MCNS APRIL 20: RULE OF LAW, MOSUL AND BASRAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001251 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER PHUM ECON IZ IR SUBJECT: MCNS APRIL 20: RULE OF LAW, MOSUL AND BASRAH SECURITY, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: Topics covered at the April 20 MCNS session included implementation of the Amnesty Law (cases are moving through the system - but there were concerns that some judicial review committees were approving too many); planning for military operations in Mosul (additional forces are being readied for operations in June/July); the state of operations to secure Basrah (encouraging - need to maintain the momentum); emergency development aid to Basrah, Baghdad, and Mosul (money has been allocated but projects are not being implemented); differing Iraqi and U.S. views of the suitability of Iraqi arms purchases from Serbia; and the status of plans to shift responsibility from the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to the Iraqi Army for transporting and securing bulk shipments of Iraqi currency. END SUMMARY. AMNESTY LAW -------------- ¶2. (S REL AUS UK) PM Maliki opened the April 20 session of the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by inviting the head of the Higher Judicial Council, Chief Justice Medhat, to present on the work of judicial committees reviewing applications for amnesty under the February 2008 Amnesty Law. Medhat briefed that from February 15 to April 10, over 16,000 detainees had been ordered released and over 6000 more moved from the detainee system into the judicial system. Twenty-seven review committees nationwide were prioritizing applications from juveniles, followed by women, detainees, and then prisoners. The Justice praised the committees for moving so many cases quickly, acknowledging that with a project of this scope errors were inevitable. Deputy PM Barham Salih noted that there had been problems implementing release orders. MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus said that the Amnesty Law was a major step forward, but he noted his concern that in five provinces the review committees had an approval rate over 90 percent, an outcome that reflected the need for greater governmental scrutiny of those committees. MOSUL PLANNING -------------- ¶3. (S REL AUS UK) Iraqi Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Babakir Zebari updated the Committee on the status of preparations for major operations in Mosul. 2200 new local volunteers had been signed up in Mosul, 590 of who had completed training. Iraqi Army (IA) units were being trained and equipped so that they could begin operations in June/July, and would be manned to 115 percent strength. The IA was receiving support from MNF-I to fortify positions and prepare medical facilities, which would be closer to the fighting than had been the case in Basrah. Each battalion would have ten medical personnel assigned. The PM cautioned against pulling units out of training prematurely to push them forward. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶4. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus applauded the GoI's decision to allocate $350 million to emergency development projects in Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul, but noted that thus far none of the funds in this allocation had been spent. He said that civilians tasked to implement projects should not be over-studying the problems but "should be walking behind the troops" and taking action with cash on the spot. He noted that now would be a good moment to rebuild a market in the southern part of Sadr City, for example, but GoI officials were not on the scene to implement such a project despite the fact that Coalition Forces and ISF had already secured the area. ARMS PROCUREMENT FROM SERBIA -------------- ¶5. (S REL AUS UK) The most energetic discussion of the evening came when the PM invited Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr al-Mufriji to explain the MoD's recent major arms deal with Serbia. The deal with Serbia had been the subject of international media criticism and a prominent article in the New York Times. Abdul Qadr invited into the room a dozen generals and MoD bureaucrats who had accompanied him to Serbia to negotiate the deal, which involved fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters as well as land vehicles, weapons, and other equipment. Detailing the professional BAGHDAD 00001251 002 OF 003 qualifications of his colleagues, he defended the price and suitability of the equipment ordered and rejected insinuations (including in the U.S. media) that the only explanation for the deal was that Iraqi officials must have received bribes or payoffs. He invited anyone with evidence of corruption to bring that evidence before the MCNS. ¶6. (S REL AUS UK) GEN Petraeus and MNSTC-I Commanding General LTG James Dubik stated that the U.S. had no objection to Iraq purchasing weapons from third countries. GEN Petraeus indeed thought most of the Serbian equipment looked like a reasonable buy, if it met quality standards. MNF-I had objected only to the MoD's decision to purchase helicopters unsuitable for Iraq's climate (those helicopters were since dropped from the procurement plan) and a new model of fixed-wing trainer/light attack aircraft, which existed only in the form of an unproven prototype. LTG Dubik said he had offered to have USAF experts sit down with IqAF counterparts to re-examine the suitability of the aircraft, but the Iraqi side had delayed the meeting due to the demands of operations in Basrah. LTG Dubik renewed the offer to have his experts sit down with their Iraqi counterparts. ¶7. (S REL AUS UK) Abdul Qadr and his team energetically defended their proposed purchase, citing the aircraft's suitability for counterinsurgency warfare and its state-of-the-art electronics, as well as the seller's agreement to equip the planes to Iraqi specifications. LTG Dubik stated that he thought Iraqi dollars had not been well spent in the purchase of an unproven, prototype aircraft. GEN Petraeus urged the Committee to make the details of the Serbian deal public to allay citizens' concerns, noting that a previous MoD had been guilty of arranging overpriced ammunition purchases so he could skim off the top. Addressing the question of purported U.S. slowness in carrying out FMS procurement, the CG reminded the Committee that the GoI was sitting on 800 million dollars in unsigned Letters of Agreement. The CG noted that the U.S. could not deliver any more equipment without major decisions by the MoD. BASRAH SECURITY -------------- ¶8. (S REL AUS UK) Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Waeli briefed on the status of Operation Charge of the Knights (OCK) phase III in Basrah. The ISF had successfully secured main roads throughout Basrah as well as the key port areas. Oil tankers continued to load. An extensive Explosive Ordnance Demolition and clearance effort was underway. ISF had seized large arms caches, including an IED factory, over 1000 IEDs, and 30 brand new mortars. Nonetheless, militia leaders and fighters had escaped across the Iranian border or into the marshes. Local tribal councils (which al-Waeli was at pains to say should not be seen as an "Awakening" movement) continued to support the GoI/ISF. The Shalamsha Port of Entry on the Iranian border - which the GoI had originally intended to close for the first 48 hours of OCK - remained closed. The PM commented that he did not object to the POE being reopened so long as personnel were replaced top to bottom to combat corruption and co-optation. ¶9. (S REL AUS UK) Al-Waeli cautioned that the militias were not a spent force, and it was important to maintain momentum: flushing out corrupt police, continuing to seek out and confiscate heavy weapons, and maintaining a tight hold on the ports to prevent corrupt elements from reasserting themselves. GEN Petraeus noted that it would be necessary to rotate fresh IA units into the city to relieve those now committed, and the effort to build up the 14 IA and rebuild the Basrah Police was an urgent task. ¶10. (S REL AUS UK) A discussion ensued on the importance of carrying out economic development projects immediately - including, noted DPM Salih, to reward Basrah-area tribes that had supported the Government. Committee members zeroed in on the importance of eliminating obstacles to commerce through Umm Qasr port, where shippers complained that they paid "taxes" (in some cases seemingly bribes) to as many as 10 local and national governmental entities to move goods through Umm Qasr. Similar concerns existed at Basrah's airport. The PM suggested that part of the solution lay in placing the port and airport in the hands of professional, Western management companies. GEN Petraeus encouraged the Committee to pursue this idea, which had been successful at Baghdad International Airport, adding that the key to success with the Basrah area ports would be "good Iraqi leadership." The PM summed up the discussion by saying that four lines of operation - military, political, tribal engagement, and BAGHDAD 00001251 003 OF 003 economic/services - must be maintained to consolidate control of Basrah. BUTLER RELEASE -------------- ¶11. (S REL AUS UK) UK Ambassador Prentice cited the bravery and professionalism of the Iraqi Security Forces and thanked the GoI formally for the recovery of a UK citizen, journalist, Richard Butler, who had been freed in Basrah during OCK II. CASH TRANSFER -------------- ¶12. (S REL AUS UK) The Minister of Defense discussed the IA's support for the movement of large quantities of Iraqi currency (which is printed in London) from Baghdad Airport to domestic distribution locations. Coalition Forces had been conducting this task, although the MCNS had directed that it transition to the Iraqi Security Forces in March. The IA had been scheduled to take over this security mission in early March 2008, but the handover had been delayed by the MoD. The MoD thanked the MoD and MNF-I for their support and asked for a month's forbearance until his organization would be prepared to accept full responsibility for the mission. BUTENIS