ISCI/SADRIST CONTEST IN BAGDHAD; LACK OF BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001276

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI/SADRIST CONTEST IN BAGDHAD; LACK OF BAGHDAD
LAW A PROBLEM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2040 (2007) LEGAL AMBIGUITY IN BAGHDAD
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE

B. BAGHDAD 2044 (2007) STRUCTURES AND CONFLICT IN
BAGHDAD GOVERNANCE

C. BAGHDAD 3391 (2007) PROVINCIAL POWERS LAW - NOT
QUITE THERE YET

D. BAGHDAD O/I APRIL 1

E. BAGHDAD 562 (2008) BAGHDAD: LOCAL COUNCILS AND
ESSENTIAL SERVICES

F. BAGHDAD 575 (2008) BAGHDAD: RIVARLY HEATS UP
AMONG SHIA PARTIES

Classified By: Baghdad PRT Leader Andy Passen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Baghdad province's uneasy power-sharing
agreement between the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI)
and the Sadrists appears to be unraveling. This cable
analyzes how these two factions divvied up the choice
positions in provincial government, where they are currently
butting heads, and why their political contest over the
provincial and municipal institutions has lasting
ramifications for the future of Baghdad as the capital city
of Iraq. The lack of a Baghdad law more clearly defining
institutional relationships contributes significantly to this
political rivalry.

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THE BAGHDAD BALANCING ACT BETWEEN ISCI AND SADRISTS
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3. (SBU) The current balance of power among Baghdad's
political factions coalesced in the aftermath of the January
2005 elections. The ISCI/Badr coalition won 28 out of 51
seats on the Baghdad PC, establishing a dominant and
disciplined majority. The Da'wa coalition, winning 11 seats,
became the de facto 'opposition,' and a smattering of other
parties divvied up the remaining 12 seats. Moqtada al-Sadr
told his followers to boycott the January 2005 elections, but
several Sadrist-affiliated politicians ran independently
under banners of a number of minor parties.


4. (SBU) Prior to the January 2005 elections, local
independents chosen in CPA-sponsored elections governed
Baghdad. By the end of 2005, provincial institutions were
dominated almost exclusively by Shia political party
loyalists. The parties on the PC expanded their authority by
overturning CPA-era institutional arrangements and replacing
independents and technocrats with party loyalists. A gap
left by CPA Order 71, which neglected to define Baghdad's
unique governance structure, was exploited by the PC to
establish control over the Amanat and replace CPA-appointed
officials with Provincial Council members (ref A,B).


5. (SBU) 2005 also saw ISCI and the Sadrists define their
power-sharing agreement, dividing the most powerful positions
in provincial government between them. After selecting
Hussein al-Tahan (Badr) to serve as Governor, the PC fired
the local independent then serving as Deputy Governor and
replaced him with Qassim al-Durraji, a Sadrist with
well-known connections to OMS.


6. (SBU) After asserting control over the Amanat (by firing
the CPA-appointed Mayor and ousting the CPA-era selected City
Council) the PC nominated several of its own to top Amanat
positions. Saber al-Esawi (ISCI list) became Mayor and Naeem
Aboub al-Kaby (Fadhila list and Sadrist-affiliated) was
selected as Deputy Mayor for Municipalities, the most
powerful of the three Deputy Mayor positions at the Amanat.



7. (SBU) In December 2005, Chairman Mueen al-Khademy (ISCI)
ousted the previous PC Chairman, Da'wa leader Mazin Makiya.
Despite the lack of 'official' Sadrists on the council, the
number two spot of Deputy Chairman was given to Sadrist Mohan
al-Saidi (Sadrist independent).

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'BAGHDAD' NEEDS TO BE MORE CLEARLY DEFINED IN
LAW; AMBIGUITY MAKES THE POLITICAL CONTEST WORSE
-------------- ---


8. (SBU) CPA Order 71 generically gave Provincial Councils
authority over the city governments within their provinces;
Baghdad's unique history was not addressed and this gap has
created space for conflict between rival factions; more
clarity in the law might have dampened the effect of this
conflict.


9. (SBU) Traditional Iraqi law considers the Amanat a

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national institution, and the Mayoralty (its leadership) as
responsive to the Council of Ministers. The recently passed
Law of Governorates not Organized into Regions, a.k.a. the
Provincial Powers Law (PPL),does not include special
language resolving ambiguity surrounding the role of the
Mayor of Baghdad (ref C). Article 124 of the Iraqi
Constitution calls for a law to define Baghdad's special
status, but the Council of Representatives (COR) has yet to
give it special attention and will likely delay it as it
focuses on the provincial election law.


10. (C) Mayor Saber told us April 1 that the lack of a
Baghdad Law inhibits the effective provision of services to
Baghdad's residents. An atmosphere of confusion prevents
Iraq's national, provincial, municipal and local bodies from
effectual coordination (ref D, E).


11. (SBU) In the absence of this law, political actors a the
national, provincial and local level seek to define the role
of the Mayor of Baghdad according to the interpretation that
best suits their own interests (ref B). Ambiguity over the
role of the Mayor in turn leads to ambiguity over the
relationships between Baghdad's local councils and the local
offices of the Amanat, relationships that form a critical
component of Baghdad's local governance structure.


12. (C) Sadrist Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby, despite his
recent (and likely politically motivated) 'firing' by the
ISCI-dominated Provincial Council, remains at work in the
Amanat as a 'Special Advisor to the Mayor,' an obviously
politically expedient way for these two parties to call a
temporary cease-fire and prepare for fresh assaults (ref F).


13. (C) During the April 4 IESC meeting, Chairman Mueen
pointedly corrected Ahmed Chalabi when Chalabi referred to
Naeem as the 'Deputy Mayor.' Chairman Mueen stoutly says that
Naeem has been fired and the matter is settled. Naeem has
appealed the decision directly to the Prime Minister's
office. According to Naeem, the Prime Minister sent a letter
to the Mayor reinstating Naeem as Deputy Mayor, which the
Mayor refuses to acknowledge. Amanat contacts confirmed this
to the PRT.


14. (C) Comment: This crisis of Naeem's firing, and possible
reinstatement, is thus both an institutional crisis, pitting
the national government against Baghdad's provincial
government, and a political crisis: ISCI versus the Sadrists.
A complex interplay of personal enmity, factional rivalry
and institutional competition defines the struggle to
dominate the institutions that govern Baghdad, a struggle
likely to escalate as provincial elections, currently
scheduled for October 1, near. End comment.

CROCKER