ISCI'S AMAR AL-HAKIM ON POST-BASRAH UNITY, JAM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001113

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: ISCI'S AMAR AL-HAKIM ON POST-BASRAH UNITY, JAM,
AND IRAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1065 (MALIKI SCORES BIG)

B. BAGHDAD 664 (AMAR-AL HAKIM MEETING)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) Summary: In an April 8 meeting, Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) heir apparent Amar al-Hakim told us
the recent GOI crackdown in Basrah was an important step in
affirming Iraq's identity as a nation based on the rule of
law and institutions rather than a country ruled by outlaw
gangs. He said he has had "frank" discussions with top
leaders about translating security gains into political
progress, and responding to growing public support through
better delivery of services. The black-turbaned Amar
asserted that ISCI and the GOI were taking a new view of
short-term integration of Shia tribesmen to assist the GOI in
maintaining security in south-central Iraq. If the Jaysh
al-Mehdi (JAM) is disbanded and its members pledge loyalty to
the state, he continued, some can be integrated into the
Iraqi ARMY and police in the same manner as members of Badr
and the Peshmerga. Regarding ISCI-Sadrist relations, Amar
said "all we see from them is anger" and he attributed poor
relations to a lack of a common ideology among Sadrists ("the
Trend in reality is a mixture of contradictory trends") and
little political experience among Trend leaders. Amar
encouraged resumption of USG-Iran dialogue, stating that it
would serve the interests of both sides as well as enhancing
Iraq's stability. End Summary.

New Momentum for Political Progress
--------------


2. (C) Meeting at ISCI's headquarters outside the
International Zone, Amar told NSC Senior Director McGurk that
the recent GOI security crackdown in Basrah signaled that
Iraq is affirming its identity as a nation based on the rule
of law and institutions rather than a country ruled by
criminals and outlaw gangs "even though a heavy price must be
paid for this." Amar said Iraq's public and political
leaders had rallied around Prime Minister in this effort, and
the Political Committee for National Security had produced a
strong and supportive April 5 statement (Ref A),and he said
he had "frank" talks with Maliki, Vice President Tareq
al-Hashemi and others on ways to build on this new-found
spirit of unity. In order to translate recent security gains
into political progress, Amar continued, the GOI must improve
its delivery of public services and invest in job-creating
rebuilding projects. This in turn will enhance Iraq's image
in the region and encourage reluctant neighboring states to
engage more with Iraq. McGurk commended the GOI for standing
up to criminals and beginning to use its various state
resources, noting the progress it has achieved over the past
year. He said the USG will continue to press Iraq's Arab
neighbors to engage more, noting the importance that PM
Maliki participate in the upcoming Neighbors meeting in
Kuwait to make Iraq's case directly to other leaders. Amar
replied that better relations with all of Iraq's neighbors
will contribute to greater balance and stability in the
region.


3. (C) Repeating complaints aired last month to the
Ambassador and repeated recently by Vice President Adel Abdel
Mehdi (Ref B),Amar griped about alleged inaccurate reporting
by USG-funded al-Hurra network. While last month's complaint
was based on alleged anti-ISCI reporting, Amar and Adel
claimed al-Hurra covered the GOI's Basrah operation with a
distinctly pro-JAM slant. Amar said Iraqis are aware that
al-Hurra receives USG support and are confused why the
network disseminates such reporting. Acknowledging Amar's
complaints about al-Hurra, McGurk said we take such concerns
very seriously: while the USG has no control over al-Hurra
content, we do have an interest in accurate journalism and we
will look further into the matter.

Militias and Tribal Engagement
--------------


4. (C) McGurk asked for Amar's response to characterizations
of the GOI crackdown in Basra as a battle between Shia
militias. Amar stated that ISCI/Badr, along with the
Peshmerga and other political movements that once had
affiliated armed groups, agreed to be named and integrated
through a legal process under CPA Order 91 - pledging loyalty
to the state of Iraq. Some Badr individuals joined GOI
security forces and others joined the GOI civil service as
individuals, according to their qualifications, a process
that took years and was coordinated with Coalition Forces.
The GOI is now pursuing similar integration of some qualified
Sunni "Awakening" members. If the JAM will dissolve itself
and follow the same procedures, Amar continued, some of its
personnel can be similarly absorbed as long as they are

BAGHDAD 00001113 002 OF 003


qualified and pledge loyalty to the state, the pre-requisites
for entering the GOI security forces. McGurk emphasized the
need to show that the GOI is taking action against criminals
acting contrary to the laws of Iraq - regardless of
affiliation.


5. (C) Noting that ISCI and the GOI appear to have a new view
regarding engagement with south-central Shia tribes to
buttress GOI security efforts, Amar stated that, unlike the
situation with tribes in Anbar and Western Iraq,
south-central tribes have always supported the GOI and
participated in the political process. Over the past few
years, these tribes had worked with the GOI to prevent armed
groups (read JAM) from establishing hegemony in south-central
Iraq. Amar said he stated frankly to Maliki that men from
these tribes can help replace the "thousands" of GOI security
personnel who deserted during the recent security crackdown
in Basrah and elsewhere, as the tribes are loyal to the GOI
and wish to preserve security in their home areas. Amar
suggested that the tribesmen can be brought on to assist on a
short-term contractual basis (six months or one year),but
the GOI should also invest in public works projects in their
areas to provide vocational training and jobs. Amar stated
that the key to GOI engagement with south-central tribes is a
long-term GOI commitment to follow-through on its projects
and programs. He said that recent experience in Basrah
showed that once people see the GOI is determined to take on
JAM and will not abandon the effort after a brief period,
common people will quickly rally to the GOI side. As an
example, he told of a group of tribal sheikhs from Amarah in
Maysan province (a JAM stronghold) who were so emboldened by
the Basrah operation that they openly pledged support for the
GOI: when they realized the GOI was not following-up on the
Basrah operation by coming to Amarah, they were obliged to
beg forgiveness from JAM commanders in their areas.

Sadrists and Iran
--------------


6. (C) When asked about relations between ISCI and the
Sadrist Trend, particularly in light of the October 2007
mutual non-aggression pact inked by Amar's father, Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, and Muqtada al-Sadr, Amar replied that ISCI has
tried hard over the years to have good relations with the
Sadrists by "opening the door to dialogue with Trend
moderates" and by exercising great patience and restraint
when dealing with Sadrists, even when "hundreds" of ISCI/Badr
offices were attacked and officials killed. Still, he said,
"all we see from them is anger and they blame us for any
attacks by the Coalition or the GOI." Amar attributed this
anger to lack of a common ideology among Sadrists ("the Trend
in reality is a mixture of contradictory trends") and little
political experience among Trend leaders. Furthermore,
moderate elements have little influence and Muqtada feels
threatened by anyone in his movement who appears intelligent
and capable, and thus keeps shuffling his senior advisors.


7. (C) In response to a question about a strategy the GOI
should pursue in dealing with criminal elements within the
Sadrist movement in Sadr City, Amar said it was important to
realize that "at least 70 percent" of Sadr City residents
follow Sistani and not Muqtada, but they are intimidated on a
daily basis by a relatively small number of criminals. Amar
said any approach must concentrate on four points: one,
display no tolerance for any violation of law or carrying of
arms against the GOI; two, reach out to moderates within the
Trend with a message that the GOI is not targeting the
political movement, only criminals who bear weapons against
the state; three, coordinate all operations closely with the
Coalition; and four, pressure Iran to stop providing support
to outlaw gangs.


8. (C) On this last point, Amar encouraged resumption of
USG-Iran dialogue, stating that it would serve the interests
of both sides as well as enhance Iraq's stability. While
Iraqis may not like having Iran as a neighbor ("if we could
change the map of the world we would put a great ocean
between ourselves and Iran," Amar stated with a playful
smile),"our destiny is to be neighbors and share a 1400 km
border." He said the Iranians complain that the USG has not
acknowledged the helpful measures Iran claims to have taken
in recent months such as pressuring Muqtada to establish and
then extend the JAM freeze, and to pressure armed groups to
stop rocket attacks against the International Zone: instead
of responding to "clear signals of interest in dialogue," the
Iranians complain that the USG continues to accuse Iran of
wrongdoing and has made problems for Iran at the UN Security
Council. McGurk replied that we now see that the JAM freeze
period was used for re-supply of rockets and advanced
training in their use. While the USG is prepared to resume
trilateral talks, we must see that Iran's actions match its
words. Amar closed the meeting by affirming ISCI's desire

BAGHDAD 00001113 003 OF 003


for close relations with the USG, asking that the two sides
deal with one another with complete transparency so that each
is always aware of the other's perspectives.
BUTENIS