MCNS APRIL 13: BASRAH LESSONS LEARNED, MOSUL NEXT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018
TAGS: MOPS PINS PGOV PREL PTER IZ IR
SUBJECT: MCNS APRIL 13: BASRAH LESSONS LEARNED, MOSUL NEXT
STEPS, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S REL AUS UK) SUMMARY: PM Maliki chaired the 13 April
Ministerial Committee on National Security, focusing on
security operations in Basrah and Mosul. Discussion
underscored the importance of analyzing recent operations in
Basrah and elsewhere to correct deficiencies in Iraqi Army
and Police planning, operations, and security prior to launch
of new operations in Mosul. The National Security Advisor
presented a proposal to formalize control and liaison
relationships among national security organs but the
Committee chose to continue discussion at a later date. END
SUMMARY.

TAKING STOCK OF BASRAH
--------------


2. (S REL AUS UK) The PM opened the 13 April session of the
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by
announcing that the next day's Crisis Action Cell would focus
on upcoming security operations in Mosul and environs, and
inviting Minister of Interior Bulani to take stock of
operations in Basrah. Bulani characterized "Operation Charge
of the Knights" against the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) as
"historic," saying it had already led to improved security
conditions in Basrah and encouraged moderate political
elements join the constitutional process. Clearance and
weapons recovery operations continued with the 12 April
launch of "Operation Charge of the Knights II" with Iraqi
Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) units taking responsibility
for different sectors. Local (i.e. tribal) volunteers who
had been given temporary positions in the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) at the start of the campaign were now being
vetted for permanent employment. The GoI had demonstrated
firm intent to confront criminals.

LESSONS LEARNED FOR MOSUL
--------------


3. (S REL AUS UK) Turning to Mosul and Ninevah, the PM said
the GoI had twenty days to reexamine plans for an operation
there. The opposition would be comprised of different
elements than those faced in Basrah - Al-Qaeda, Ba'ath
remnants, "hit and run cells." The Ministry of Defense
(MoD),Ministry of Interior (MoI),and intelligence agencies
would need to pool resources and coordinate targeting. The
PM continued that the Basrah operation had not gone according
to expectations. For example, the GoI/ISF had expected a
tough fight for militia strongholds and the port area, but in
the end the militia had relinquished its strongholds and had
given up the port almost without a shot. The Iraqi Air Force
(IqAF) aircraft did not have the combat power to provide air
support, but CF attack helicopters and utility helicopters in
the transport role had been invaluable. The PM praised the
support of tribal forces, adding that he hoped this element
could be brought to bear in Mosul. The head of the
Counterterrorism Bureau interjected that many of the IPs in
Basrah had proved disloyal, and would telephone JAM to warn
them of upcoming attacks. A lengthy exchange followed with
MoI Bulani, who denied that the IPs had been any less loyal
than other elements of the ISF.


4. (S REL AUS UK) Turning again to Ninevah, the PM reiterated
the importance of drawing lessons from previous operations.
Forces deployed must be of proven loyalty to Iraq (a point
that MoI Bulani echoed, saying that in Basrah the ISF had
fought two battles - one "within our own establishments" and
the other with the enemy). The IA, IP, and intelligence
agencies must coordinate. Deputy PM Barham Salih suggested
that the PM's presence on-site in Basra had been a valuable
element of the GOI/ISF success. He called on the MCNS and
ISF commanders to form a "Lessons Learned" committee to
analyze the fighting in Basrah, Sadr City, and elsewhere.
One aspect of this review should be to analyze ISF forces
unit by unit to ascertain which could not be relied on.
MNSTC-I commander LTG Dubik noted that decisions made in 2007
on the structure and composition of units had provided the
ISF with the strategic flexibility rapidly to reinforce
"Charge of the Knights." He added that any after-action
review should look at planning already underway in MoD and
MoI.


5. (S REL AUS UK) LTG Babakir Zebari, Armed Forces Chief of
Staff, echoed the theme that the coming fight for Mosul would
not be a rerun of Basrah. The ISF would face foreign
fighters infiltrating from Syria. The IA forces would not be
as subject to local influence as in Basrah, but this problem
would still exist among IPs: local police were always local.

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On the positive side, operations to shape the battlefield in
Mosul had continued even during the Basrah fighting, and
liberated zones had been established on both banks of the
Tigris. Citizens were tired of terrorists and eager for
change, as in Baghdad.


6. (S REL AUS UK) MNF-I DCG LTG Cooper highlighted the
importance of ensuring that reconstruction and services
initiatives were integrated into Mosul planning and
operations. He also welcomed that fact that plans for Mosul
were to be discussed with the CG MNC-I the next day at the
Crisis Action Cell and emphasized the need to co-ordinate
planning with Coalition. Foreign Minster Hoshyar Zebari (a
native of Mosul) emphasized the need to coordinate with local
leaders. The PM said that Mosul differed from other cities
in that, while tribal influence was strong on the outskirts,
in the city proper a number of established families rather
than tribes exercised influence. The PM would mobilize
Mosulawi parliamentarians of every stripe to support the GoI
action.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
--------------


7. (S REL AUS UK) National Security Advisor Rubaie invited
the Director of INIS, Muhammad al-Abdullah Al-Shawani, to
offer a threat assessment, noting that this assessment had
been coordinated by Iraq's several intelligence agencies.
Al-Shawani ticked off a number of threats the intelligence
community was working: a possible increase in sectarian
violence, tensions in the Middle Euphrates and South,
continued infiltration of the ISF, possible major
infrastructure attacks, possible AQI attacks on high-value
(Shia) targets to goad JAM into lifting its ceasefire, and
continued AQI suicide bombings. INIS expected that AQI,
which was short of funds, would continue its efforts to
infiltrate the ISF as well as Sons of Iraq (SoI) units, to
rebuild its bases in the Baghdad belts, and to seek
opportunities to build ties to Shia radicals and to Shia who
sought revenge against the ISG for personal losses. The
Director called for ISF to be flexible and adaptable to
confront a flexible, adaptable enemy. As an example, he
noted that the IPs needed female officers able to search out
female suicide bombers.


8. (S REL AUS UK) MoI Bulani dismissed the general and
specific contentions, saying that the IPs had some female
officers, and their numbers sufficed given the paucity of
female suicide bombers. He disagreed with the proposition
that the ISF had fallen into predictable patterns. Rubaie
supported INIS, suggesting that the CF/ISF approach to
establishing Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts had
become too routine - each area of Sadr City, for example, had
its own special character which ISF/CF must take into
account. A vigorous discussion ensued of the importance of
developing intelligence to permit ISF to target specific
criminals in raids rather than rely on neighborhood clearance
operations.

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
--------------


9. (S REL AUS UK) Rubaie next presented a proposed new
national security architecture, meant to be consistent with
Iraqi law and those elements of Coalition Provisional
Authority still in effect pending Iraqi legislation.
Discussion of Rubaie's proposal bogged down in confusion and
jocularity regarding his complicated multi-colored
organization charts, but not before LTG Babakir had made a
plea for delineation of MoD and Chief of Staff
responsibilities, and an indecisive debate had ensued as to
whether Special Forces should come under the Ministry of
Defense, Ministry of Interior, or directly under the office
of the Prime Minister. Rubaie said he would take comments on
board and come back to the committee with a revised version.

CROCKER