SADR TO COALITION: HEY INFIDEL, WE WILL ALWAYS BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001153

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: SADR TO COALITION: HEY INFIDEL, WE WILL ALWAYS BE
ENEMIES

REF: HILLAH 46 (RIYADH AL-NURI ASSASSINATION)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) Summary: After more than six months of relative
silence, Muqtada al-Sadr has issued three public statement in
the past five days. The latest statement on April 12
addressed recent public remarks by Secretary Gates (who Sadr
branded a "terrorist") and is a rabble-rousing screed that
turns repeatedly to Sadr's lowest-common-denominator refrain
of enmity toward the Coalition. Although the statement did
not expressly lift Sadr's freeze on Jaysh al-Mehdi (JAM)
operations, it gives implicit sanction to attacks against
Coalition targets and may be interpreted by militant Sadrists
as a relaxing of the freeze for at least this limited
purpose. It also calls into question Sadr,s willingness to
participate in provincial elections, and more broadly in
Iraq's fledgling democracy. A local political observer with
good lines into the Sadrist Trend told us that Trend
officials are blaming Badr cadres, possibly with the active
assistance of Iranian Qods Force operatives, for the April 11
assassination of senior Sadr aide Riyadh al-Nuri. An
ISCI/Badr source refuted this allegation, blaming it instead
on an internal Trend rift over the direction of the movement,
and claimed that ISCI/Badr had heard through multiple
channels that Sadr has been back in Najaf since Wednesday
April 9. End Summary.

April 12 Sadr Statement
--------------


2. (C) On April 12, Sadrist websites posted a statement
attributed to Sadr "in response to the comments of the
terrorist (the American Secretary of Defense)." (Note: In an
April 11 press conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
said "those who are prepared to work within the political
process in Iraq, and peacefully, are not the enemies of the
United States" and he encouraged Sadr to participate in the
political process. End Note.) In his statement, Sadr
repeatedly and explicitly rejected Gates' statement and any
cooperation with the U.S., saying "you will never be anything
but my enemy until the last drop of blood leaves my body."
After reciting a well-known Quranic verse entitled "The
Infidels," Sadr vowed that "even if you do not take me for an
enemy, I consider you as my enemy, and if you do not withdraw
from our land or schedule your withdrawal...we will never
give up resistance." Referring to calls to join the
political process, Sadr asked "What political process do you
want me to participate in while you occupy our land? It is
we that gave life to the process...because we thought it was
a prelude to your departure from our land."


3. (C) Sadr emphasized Iraqi unity and downplayed any
conflict with the GOI, calling on the GOI "to stand side by
side with its people to get the occupier out of Iraq" and
saying "the government, parliament, and all those who belong
to this holy land are my brothers so long as they are your
(U.S.) enemies." Notably, Sadr clarified that "I do not
support armed manifestations in any area as long as it is
free from the occupier," giving at least implicit endorsement
to armed attacks in areas with a Coalition Force presence.
The statement also seemed to sanction violence against Iraqis
who cooperate with the coalition, but reserved most of its
venom for the Coalition itself. Throughout the text, Sadr
used language and verses from the Quran instantly
recognizable to his audience as part of a broader Islamic
narrative of Muslim resistance to Western occupation. In so
doing, Sadr reinforced the theme of recent messages in which
he has tried to re-frame his struggle with the GOI as a fight
against foreign occupation.

More on Assassination of Riyadh al-Nuri
--------------


4. (C) Ibrahim al-Sumayda'i, a local political observer who
has good lines into the Sadrist Trend, told us April 13 that
Trend officials are blaming Badr cadres, possibly with the
active assistance of Iranian Qods Force operatives, for
al-Nuri's assassination (reftel). According to Trend rumors,
al-Nuri reportedly ran afoul of the Iranians by spurning
recent Qods Force advances. Haitham al-Husseini, senior aide
to ISCI chief Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, told us April 13 that
al-Nuri was one of the more influential "moderates" within
the Sadrist movement, and that al-Nuri had participated in
past mediation efforts between the Sadrist Trend and
ISCI/Badr. Haitham conceded that many Sadrists are accusing
ISCI/Badr of the killing ("they blame us for every bad thing
that happens to their group") but denied that ISCI/Badr was
in any way connected with the incident. Haitham pointed out
that Badr strongman Hadi al-Amri was one of the first CoR
members to condemn the assassination during the April 12 CoR

BAGHDAD 00001153 002 OF 002


session. He speculated that the killing may have resulted
from an internal rift over the direction of the Sadrist
Trend, and called our attention to a letter purportedly sent
recently by al-Nuri to Sadr in which he expressed support for
the dissolution of JAM.


5. (C) Haitham also said that ISCI/Badr had heard through
what he characterized as "three different channels which have
been reliable in the past" that Sadr has been back in Najaf
since late Wednesday April 9 on a visit from Iran, and that
he intends to return to Iran. "Al-Sharq al-Awsat" newspaper
carried a similar report, claiming that Iranian officials
forced Sadr to return. We note that rumors of Sadr's return
to Iraq are not new and have circulated periodically in past
months.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) During the first six-plus months of Sadr's freeze on
JAM operations, Sadr issued only two public statements under
his name: a December 2007 statement which affirmed the
validity of the freeze and a February freeze extension order.
Since the GOI's "Operation Charge of the Knights" began last
month in Basrah, however, four statements alleging to be from
Muqtada have been circulated - three in the past week alone.
This sudden burst of often fiery verbiage may signal an
attempt by Sadr or his inner circle to more firmly impose
leadership and direction on the Sadrist movement while it
faces a perceived period of danger. There is no reason not
to take Sadr,s opposition to the Coalition at face value, as
it has been the foundation of his popular appeal since 2003.
At the very least, the statement represents a calculated
increase in Sadr,s rhetorical attacks against the Coalition.
Although not a formal lifting of the cease-fire, it gives
implicit sanction to attacks against Coalition targets and
may be interpreted by militant Sadrists as a relaxing of
restrictions on JAM activity for at least this limited
purpose. It also calls into question Sadr,s willingness to
participate in provincial elections, and more broadly in
Iraq's fledgling democracy. Sadr is striking an increasingly
strident and militant tone at the same time Maliki insiders
Sadiq al-Rikabi and Sami al-Askari tell us -- with apparent
but possibly ill-founded confidence -- that the GOI is
preparing to strike even harder at what they seem to perceive
as a paper JAM tiger that has not obeyed the freeze order
since Basrah fighting began last month.
BUTENIS