SADRIST CONFIDANTE WARNS OF BAD PRESSURE BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001105 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: IR IZ PGOV SUBJECT: SADRIST CONFIDANTE WARNS OF BAD PRESSURE BUILDING WITHIN SADRIST MOVEMENT Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 8 meeting with Poloffs, Ibrahim al-Sumaydai - a local political observer with close ties to senior Sadrist Trend and JAM figures - told us Sadrists see an Iranian hand behind recent events, accusing Tehran of pushing Maliki into a confrontation with the Sadrist movement to ensure the political dominance of its Iraqi allies and the spiritual dominance of the Persian marja'iyya. He said that Iraq's main political parties have allied against the Sadrists because it was the only legitimate popular movement. Ibrahim said Sadr wants to dissolve the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),but gradually, and warned that an abrupt dissolution of the militia would lead to chaos. Ibrahim confirmed that Sadr had referred the matter to the marja'iyya. Above all, he warned, Sadr was not to be provoked into lifting the cease-fire. Ibrahim said Sadrist CoR bloc leader Nassar Rubaie had fallen out of favor within the movement and said three groups were responsible for attacks on the International Zone (IZ),including cells linked to ISCI/Badr official Jalal al-Din al-Saghir. He asked that two Sadrist detainees be released under his recognizance. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ibrahim opened the meeting by announcing that he alone had been authorized to speak to the U.S. on behalf of the Sadrists by Luwa' Smaisim, head of the Sadrist Trend Political Committee in Najaf. Presenting what he claimed was the Sadrist view on recent events, he said that Iran had sacrificed the Sadr movement to further its own agenda: to prevent Iraq's Shia from aligning with Arab rather than Persian marja'iyya; to guarantee that its true allies - ISCI and the Dawa Party - would win the upcoming provincial elections; and foster the creation of a nine-governorate Shia region in southern Iraq, which the Iranians would control. Iran also wanted to create chaos to hurt the presidential prospects of John McCain and decrease U.S. popular support for an enduring military presence. Ibrahim agreed that Iraq's main political parties had allied against the Sadrists, but said that was because "none of them have a following" and feared the political potential of the Sadrist movement. He said senior Sadrist leaders are gradually warming to the idea of direct dialogue with the U.S. but cautioned that "it is very difficult." Ibrahim stressed the importance of allowing the April 9 protest to occur, saying "the people must be given a chance to express their voice" or else the tensions within Sadr City would erupt again into violence. ¶3. (C) Ibrahim cast Muqtada al-Sadr as a developing but still volatile political leader who needed to be respected but carefully managed. "Sadr wishes to dissolve JAM," Ibrahim claimed, but "needs to do so gradually." Forcing him to move quickly, he warned, would lead to chaos. At the same time, the U.S. must ensure that Sadr is not provoked into lifting the freeze on JAM activity. Ibrahim said that Sadr wants to escape Iran, and suggested that the U.S. should offer Sadr some guarantee of security as a means to lure him fron Iran's influence. "There has been a big change in Sadr over the year," Ibrahim said, pointing to a recent "al-Jazeera" interview as evidence that Sadr was increasingly open to secular ideas. He confirmed that Sadr is waiting for a response from the marja'iyya, which he predicted might come within a week. Ibrahim initially predicted that the marja'iyya would refuse to offer an opinion. However, he later mused that Ayatollah Sistani would "remain close to the U.S., like he always does" and support the dissolution of JAM. Qom-based Ayatollah Khazim al-Ha'iri, meanwhile, would be true to his Iranian roots and publicly oppose the disbanding of JAM as a means of weakening Sadr by forcing him into further confrontation with the Maliki government (Note: According to April 8 media accounts, Sistani refused to comment on the issue of JAM's dissolution. End Note). ¶4. (C) The Sadrists "are not a true movement, but a collection of desires," Ibrahim said. He alluded to tensions within the political wing of the party, saying that CoR bloc boss Nasser Rubaie had lost favor "because he is stupid" and predicting that Ahmad Hasan al-Masudy would become the new head of the Sadrist parliamentary bloc. Baha al-Araji had proven his loyalty to Sadr in his recent public statements but "he is still not trusted totally because he is originally from Da'wa." ¶5. (C) Ibrahim said three groups were responsible for the recent rocket and mortar attacks on the IZ: Special Groups controlled by Iran; militants trying to prove their devotion to Sadr; and cells answering to ISCI/Badr firebrand preacher Shaykh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir. (Comment: The latter conspiratorial charge is presumably based on the premise, accepted by many Sadrists, that ISCI/Badr is seeking to BAGHDAD 00001105 002 OF 002 provoke strong ISF and CF operations against JAM. End Comment.) He added that a JAM team had been sent from Najaf to hunt down the groups responsible. ¶6. (C) Ibrahim cast himself as a loyal Iraqi, saying with a heavy sigh that, despite numerous difficulties and threats on his life, he "kept working, because I think I can do something for my country." He said an Iraqi intelligence officer had warned him that he was being targeted for assassination, and warned that the Sadr movement had been infiltrated by Iranian and Badr operatives intent on stopping any U.S.-Sadr dialogue. Ibrahim asked that two men arrested with Haji Shibl - Faisil Shibl and Abdel Khaliq (Abu Zainab) be released under his recognizance. "I need these two badly," he said, "they know everything that is going on in Sadr city." Near the end of the meeting Ibrahim received a call from someone he identified as a Najaf-based JAM commander. After hanging up he revealed that Sadr had canceled the April 9 protest and would soon release a new statement. Asked about the content of the statement, he said "I expect it might be...tough." (Note: A statement attributed to Sadr and released over the internet that same afternoon announced that the protests were postponed but warned that the cease-fire would be lifted if Sadrists were prevented from accomplishing their goals in Iraq. End Note). ¶7. (C) Comment: Ibrahim is eager to portray himself as a bridge to the Sadrist Trend and a moderating influence within the movement. In the past his analysis has often proved accurate, and Ibrahim's theory of an Iranian-Maliki conspiracy is no doubt widely shared among both Sadrist leaders and grassroots followers. However, it is difficult to reconcile the vitriolic language of Sadr's April 8 statement, replete with references to jihad against the unbelievers, with Ibrahim's portrait of an emerging leader growing comfortable with secular ideas. Regardless of any personal evolution Sadr has experienced, for now it seems he finds the populist appeal of anti-coalition rhetoric too tempting to resist, as it is the basis of much of his legitimacy. The danger, as Ibrahim himself noted, is that Shia underclass resentment, continuing ISF and CF operations, and Sadr's inflammatory words will combine in another, and perhaps deadlier, round of violence. End Comment. BUTENIS