ADEL AND BARHAM OPTIMISTIC OVER BATTLE WITH JAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ MOPS
SUBJECT: ADEL AND BARHAM OPTIMISTIC OVER BATTLE WITH JAM

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Rob Waller for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In separate April 15 meetings with Special
Assistant to the President Brett McGurk, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh marveled
at the new political atmosphere in Baghdad following PM
Maliki's offensive in Basrah. Both leaders expressed
optimism over what they characterized as a decisive
confrontation between the GOI and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).
McGurk emphasized that the U.S. supports Maliki's actions
"100 percent" - but the overall strategy must be designed to
minimize the fight. Both Barham and Adel said they heard
that Muqtada al-Sadr was in Najaf. Barham said that the
Iranians were "scared" after the events in Basrah and seeking
to restore the status quo in Iraq. Adel said "nothing new"
was occurring in Iraq-Iran talks and urged the U.S. to talk
to Iran directly. Prior to his meeting with McGurk, Barham
was discussing a 10 million USD development plan for an area
in the heart of Baghdad. Polmilcouns also attended the
meeting with Adel. End Summary.

VP Mehdi: JAM on Defensive, Nothing New With Iran
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Adel was optimistic about the GOI offensive against
JAM, crediting an improved political atmosphere to PM
Maliki's Charge of the Horseman. "All of us agree Basrah was
badly implemented," he said "but the outcome was good." Adel
explained that we "may have over-evaluated" the Sadrists,
saying that they are strong only when they control the
population. He said that JAM was now weakened and expended
the "maximum of their power" in Basrah. Sadr now faced a
choice between being either a "revolutionary or a peaceful
movement, you can't be both" and only by applying continuous
"pressure on the security issue" could the GOI compel the
Sadrists to make the correct choice. Adel said it was
"absolutely false" to see the campaign as a showdown between
ISCI/Badr and JAM, saying that the conflict was between the
government and those trying to hinder progress. Adel added
that the Badr Corps made a decision in 2004 to integrate into
the ISF through a legal process, and said a similar option
"should be open" to JAM, even though they were founded after
the overthrow of Saddam.


3. (C) "Your side hesitated," Adel complained, when the GOI
decided to prosecute JAM. He said that within the UIA there
was confusion over the American position. McGurk explained
that in the early stages of Basrah we worried the offensive
might reunify JAM Special Groups, JAM writ large, and the
larger Sadrist Trend, but emphasized that the U.S. supported
Maliki's actions "100 percent." He described the
conversation the previous day between the Prime Minister,
Ambassador Crocker, and General Petraeus, in which all agreed
on coupling a strong and resolute security strategy with a
political and economic opening, so as to minimize the group
that the Iraqi government, with Coalition support, will need
to fight.


4. (C) On Iran, Adel said Iraqi officials were traveling to
Iran to receive Iranian reassurances that Tehran would stop
supporting violence in Iraq. Asked if the assurances
amounted to anything, Adel responded that the "key part" was
the U.S.-Iran relationship. Adel suggested that the U.S.
address the issue of the Mujahideen el-Khalq (MEK) as a way
to improve its relations with Iran. McGurk pointed to the
President's April 10 speech, explaining that Iran has a
choice to make; and assurances amount to nothing so long as
Iran continues to arm, fund, and train illegal groups.

Barham: Support for Maliki, but concerns about Mosul
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Told that Talabani had characterized the current
situation as "spring in Baghdad," Barham laughed and said "or
it could be an Indian summer." "The Iranians are scared,"
said Barham, "they were shocked by Basrah and they are trying
to restore the status quo by wooing back Maliki." He sharply
criticized the GOI for refusing to take a stand, "even in
private," against the Iranians for their role in inciting
violence, saying GOI needed to "get off the fence." The
bottom line, Barham said, "is who is supplying the weapons?"
Barham complimented the recent POTUS speech on Iran, agreeing
that Iran faced a clear choice in its policy towards Iraq.
"We have an opportunity now to break JAM apart, both
militarily and politically, and prevent it from becoming
another Hizbollah" said Barham. He acknowledged that the
Sadr City operation "could backfire big time" and emphasized
the importance of rallying behind PM Maliki. McGurk
reiterated U.S. support for the GOI's moves against JAM.
Barham added that several Sadrists told him that Sadr had
returned to Najaf. Barham said the planned offensive in
Mosul was important politically as a demonstration to Shia

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that PM Maliki was also targeting Sunni extremists. However,
he said he left "unhappy" from a recent briefing on the
operation, worrying that the expected May 1 start date was
too early and the GOI risked stretching its forces too thin.


6. (C) Before meeting with American officials, Salah
concluded a meeting with the mayor of Baghdad on a 10 billion
USD development plan for the Rashid garrison, a large area of
the capital adjacent to the International Zone (IZ). The
project will include commercial and residential development
and be financed through private investment, and Barham
planned to call the heads of various companies over the next
week to solicit their support. According to the Baghdad
mayor, "for the first time people feel comfortable standing
up to JAM."


7. (C) Barham said that Tawafuq had submitted a list of
ministers to the GOI, mentioning Ali Baban and Rafad Asawi,
and added that Khalaf al-Ayan was being nominated for the
position of deputy prime minister.
CROCKER