THE AMBASSADOR'S AND GENERAL PETRAEUS' APRIL 14

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001198 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S AND GENERAL PETRAEUS' APRIL 14 MEETING WITH PM MALIKI Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Prime Minister (PM) Maliki reviewed plans for security operations in Mosul with the Ambassador and General Petraeus on April 14. Maliki expressed consternation with what he saw as overly-generous descriptions of the Sadrists during the recent Congressional testimony; the Ambassador and General Petraeus countered that it was important to offer the Sadrists a choice between enjoying legitimate political participation and maintaining an illegal militia. After reviewing positive political developments with the Sunnis and Kurds, Maliki delivered an impassioned criticism of Iraq's Arab neighbors in general, and of Saudi Arabia in particular. End summary. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador and General Petraeus, accompanied by NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk and Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries, met April 14 with PM Maliki at his residence. The PM was joined by his Chief of Staff, Dr. Tariq Abdallah, and his Chief of Protocol. Mosul -------------- ¶3. (S) The PM noted that he was headed to a meeting with General Austin at the National Operations Center to discuss plans for Mosul. General Petraeus suggested that the PM task General Riyad with preparing a campaign plan, to include a multi-month security plan, a plan for tribal/political engagements, an economic development plan, and a border security component. He suggested that the PM also consider appointing a minister or deputy minister to assist in the execution of the non-security lines of operation. Maliki said General Riyad has a "full plan" that includes tribal engagements and reflects ISF lessons learned in Basrah. "Mosul is different from Basrah, but we can still apply some of those lessons there," said the PM, who planned to hear out Riyad's plan before making any decisions. He added that the GOI was moving forward with plans to spend USD 100 million in Mosul on improving services, and noted that no fewer than 10,000 volunteers had stepped forward to assist in the effort to secure Mosul. General Petraeus observed that it might be a good idea to ensure a healthy representation of Yezidi, Shabbak and Christian elements so that those populations would be in a stronger position to resist efforts to displace them. Maliki agreed, and said all three groups already had put forward lists of candidates for their areas. Maliki said that while the Kurds were willing to help, using their forces might create a political crisis. "I told the Kurds we'll keep them in reserve and use them if we need to," said Maliki. Maliki also noted continued tensions between General Riyad and the Ninewa governor. General Petraeus suggested that Maliki still needed to try to get the two to work together. Maliki Mollified -------------- ¶4. (S) Turning to the recent Congressional testimony, PM Maliki expressed -- at considerable length, and with visible emotion -- his disagreement with remarks attributed to the Ambassador and General Petraeus indicating that the Sadrists were a legitimate Arab nationalist movement. "Are these statements true or not true? And if they are true, what is the intention behind them?" asked Maliki, who added that such statements had left some in Iraq, such as the Kurds, puzzled by the U.S. position. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador explained that both he and General Petraeus had simply emphasized that the Sadrists face a choice and must decide whether to participate as a legitimate part of the Iraqi political process or to pursue illegal militia activity. He added that our understanding of Maliki's position is that he is, in fact, prepared to deal with the Sadrist Trend as a political movement, but not to tolerate their involvement with violence. Maliki agreed with that description, adding: "You know I've tried with them, and I've even defended them" (a point General Petraeus later reinforced by reminding Maliki of how the GOI had prevented MNF-I from going after JAM's Baha al-Araji Brigade). However, the PM continued, recent Sadrist atrocities against innocents had crossed a line. "When I said that they are now worse than Al-Qaeda in Iraq, I meant it," declared Maliki, who spoke at some length about why violent Sadrists were not Arab nationalists. "Nationalists do not fight their own government, and they do not gouge people's eyes out, or break their arms . . ." Maliki said. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador reminded Maliki that both he and General Petraeus had publicly declared that the GOI had taken a courageous stand against militias, and that the country was BAGHDAD 00001198 002 OF 003 united behind the government. At the same time, in order to isolate extremists within JAM, they had emphasized that those in the Sadrist Trend must make a choice about the future of their movement. "I don't disagree with this as policy," admitted Maliki, who conceded that telling the Sadrists they needed to make a choice was a useful message. "We must show decisiveness, while leaving the door open for their return to the political process," Maliki eventually summarized. Next Steps in the Fight -------------- ¶7. (S) Turning to next steps, Maliki said that experience had shown that political engagement alone does not work with the Sadrists; the GOI had to use force. On an encouraging note, he claimed that Governor Maliki of Maysan Province (a Sadrist distantly related to the PM, who suspects him of being involved in smuggling Iranian weaponry into Iraq) and the Provincial Council had separately written Maliki with offers to hand over wanted criminals and respect the law so that Maliki would not need to send forces into Maysan. Maliki then recapped his plan to spend $100 million on economic reconstruction in Mosul, $100 million in Basrah, $100 million in Sadr City, and $50 million in Shula. "We'll compensate people, help them to feel that the state is taking care of them, and use the money to separate them from the militias," Maliki vowed. He said a special committee would be formed to deal with reconstruction in Sadr City, which posed unique challenges because of its population density, and discussed using a portion of the $100 million to build 4,000 housing units outside of Sadr City to relocate some families. He noted plans as well to make Kadhimiya a weapons-free holy city like Karbala. ¶8. (S) General Petraeus probed for clarity on what the endstate would look like: Which ISF units would bear responsibility for what areas? Maliki blithely asserted that General Abud and his Coalition advisors were "working on this." General Petraeus noted that he did not think the there were sufficient forces. Maliki responded that General Abud was confident the ISF had the necessary numbers so long as Coalition reserves were nearby; General Petraeus reminded the PM that, to the maximum extent possible, the ISF needs to remain in the lead on this operation. Political Developments -------------- ¶9. (S) Turning to the political front, Maliki confirmed that he has had positive discussions with Sunni Vice President Hashimi on IIP's return to the government, and Hashimi has promised to provide a slate of IIP nominees to fill the ministerial vacancies created by Tawafuq's departure. "He promised they'll return soon," said the PM. Maliki admitted he was offering Hashimi incentives (movement on the Executive Council and detainee issues) after being prodded by President Talabani to do so. "Hashimi wants our support for his position within the IIP, and we're ready to provide that," he said. Maliki was also upbeat about relations with the Kurds, noting that the Kurds had agreed to move a draft oil bill through the parliament as soon as annexes to the bill were completed. Neighbors Conference -------------- ¶10. (S) Towards the end of the meeting, Maliki shifted his focus to the upcoming Neighbors Conference in Kuwait. Maliki demanded to know why the UAE, Oman, Qatar, the GCC and Sweden had been invited to the Conference without Iraq's knowledge or consent. (Note: The Iraqi MFA was consulted and concurred with the invitation of Sweden. Kuwait extended invitations to the other GCC states without first consulting with Iraq. End Note.) He then disparaged the very idea of another Neighbors Conference, saying that Iraq got nothing out of it. "We have seen nothing positive from Iraq's neighbors: they did not reduce our debt, they did not return their embassies, and they have all interfered in our political, military and financial realms. So what's the use of continuing the Neighbors process?" asked the PM. Maliki said he intended to be candid with the neighbors and would deliver a "tough message" that their current behavior cannot continue. The Arab neighbors needed to discharge their obligations toward Iraq if they expected Iraq to shield them from Iran. The Ambassador and General Petraeus agreed with Maliki's frustration with Iraq's Arab neighbors, but reminded Maliki that the presence of additional GCC states at the Neighbors Conference was a positive development, as was the invitation for Iraq to join the GCC 2 meeting in Bahrain. ¶11. (S) Maliki blasted the Saudis in particular. "If they (the Gulf Arabs) want to talk about violence, maybe we should BAGHDAD 00001198 003 OF 003 have a conference about Saudi Arabia. Most terrorists here are Saudis . . . The Saudi people have a culture that supports terrorism. The Saudi government cannot control it, and they cannot get rid of the terrorist institutions that are creating and funding terrorism. I told Vice President Cheney that (Saudi) Prince Muqrin is funding a Sunni army to oppose the Shia army . . . I don't want to make threats, but if the Saudis keep saying things about me publicly, that I am Iran's man, then I can say things publicly about them as well," said Maliki. Pausing for breath, Maliki resumed: "We welcome relations with the Saudis and we do not want tensions, but neither do we want to be seen as weak. We are not begging for a relationship with them. We want a relationship of equals." Maliki concluded the meeting by wishing the Ambassador and General Petraeus success in their visit to Riyadh. CROCKER