Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1240
2008-04-22 02:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP IN DAMASCUS: DEFT

Tags:  PBTS PTER IZ KU 
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P 220212Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6951
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 001240 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2018
TAGS: PBTS PTER IZ KU
SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP IN DAMASCUS: DEFT
SYRIAN AND IRAQI HANDLING OF THE MEETING; IRANIANS UNDER
THE CLOUD OF BASRAH

REF: 07 BAGHDAD 2693

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 001240 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2018 TAGS: PBTS PTER IZ KU SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP IN DAMASCUS: DEFT SYRIAN AND IRAQI HANDLING OF THE MEETING; IRANIANS UNDER THE CLOUD OF BASRAH REF: 07 BAGHDAD 2693 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: SARG MFA allowed the Iraqi delegation considerable latitude to pursue its agenda at Syria's second hosting of the Iraq Neighbors' Border Security Working Group (BSWG) April 13-14 (the first Damascus meeting was in August 2007). Surprisingly, given the state of Syrian Saudi relations, the Saudis were represented. Iran sent a delegation that was considerably less confrontational than last year. Turkish special envoy to Iraq Ozcelik was effective in his efforts to balance Iraqi criticism for cross-border raids, and prevent the Iranians from getting special mention of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Substantively the final recommendations and the lack of practical discussion mean the format has few specifics to pass to the Neighbors Foreign Ministerial in Kuwait, but the Iraqis seem happy with their performance in this multilateral forum. This may reflect tough questions from the Egyptians, Kuwaitis and Jordanians as to whether the BSWG should come under the Foreign Ministers or Interior Minister rubric. While the SARG succeeded in getting favorable language and watering down some language, the fact the meeting was held and the Iranians were kept on a short leash were the event's accomplishments. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In preparation for the Neighbors Process Ministerial scheduled to be held in Kuwait April 22, the Border Security Working Group (BSWG) held its second meeting in Damascus April 13-14. Participants included neighboring states Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (a previous no-show which sent a representative from their Damascus Embassy),plus Egypt, Bahrain, the Arab League, and first-time attendee the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Attending as observers were UNAMI (Political Affairs officer Matthias Leitner),the EU (represented by the French DCM on behalf of current EU president Portugal),and the G-8 ambassadors. (Note: the August 2007 session included P-5 ambassadors. We understand that the Japanese ambassador's request to attend the BSWG led to the G-8 formulation. Within this framework, the Italian Ambasssador and German Charge also attended the meeting. End note.) The U.S. delegation comprised the Charge, as we
ll as the DHS Attache and Deputy POLITICAL Military Counselor from Embassy Baghdad. ¶3. (C) Echoing the opening remarks he delivered during the August 2007 gathering, Syrian Interior Minister MG Bassam Abdel Majid noted that Syria was one of the first states ever to suffer from terrorism in the 70's and 80's. He reiterated the steps that Syria was taking to stem the flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq, including mobile patrols, increased checkpoints spaced every 2-3 km along the 550-km border, a 3 meter-high berm, and increased inspection to impede the flow of illegal arms and goods across the border. Abdel Majid again lamented the unfulfilled "foreign promises" of equipment like night vision goggles, a reference to what the SARG believes was a U.S. and later UK promise to provide border equipment in 2004. ¶4. (C) Abdel Majid said that it was not up to Syria alone to control the border but cited the "common responsibility among the neighboring countries." In closing, Abdel Majid reaffirmed SARG condemnation of all forms of terrorism and readiness to combat it, cautioning against linking terrorism to Arabs and Muslims, renewing a call for an international conference under UN auspices to identify terrorism and its motives, underscoring the need to "differentiate between terrorism and the rights of peoples to resist occupation." ¶5. (C) Iraqi delegation head D/FM Labeed Abbawi presented his remarks, noting that the group's work would have an important effect on the lives of Iraqis, allowing them to live in peace and permitting those in neighboring countries to return home. It was important to make progress on the group's work since the August 2007 meeting. In response to Abdel Majid's remark that the neighbors need a partner with which to work, Abbawi pointed to the improved security situation in Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces successful efforts since the GOI started applying Fard al-Qanoon (FAQ) in Baghdad and other cities. This plan has been successful and contributed greatly to reducing the incidents of violence, terrorism, and crime, in addition to bringing back displaced families to their homes. FAQ was comprehensive and was not intended to target any particular party. The government has cracked down on terrorists and volatile areas throughout Iraq, proof to all Iraqi parties that the GOI was not sectarian or representative of any one particular POLITICAL slant. BAGHDAD 00001240 002 OF 007 ¶6. (C) National reconciliation is occurring side-by-side with FAQ, through legislation passed by the CoR: the amnesty law, which led to release of close to 30,000 detainees; the Accountability and Justice law; which facilitated the return of many former employees, civilian or military, and also provided pension rights to several others. The GOI is now opening to the tribes who fought against AQI and armed groups. This has a large impact on building trust among Iraqis. The main result was the Iraqi awakening. These steps, however, do not mean that all that needs to be done has been accomplished. ¶7. (C) There are still some issues that were agreed upon at the last meeting that need implementing procedures and follow-up, such as liaison officers between Iraq and neighboring countries. While every country has pledged to appoint an LNO except for one (Note: believed to be Saudi Arabia. End note),officers have not been exchanged, nor have there been any meetings. We need new information-sharing procedures on terrorists, weapons smuggling and organized crime members, and drugs. There are still weapons smuggling routes as well as terrorist financing networks that require better border control. We have information on the presence of some groups that exist in neighboring countries. This situation requires cooperation to remove this cancer that kills everywhere. ¶8. (C) Iraq, however, has seen improvement in the implementation of some recommendations made at the last meeting in the areas of counterintelligence exchange, and a reduction in the level of inflammatory media rhetoric. There also has been a reduction of fatwas from religious circles in some of the neighboring countries. As far as border infiltration, there has been a reduction in the number of infiltration by terrorist groups, VBIEDs, and the incidence of expired consumer goods being smuggled into the country. ¶9. (C) We are concerned about the bombing that has occurred on the border by Turkish and Iranian forces, which negatively affects border villages and threatens the lives of innocent Iraqi citizens and their property. This issue needs to be discussed with our Turkish and Iranian friends to prevent its recurrence. We bring these concerns not to exchange accusations but to move forward. We want this meeting to be as much about quality as well as quantity in terms of the work accomplished in counter-terrorism and criminal control or border control and to prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives to achieve stability, which will in turn reflect on the stability and security of neighboring countries. ¶10. (C) Unfortunately, events in Basrah demonstrated continued regional interference by neighboring countries in domestic Iraqi affairs, direct and indirect, according to agendas that contradict with Iraq,s unity and the security of its territory. Military operations, however, were a striking indication that POLITICAL reconciliation was occuring side by side with respect for rule of law. ¶11. (C) In closing, Abbawi called on the need to exchange information on the smuggling of arms, drugs and people, citing the existence of routes from some neighboring countries leading into Iraq. Abbawi underscored that Iraq did not want to confront neighboring countries on these issues, rather, it sought to identify the problems in order to resolve them. ¶12. (C) In separate remarks, Iraqi MOI U/S for Intelligence Hussein Ali Kamal noted that "foreign" arms were captured during the GOI security operations in Basrah, adding that some of the neighboring countries were negatively affecting the security situation by providing training to militias. Kamal called for the establishment of a committee to document illicit actions foreign entities were carrying out in Iraq. ¶13. (C) Under co-chairs Abbawi and Syrian Assistant FM Ahmed Arnous, who took over the role played by Syrian Political Security Department head Major General Mohammed Mansoura at the August 2007 meeting, Egyptian delegate head MFA Assistant Minister Dr. Hamid al-Zain began the formal delegation remarks, noting that Egypt had taken a stand with Iraq since the "beginning of the crisis" and sought to coordinate with all parties in order to bring stability to Iraq. Regional security and stability is integrated, which led Egypt to host Sharm el-Sheikh conference and other international conferences to deal with Iraqi conditions. ¶14. (C) National reconciliation is the foundation for the return of security and stability of Iraq. The gathering of the working group is about all countries respecting each BAGHDAD 00001240 003 OF 007 other and also respecting the principle of good neighbors and non-interference in the internal affairs of others and support for reconciliation efforts. Egypt watched with concern the recent security setback in Iraq, namely, Basrah. Let,s be honest, al-Zain said, the road to Iraqi security and stability is still a long one. The emergence from the recent crisis requires compromise and security, which is not achieved by force. We have to intensify POLITICAL measures to ensure the existence of a unified government that represents all Iraqis based on a constitution accepted by all Iraqis. We are gathered here to confront terrorism in a coordinated fashion. ¶15. (C) al-Zain made five suggestions: 1) Re-activate channels to exchange information, particularly with the neighboring interior ministries regarding suspect individuals to prevent threats to Iraq and other countries; 2) Iraq should provide to the GOE the latest report on Egyptian detainees in Iraqi custody, as well as the charges against them; 3) BSWG members, particularly Iraq, should exchange lost passport data to prevent use by terrorist entities; 4) Inform the Neighbors Process standing secretariat of the Interior Ministers of the recommendations of the BSWG; 5) Focus on the main hierarchy for issues related to the Security Cooperation protocol in counter-intelligence, borders, and organized crime that was signed by Neighboring countries ministers. Al-Zain hoped that the conference would conclude with an agreement on serious steps which show commitment and honest intentions to support and aid Iraq with what is needed to reach tangible results. ¶16. (C) Jordanian MOI Secretary General Mukhaimer Abu Jammous expressed confidence in the improvement in the security situation in Iraq, stating that Jordan was doing its utmost to fight terrorism, noting the existence of networks and Jordan's firm pledge to combat terrorism and these networks. He underscored that security in Iraq is integrated with regional security declaring that the GOJ will not hesitate to act against any terrorist operation targeting Jordanian security, nor would it provide safe haven to any terrorist groups on Jordanian soil or who seek to use Jordanian soil from which to launch operations against neighboring countries or other countries. Finally, Jordan rejected any bargaining with terrorists or giving in to their demands. ¶17. (C) Jordan has suffered from terrorism, notably the 2005 hotels attacks and the rocket attack in Aqaba in which dozens of innocent civilians died. He stressed the need for regional collective effort against terrorists and identification of specific measures to control the border and stop illegal cross border activities. He added that Jordan had taken border security such as the addition of a checkpoint across from Iraqi Trebeel crossing point. He underscored that Jordan prevented any practices that promote violence and sectarianism. ¶18. (C) The Kuwaiti Delegation head noted the importance of the BSWG as a forum in which to exchange ideas on how best to achieve cooperation and coordination between Iraq and the neighboring countries, either bilaterally or within the framework of the Security Protocol signed by interior ministers at the second Neighbors conference held in Jeddah in 2006. Kuwait has taken a number of steps to control the border, using advanced equipment for both day and night surveillance, as well as physical barriers and increased maritime patrols. The GOK appointed liaison officers to exchange information with Iraqi officers to crack down on terrorist activities. Kuwait is ready to provide border security training to Iraq. He closed by expressing his hope for "an end to all border violations and excesses by Iraq" to permit the UN to carry out its work according to UNSCR 833, including preserving delineation of the border. He expressed support for Fard al-Qanoon which has led to security improvements in Baghdad and the central provinces. ¶19. (C) On Basrah, he said that the violence and opposition had led to Iraqi casualties that confirmed the need to redouble efforts to do away with all militias and take steps to encourage all the parties and POLITICAL blocs to participate in POLITICAL activity and use peaceful means to convey their POLITICAL stances. Kuwait supports all Iraqi efforts aimed at enforcing government institutions and political dialogue and support for vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Kuwait added it answered the UN,s call for donations to the refugee commission to help the Iraqi displaced allocating USD 1million for health and education. Kuwait condemned all attacks against institutions and innocent Iraqis, infrastructure, and houses of worship. He stressed Kuwait,s BAGHDAD 00001240 004 OF 007 commitment to Iraqi sovereignty, independence, and peace, pledging not to interfere in Iraqi domestic matters. Kuwait said its desire to assist Iraq is demonstrated by its hosting of the third Neighbors Process ministerial meeting April 22. Kuwait would work to re-enforce its cooperation with Iraq and support the establishment of security and stability. Iraq and other neighboring countries should all shoulder this responsibility. ¶20. (C) Iranian delegation head MFA Director for Arab Affairs Firoozadeh (who led the Iranian delegation to the 2007 Damascus meeting) said that Iran had taken steps to control the border, having signed the Security and Cooperation protocol to implement all relevant procedures. Iraq has seen progress and more success under Maliki, as demonstrated by improving security conditions and confronting insurgency and criminal activities. The GOI had proven its ability to manage its own affairs, given its several successes despite all the obstacles laid by Coalition Forces. What will help Iraq most will be the transfer of POLITICAL and security responsibilities to the GOI and an end to Coalition interference. ¶21. (C) Iran continues its support to the GOI in the realms of politics, government, security and economics. Continuing efforts between Iraq and its neighbors within the framework of the Neighbors Process will help dramatically improve security and stability in Iraq. This will occur in addition to individual efforts taken by Iran in controlling the common border. Continuing cooperation continues via existing agreements to control the borders like the MOU to implement the bilateral border agreement to delineate the land and maritime borders signed by foreign ministers in Tehran in March. ¶22. (C) This conference takes place in the face of unfortunate events in Basrah and Baghdad. Iran, Firoozadeh said, spared no efforts to improve cooperation and coordination aimed at building a foundation for security. What happened in Basrah was an example of Iran,s active role in bilateral cooperation, demonstrated by controlling the clashes and limiting them and supporting all Iraq security plans to implement the law. After 5 years of occupation, the GOI is capable of managing its internal affairs. The situation calls for an expedited end to the occupation, and for an end to UN Chapter VII vis-a-vis Iraq. What is required is support from neighbors. Sovereignty and independence is the right of all Iraqis that should not be compromised. Foreign occupation forces should not make Iraq bargain for its current and future stability and independence. We see improving POLITICAL and security operation. It should have the support of the regional states. The occupier should stop humiliating the GOI with its practices and procedures. If these practices stop, there is hope that the conditions will improve and Maliki,s government will succeed. ¶23. (C) The Arab League delegation head said Iraq needed to "reach the shore safely," as demonstrated by the gathering today. Iraq must live in peace with itself and its neighbors, and be integrated with the region and within the international community. Occupation forces had the primary responsibility for security. This responsibility was then transferred to Coalition Forces. Recently, a conference was held among Arab leaders in this very city where they reached a decision to stress again the Arab point of view of achieving security and POLITICAL solutions for Iraq,s challenges, based on the basic elements of respect, unity, sovereignty, and the independence of Iraq. ¶24. (C) Turkish Envoy to Iraq Murat Ozcelik rebutted Abbawi,s remark on the Turkish bombings in the north, noting that the GOT had taken "stringent measures" on the borders to prevent terrorists from going into Iraq as well as terrorists going into Turkey, steps which have contributed to Iraqi stability. PKK is an issue which has been discussed between both countries. Iraq has condemned the PKK as a terrorist organization. We are now cooperating with Iraq. In this vein, there is forward motion, such as the late April visit of Iraqi Deputy Joint Forces Chief Abadi to Ankara. There is discussion on other ways to deal with these issues. Military cooperation is a possible outcome. We are moving in the right direction. The policy process is ongoing. The GOI passed important legislation. We have to see what direction the election law will be going. ¶25. (C) There are still difficulties, Ozcelik said, but today,s gathering is a sign of the commitment of the neighbors to Iraq,s security. All steps must be taken to BAGHDAD 00001240 005 OF 007 stop individuals from infiltrating into Iraq. Turkey has controlled its border and deterred criminals. This is a critical year. The neighbors must work together to take steps to help Iraq to restore security and stability so that the POLITICAL process can go forward. ¶26. (C) Absent from this session were remarks by the observer countries, despite assurances by Deputy FM Arnous that delegations would be invited to comment. ¶27. (C) The final session entailed review of the 13-point recommendation paper (text below) ) 8 points longer than the August document. Drawn from the Iraqi recommendation paper with the input of various delegations, notable additions were support for Iraqi efforts to end armed activities, collection of illegal weapons, and the dismantling of militias; explicit reference to the exchange of liaison officers; the creation of a Baghdad-based secretariat for the working group to interior ministers that would issue biannual reports; support for the Support Mechanism to the Foreign Ministers Plenary; a call for adoption of &international criteria8 when countries are considering designation of refugee status to individuals who may be involved in terrorism. The final point expressed gratitude to Syria for hosting the meeting and &extensive Syrian efforts and cooperation8 in controlling its border with Iraq. When we suggested quietly to other neighboring delegations that they might want to broaden the list of cooperating names, the Iraqi and Jordanian delegations told us the wording only drew attention to Syria's unhelpfulness since Syria was the only name mentioned. The Iranian delegation suggested naming the MEK specifically in Article VII as an example of a terrorist group that is using Iraqi soil to carry out elicit activities. The motion was quickly rebuffed, as Syria and Iraq argued that mentioning one group would lead to mentioning all groups. ¶28. (C) The session became somewhat contentious, as Egypt and Jordan criticized the out-of-nowhere appearance of the separate support mechanism for the BSWG, wondering whether it would be subordinate to the interior or foreign ministers. The Kuwaiti delegation added its concerns as to whether the BSWG came under the Interior or Foreign Ministry umbrella and it was agreed that this matter would be addressed before or during the April 22 meeting. The Arab League reprised its positive role of helping the process by preventing the SARG from eliminating text calling on neighboring countries to collect illegal weapons, dismantle militias, and prevent the entry of illegal weapons into Iraq. A number of the recommendations are a grab-bag of bilateral pet peeves, with the reference to Takfir reflecting Iraq,s disquiet with radical Saudi and Kuwaiti clerics who occasionally denounce the GOI, and the vetting of refugee applicants for terrorism ties a possible Iranian addition related to its MEK concerns. In contrast to the August session, delegates for the most part avoided bilateral backbiting with Iraq and appeared to approach the proceedings with more purpose. ¶29. (C) Comment: The SARG allowed the Iraqis considerable leeway as Syria sought to cast itself as the facilitator rather than be branded the guilty party in foreign terrorist infiltration into Iraq. Both the Syrian and Iraqi delegations clearly learned their procedural lessons from the August gathering, opting to prepare the media statement the evening before the opening session, and limiting the drafting committee membership to Iraq, Syria, and the Arab League to blunt Iranian interference. The Iraqi delegation seemed more confident and self assured as it worked the meeting to its advantage and was satisfied with the recommendations paper. While the SARG MFA lead role meant that there was no focus on practical measures that had been seen last year when the Ministry of Interior chaired the meeting, the MFA controlled discussion and ensured the meeting stayed on track. The GOI was able to use the specter of Iranian complicity in the events in Basrah and Baghdad, a theme that figured prominently throughout the conference, to its advantage against Iran. In that vein, the Iranian delegation was markedly less aggressive in its presentation and remained virtually silent throughout the two days. ¶30. (C) The BSWG has not reached its full potential and may not in its current format. The gathering to focus on Iraq,s security needs is irksome to many delegations, epitomized by the stony silence of the Saudi representative from the Damascus Embassy. The occasional digressions towards bilateral irritants have prevented the group from focusing on concrete measures, leaving little substance to forward up to the interior ministers. End Comment. BAGHDAD 00001240 006 OF 007 (BEGIN TEXT) Recommendations The Security cooperation and Coordination Committee of Iraq's Neighboring Countries met in Damascus on April 13-14 2008 with the participation of representatives of Iraq's neighbors, Egypt, Bahrain, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference the five permanent national at the UN SC, the G-8, the UN and the European Union. Based on the common desire to enhance the cooperation between Iraq and the countries neighboring it for the consolidation of its security and stability, Stressing the respect of Iraqi unity, sovereignty, independence and preserving its Arab Islamic identity, and the reflection of this on security and stability in the region, and in light of the mutual commitments among the parties according to the recommendations reached in the first meeting of the Committee held in Damascus on August 8-9, 2007, as well as the agreements and Memoranda of Understanding signed between Iraq and the neighboring countries, And after listening to the presentation made by the head of the Iraqi delegation on the current security situation in Iraq and the needed security efforts to support the endeavors aiming at establishing security and stability in Iraq, And while the Committee stresses the importance of the topics it discusses as they constitute a significant element for the success of the committees of Sharm el-Sheikh conference held on May 4, 2007 as what is being established in the security arena reflects positively on the work of these committees and different aspects of life, The participants agreed on the following recommendations which will be presented to the forthcoming plenary Ministerial expanded meeting of Iraq's Neighboring Countries due in Kuwait on April 22, 2008, and to the next meeting of Interior Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring countries which will be held in Jordan in October of this year. ¶1. Praising the positive cooperation between Iraq and the neighboring countries in the field of fighting terrorism and controlling borders, and the efforts exerted by the Iraqi government in this field, leading to improvement in the security situation in Iraq. The continuation of this requires more coordinated efforts and taking practical steps to fight all forms of terrorism and drying up its various resources of financing, and confirmation that controlling the borders is a shared responsibility between Iraq and the neighboring countries. ¶2. Supporting efforts of the Iraqi government to end armed activities, collecting illegal weapons, dismantling of militias, and calling on all countries to commit to prevent the entry of weapons into and from Iraq. ¶3. Stressing the importance of boosting the cooperation on the bilateral and regional levels to combat organized criminal activities and drugs. ¶4. The necessity to activate channels for the exchange of information on security issues, inter alia, to the concerned elements through the channels and the agreed-upon mechanism, particularly within the framework of the meetings of the Interior Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries in a way that guarantees that no threats occur against Iraq or any neighboring country. ¶5. Calling on the countries which haven't yet ratified the Security Cooperation Protocol signed on September 26, 2006 in Jeddah, to sign it as soon as possible, and stressing the importance of the bilateral security committees formed between Iraq and the neighboring countries, urging the neighboring countries which haven't signed yet on the bilateral MOUs with Iraq in the security field to take the needed procedures towards signing these memoranda as soon as possible. ¶6. Calling on the concerned countries and parties to adopt the international criteria in fighting terrorism when considering granting the status of refugee as to make sure of the legal situation of those applying for it. ¶7. Stressing on the necessity of taking measures that guarantee not using the territories of Iraq or any territory BAGHDAD 00001240 007 OF 007 of neighboring countries for training or organizing terrorist actions committed within Iraq or against other countries or their citizens and enhancing cooperation between Iraq and neighboring countries to eliminate any such threat through dialogue and diplomatic channels. ¶8. Stressing on the prevention of provoking violence or blaspheming the others (Takfir) in whatever forms, and adopting recommendations not to deal with any Iraqi elements that call for terrorism, Takfir, inciting sectarian sedition, or calling for undermining the POLITICAL process in Iraq. ¶9. Stressing the importance of the recommendations issued by the Committee of Border experts which was held in Kuwait on October 22-23, 2007, in implementation of the decision of the Security Cooperation and Coordination committee in its first meeting, with an emphasis on the necessity on carrying out these recommendation which tackled the process of border control, taking quick procedures to name liaison officers, if not yet done so, and defining means of communications to activate their roles, exchange of information, and the proposal to hold another meeting of the Committee on the margins of the upcoming fifth meeting of the Neighbors Process Interior Ministers meeting this year in Amman in 2008, to follow up the implementation of the recommendations endorsed by the first meeting. ¶10. Calling on all neighboring countries to cooperate with the Baghdad-based Secretariat of Ministers of Interior of Iraq's Neighboring countries, presenting the bi-annual reports to follow up the implemented recommendations and decisions. ¶11. Stressing on cooperation with the Support Mechanism ratified in the plenary meeting of Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries held in Istanbul in November 2007 which will be formed at the Iraqi foreign Ministry to follow up all results of the Ministerial meetings and their sub-committees, and presenting their findings to the ministerial meetings of the neighboring countries once the duties and the rules of the procedures concerning this mechanism have been ratified. ¶12. Stressing the importance of commitment to achieve Iraqi national reconciliation and accord, praising the role for the Iraqi government in this regard, calling on the Arab League to continue its efforts in this regard in coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi government and the parties concerned. ¶13. Expressing thanks and gratitude to the Syrian Arab Republic for hosting this important meeting, excellent hospitality and welcome, and for the facilities it has provided to make this meeting a success. Also commending extensive Syrian efforts and the cooperation it showed in controlling the borders with Iraq which helped improve security and stability in Iraq. (END TEXT) BUTENIS

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