SADR CITY SHEIKHS EXPRESS INTEREST IN SOI IN ORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001258

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PINS PGOV PTER MARR IZ
SUBJECT: SADR CITY SHEIKHS EXPRESS INTEREST IN SOI IN ORDER
TO FINISH JAM

Classified By: Classified by Baghdad 3 EPRT Team Leader Theodore H. And
rews, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Baghdad 3 EPRT Team Leader and the 3BCT/4th
ID Commander met on April 19, 2008 with five leading tribal
sheikhs from Sadr City. During the course of a cordial two
and a half hour meeting and lunch, the sheikhs:

-- Expressed strong interest in launching a SOI program in
the Jamilla and Thawra 1 sections of Sadr City, but insisted
that the USG underwrite the effort and that a senior Iraqi
officer serve as the program's public face;

-- Called for an all out military effort to eliminate JAM ,
urging coalition forces to envelop Sadr City by beginning an
attack from the northeast; and

-- Made clear that they thought any reconstruction effort
would not be effective at this time, but noted the need for
humanitarian assistance and employment generating projects.

The U.S. side briefed on the continuing military operations,
and urged the sheikhs to participate actively in the
reconstruction/redevelopment effort that will follow
completion of the Sadr City barrier access project. Both
sides agreed to meet again on April 26. End summary.


2. (U) Participants:

Iraqi

-- Sheikh Jalil Mohammad Al-Badaiy (Al-Sawaed Tribe)
-- Sheikh Mohammed Jakhair Mutlak (Al-Izerij Tribe)
-- Sheikh Kadhem Fares Al-Mizban (Al-Sawaed and Al-Teeran
Tribes)
-- Sheikh Chaseb Moolah Khaleefah (Al-Bineiter Tribe)
-- Sheikh Kadhem Sahen Eissa (Al-Tameem Tribe)

U.S.

-- Mr. Andrews, Baghdad 3 ePRT Team Leader
-- COL Hort, 3rd BCT Commander
-- COL Chimienti, Baghdad 3 ePRT Deputy Leader.

Location: Iraq ARMY Headquarters Building, Old Ministry of
Defense Complex, Baghdad


3. (SBU) Note: This meeting followed several attempts
thwarted by various contingencies, including movement
restrictions out of Sadr City, and the April 12 meeting
between the sheikhs and senior Iraqi government officials.
The sheikhs indicated that four of their colleagues were
unable to attend the meeting at the last minute. They
promised to inform them of the meeting's results. Sheikh
Jalil Mohammad Al-Badaiy did most of the talking for the
Iraqis. End note.

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Sons of Iraq and Sadr City
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4. (C) The meeting opened with a detailed discussion of
current military operations in Sadr City, and the Sheikh's
views on JAM and its membership. Saying that the vast
majority of Sadr City residents opposed JAM, Sheikh Al-Badaiy
said the group had roughly 4,000 followers in Sadr City.
Only about a third of the group was trained to fight. He and
the other sheikhs were particularly scornful of Moqtada al
Sadr. At various times in the discussion, they belittled his
intelligence or sneered at his leadership abilities.


5. (C) Although the sheikhs said they had rejected an appeal
by senior Iraqi officials to designate about 300 people to
serve as a local security force in Sadr City, the sheikhs
expressed keen interest in the idea of a Sons of Iraq program
in the Jamilla and Thawra 1 sections of Sadr City. They
believed they could identify up to 500 names for the program
within a week to ten days. All the candidates would be
residents of the area.


6. (C) Several of the sheikhs emphasized the importance of
U.S. funding. They did not believe the GOI would provide any
funds, let alone regular payments. That said, the group
agreed that an Iraqi had to be involved with any
disbursement. They specifically rejected MOI involvement,
but named several figures associated with the MOI as
potential program sponsors.


7. (C) The U.S. side noted that the SOI was not a panacea for
all that ailed Iraq. Within six months, the volunteers would
find themselves directed toward conventional careers in the
Interior or Defense Ministries. The sheikhs accepted this

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news without comment.

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Call for All Out War/Humanitarian Update
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8. (C) The Iraqi side issued several blood chilling demands
for an all out effort to smash the JAM and, by extension, Al
Sadr. If necessary, they claimed themselves ready to
sacrifice 500,000 Sadr City residents if that was what it
took to eliminate JAM. Bombing the Office of the Martyr
Sadr's office in Sadr City was another idea they proposed.
More practically, several of the sheikhs called for an
aggressive effort to pay for information about senior JAM
leaders.


9. (C) When asked about the wall now under construction, they
said they understood its purpose, but worried about the
impact on other parts of Sadr City. It would be useful, they
argued, to attack from the northeast, thereby squeezing the
JAM fighters in the central part of Sadr City. The sheikhs
wondered about recent reports that Moqtada al Sadr would
order the dissolution of JAM if the rival Badr Organization
were also disbanded.


10. (C) The sheikhs claimed that reconstruction was useless
under present circumstances, but called for humanitarian
assistance in areas where possible. They thought
electricity, trash, and sewage removal were the most
important jobs now. Several of the sheikhs said they were
not aware of the Iraqi Army's distribution efforts in parts
of Thawra 1.


11. (C) Comment. The sheikhs were scornful of the Iraqi
government, which they thought was more corrupt and
ineffective than Saddam's At the same time, they were fully
supportive of the idea that the elected government should be
in full control of the country's streets. This attitude
reflected their sense that they should be bigger players in
running the country, and disdain for the upstart Moqtada al
Sadr. We agreed to meet again on April 26. End comment.
CROCKER