an upcoming meeting with Maliki.
Picking up on a point the Secretary made with Adel and other
senior GOI leaders during an April 20 lunch meeting, the
Ambassador said it was clear that Iran was not dealing with
Iraq as a normal, sovereign nation but instead had ceded Iraq
policy to Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani and was
treating Iraq as it did Lebanon or the Palestinians. He
urged Adel and other top GOI leaders to send a clear, united
message directly to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that
Iran's destabilizing actions in Iraq must stop.


4. (C) Adel replied that while Iran has used Iraq as a
platform from which to attack the U.S., above all the
Iranians do not want the Maliki government to fail and this
gives the GOI a "strong card to play" when dealing with
Tehran. The GOI crackdown on Iran-aided armed groups in
Basrah was vitally important "and showed how things should be
done" in dealing with Iran. Adel stated that Suleimani had
warned Iraqis that operations near the Iranian border, such
as the Basrah operation, was a "red line" for Tehran but did
not try to stop the GOI when it showed resolve and firmness.
He asserted that the Iranians had made the calculation that

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the fall of the Maliki government is dangerous to their
interests, and the GOI must take advantage of this
calculation. When asked about the health condition of ISCI
Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Adel replied that Hakim had
been in poor health since his return 10 days ago from ongoing
cancer treatment in Iran (last week he had a fever of 104
degrees) but is currently on the mend.

GOI Anti-Militia Operations
--------------


5. (C) Adel said that just as the GOI was firm and resolute
in Basrah, it must continue to be strong in its crackdown on
armed militias in Sadr City: "this is a good moment for the
GOI to gain control over Sadr City." The Ambassador stated
that the GOI campaign against armed groups is defining Iraq's
future under the principle that no group other than GOI
security forces may bear weapons: however, the campaign must
be accompanied by political and economic measures and an
emphasis that the operation is not aimed at the entire
Sadrist movement. Sadr City must not be allowed to
degenerate into something resembling Beirut's southern
suburbs to be used by a Hizbollah-like entity. He also urged
the GOI to continue the work begun in the south and to work
with southern tribes, particularly in Maysan, where people
have grown disillusioned with militias and Iranian influence.



6. (C) In reply to Adel's question about GOI/MNF-I military
progress in the Sadr City area, the Ambassador replied that
forces are consolidating gains made in recent days by
installing barriers around cleared areas. He stressed the
importance of quickly following up on such gains with a
GOI-led, GOI-executed economic plan to show area residents
what life can be like without a JAM presence, and noted he
would raise this point in his meeting with Maliki. The
Ambassador said Baghdad's Mayor had already held meetings on
improving local government delivery of services in Sadr City,
and the Deputy Mayor -- a Sadrist -- has participated in such
meetings. Adel stated his belief that JAM had expended the
bulk of its fighting power in late-March: by controlling
entry/exit points and by methodically establishing a
district-by-district presence, the GOI and Coalition can gain
control over Sadr City just as it did in the once-troubled
Karrada area. The Ambassador again emphasized the importance
of an accompanying economic package to take away JAM's
ability to posture as "defender of the oppressed."
CROCKER