VP ADEL ON APRIL 5 PCNS AND GOI OFFENSIVE AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001075

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON APRIL 5 PCNS AND GOI OFFENSIVE AGAINST
JAM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1065 (MALIKI SCORES BIG)

B. BAGHDAD 1066 (PCNS STATEMENT)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).



1. (C) Summary: In an April 7 meeting, Vice President Adel
Abdel Mehdi said political unity expressed in the April 5
meeting of the Political Council for National Security (PCNS)
had built momentum for progress on several fronts,
particularly the dissolution of the Jaysh al-Mehdi (JAM) and
the return of Sunni Tawafuq ministers to the GOI. Adel said
Maliki was considering a speech to the CoR as part of a
larger effort to seize momentum in the GOI crackdown on JAM.
Reading from notes, Adel set forth the broad outlines of an
ongoing GOI offensive designed to finish off JAM. He said
the GOI effort will focus on Sadr City and isolate and target
JAM commanders and key figures. Describing Sadr City
residents as "a potentially powerful weapon for the
government," Adel said the GOI will seek to take advantage of
the growing antipathy of ordinary citizens toward JAM and
bring them to the GOI side, just as he claimed the people are
doing in Basrah. Over the next few weeks, the GOI (in close
coordination with Coalition Forces) will continue to surround
Sadr City and conduct targeted raids before entering Sadr
City in greater force and dividing the area into sectors to
restrict movement. Adel closed the meeting by declaring the
GOI "must win the battle for Sadr City, and I think it is
feasible." End Summary.

PCNS Unity Creates New Momentum for Political Progress
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Adel told NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan
McGurk that the only issue discussed in the 4-hour PCNS
meeting on April 5 (reftels) was how to deal with the JAM
militia. In the best Arab rhetorical tradition, Adel
characterized the discussion and the written statement
produced by the discussion as "direct, open, frank,
transparent, objective, and detailed." He said Sadrist Trend
representatives at the PCNS were "overwhelmed" by the unity
of all other participants. While Trend officials began the
meeting by speaking with harsh and accusatory words, by the
end of the meeting they were "apologetic and asked us to help
them and protect them" from militants within Sadrist ranks,
saying "they will kill us if we say something." Adel said
the Sadrists were told by the others that there is consensus
that JAM must be dissolved and that the Trend cannot continue
as both a mainstream political entity and an armed
revolutionary group. In an April 7 press interview, Prime
Minister Maliki echoed this sentiment by threatening to bar
the Trend from participation in upcoming elections unless JAM
is dissolved.


3. (C) Adel said PCNS unity created new momentum for real
progress, and McGurk pressed him to seize the opportunity.
Adel listed possible steps forward as a Tawafuq return to the
government, a real possibility since he said it was VP
Hashemi who drafted the PCNS statement point about Tawafuq's
return; a more inclusive leadership approach by Maliki; and
continued security and stability in the provinces. He noted
that the Executive Council (comprised of Maliki and the
Presidency Council) would meet later on April 7. McGurk
asked Adel to encourage Maliki to address the CoR and brief
on the way forward in dealing with armed criminal groups, and
also to share his vision on investment and spending of the
GOI's budget surplus. In addition, McGurk suggested that
Adel discuss the strategic framework with the Executive
Council, noting that we need an Iraqi green light to begin
formal negotiations. McGurk again recommended that the
Executive Council deputies would be an appropriate
negotiating team - as the Executive Council Principals would
be signatories to the document.

Outline of Plan to Take On JAM
--------------


4. (C) When asked how the GOI would accomplish JAM
dissolution, Adel laid out the outlines of a GOI strategy
that he predicted would be effective and cause minimal loss
of life. Reading from notes, he said the effort has already
begun with a consensus position among Iraq's political class
that the Sadrists must pay a price for every transgression.
He said the GOI effort will focus on Sadr City, not to
"liberate" the area but rather to isolate and target JAM
commanders and key figures. Describing Sadr City residents
as "a potentially powerful weapon for the government," Adel
said the GOI will seek to take advantage of the growing
antipathy of ordinary citizens toward the Sadrists and bring
them to the GOI side, just as he claimed the GOI is doing in
Basrah. Over the next few weeks, the GOI (in close
coordination with Coalition Forces) will continue to surround

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Sadr City and conduct targeted raids against arms caches and
command elements. In time, the GOI will enter Sadr City in
greater force, and then divide the area into sectors and
restrict movement between sectors and access to and from the
entire area, a process that will disrupt JAM communications
and further isolate hard-core elements. At the same time,
the GOI will reach out to residents "because thousands will
surrender if we create the right moral and psychological
conditions." Adel closed the meeting by stating that the GOI
"must win the battle for Sadr City, and I think it is
feasible."
BUTENIS