BUDGET EXECUTION AND PRISON REFORM DOMINATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000126 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018 TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF PREL PTER SUBJECT: BUDGET EXECUTION AND PRISON REFORM DOMINATE DISCUSSIONS AT WEEKLY MCNS REF: BAGHDAD 57 BAGHDAD 00000126 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During the January 13 Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS),National Security Advisor (NSA) Rubaie led a discussion about capital improvement budget execution problems in the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice. Both the IntMin and acting JusMin acknowledged problems but noted improvements over FY2006 execution and briefed planned improvements. The acting JusMin also briefed problem areas within the prison system, noting the need for more prison space, additional guards, militia-free administration, and rehabilitative programs. He expressed appreciation to the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) for building additional prisons and training prison guards. The meeting concluded with a decision to name a MinInt general as the overall operational security force commander during nation-wide Ashura commemorations, honoring Hussein Ali, the Third Imam and sacred Shia martyr. END SUMMARY. Budget Execution Problems -------------- ¶2. (S). In an orderly and relatively productive MCNS, cabinet ministers--urged on relentlessly by National Security Advisor (NSA) Rubaie and FinMin Jabr --focused attention on problems with FY2007 budget execution by the security ministries. Repeatedly Rubaie asked Jabr to detail end-of-year statistics which showed Ministry of Defense (MOD) capital budget execution at just 10 percent, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) at 7 percent, and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) with a "last place" 1 percent. As they reeled through the data, it was obvious that Rubaie and Jabr had orchestrated a well-rehearsed production that seemed to have its intended effect. Deeper Analysis -------------- ¶3. (S) Gone were Bolani's sharp retorts to Rubaie during the last MCNS regarding his unwillingness to present a monthly budget briefing (reftel); rather, he sat quietly, listened intently, and then offered several explanations for the poor performance. He noted the security environment and lack of clear land ownership made building a new police station much more difficult than rebuilding a school, adding that many companies refuse security construction contracts. (Note: the Education Ministry executed about 30 percent of its capital budget authorization, End Note.) Another related problem, he explained, was the difficulty in exercising eminent domain for police stations and traffic control centers. In either case, without proof of MOI property ownership, the Finance Ministry would not release funds for capital improvements. Gaining a bit more traction, he pointed out that planning ministries like Finance--which are based primarily in Baghdad--had relatively simple capital investment issues; but country-wide ministries like Defense, Justice, and Interior had very complex capital improvement challenges. ¶4. (S) Acting Minister of Justice (JusMin) Safa al Safi concurred with Bolani's assessment and added that improvements to FY2008 performance would go hand-in-hand with development of more capable Iraqi construction companies to execute contracts. He also agreed that the government needed to solve the problem of property ownership--especially by ministries--before significant improvements occurred. Performance Data Issues -------------- ¶5. (S) FinMin Jabr admitted gaps and problems with the statistics. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),for example, did not report some foreign embassy construction in its capital expenditure data. The Education Ministry signed lots of contracts, but had yet to request release of funds from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Defense and Interior did not include several multi-year projects. Most problematic, he said, was the failure of some ministries to report any fiscal data at all. Jabr proposed formation of a committee from the security ministries to study capital investment problems--including property ownership--and monitor contracting processes. He advocated concentrating his MOF resources on improving budget execution on the security, BAGHDAD 00000126 002.2 OF 003 service, and key resource (i.e. oil) ministries. Work to Be Done -------------- ¶6. (S) Noting that much hard work remained, Ambassador Crocker congratulated the ministers on significantly improving their performance over FY2006. He pointed out that the American people and their representatives would monitor how well the Iraqi government managed and executed its budget; improving GOI performance would consequently help U.S. Embassy and MNF-I programs. ¶7. (S) General Petraeus also offered congratulations to the ministers for improving their performance and noted their excellent analysis of the overall problem. But he emphasized that the Iraqi "man-on-the-street" was not interested in why a problem existed, they wanted actions to fix it. General Petraeus agreed this work was hard but he urged them to work diligently to significantly improve their execution of FY2008 capital expenditures. Prison Reform -------------- ¶8. (S) Acting JusMin Safa al Safi briefed the MCNS on past problems in the MOJ-directed prison system including several successful escapes made with insider assistance. He acknowledged these problems but promised action. He said he will concentrate his efforts in three areas: infrastructure, administration, and rehabilitation. Regarding infrastructure, he called overcrowding his most immediate problem and thanked MNF-I for building a new prison in Basrah, noting that Coalition Forces have agreed to help with two more in Nasiriyah and Karbala. He expected to see improvements within the next month. Administrative issues were more complex, he explained, because of the influence of militias within the guard force and management. Under the MOJ DG for Corrections, he said he would personally appoint a deputy director with high ethical values for each individual prison; he noted he had already begun the process. Additionally, he lamented the dearth of well-trained prison guards but again expressed appreciation to MNF-I for their training of over 50 new guards and their plans to train about 200 more in the next few months. He noted that rehabilitative efforts were not going as quickly as he hoped but noted the recent appointment of special inmate advisors. He expressed hope that significant changes would occur within the next two or three months. ¶9. (S) The Acting JusMin gave special attention to Baddush prison near Mosul, where there have been significant problems. He promised to press the investigation on recent escapes that were facilitated by prison guards and management. JusMin Safa al Safi said the MOJ already knew most of the collaborators and expected arrests in the very near future. He noted that he was in close contact with the Ninawa (Mosul) Governor to provide additional prison guards who were not under militia influence or control. ¶10. (S) The Ambassador pulled the minister aside at the end of the meeting to stress that the removal of the Corrections DG Juma was necessary for a long term fix of the system. Safe said he understood this and a quick search is underway for a replacement. Finding some one with the requisite ability, integrity and courage would take time; in the meantime the new deputies would constrain him. Ashura Commemoration and Security -------------- ¶11. (S) NSA Rubaie briefed ministers on the general security plan for Ashura which will be observed this year on January ¶19. (Note: Ashura begins a 40-day holy period commemorating the battlefield death at Karbala of the Third Imam and sacred Shia martyr, Hussein Ali, grandson of Mohammed. End Note.) Rubaie pointed out the need for an overall operational commander since commemorations are spread throughout the Shia areas of Iraq, with Karbala as the destination for around 9 million people during the holy days. IntMin Bolani suggested his deputy, saying that the MOI had the largest number of forces involved and a fully functional National Operations Center. Suggesting that time was an issue, NSA Rubaie agreed with the nomination of the Deputy IntMin. General Petraeus BAGHDAD 00000126 003.2 OF 003 suggested the final decision should have MinDef input, but MNF-I would fully support the MCNS nominee in order to have a single commander in place, responsible for all the security forces tasked against the Ashura mission. (Note: MinDef Abdel Qadr is on an official visit to the U.S., end note.) CROCKER