BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP: REQUEST FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001063 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 TAGS: PBTS PINS PREL PTER BA EG IR IZ JO KU SA SY, TU SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP: REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 2683 ¶B. 07 DAMASCUS 814 ¶C. 07 DAMASCUS 836 ¶D. 08 DAMASCUS 218 ¶E. 08 STATE 35471 BAGHDAD 00001063 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political-Military Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries, Re asons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS: Post requests the Department to instruct posts in capitals of participants in the Border Security Working Group (BSWG) to urge their host governments to support Iraqi efforts to secure agreement on concrete measures aimed at stopping the flow of terrorists and weapons into Iraq at the April 13 Border Security Working Group being held in Damascus. The recent upsurge in Shia militia violence in Baghdad, Basrah, and the southern provinces, which is being fueled by Iranian weapons and Iranian-trained terrorists, was only the most recent reminder of the lethal accelerants crossing Iraq's borders. Background and suggested talking points follow. Posts may wish to include points on this issue when presenting their demarche as requested by State 35471. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (U) Terrorist facilitation networks operating throughout the region continue to pose a significant threat to the stability of Iraq and, by extension, the entire region. Sunni extremist groups, in particular Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), depend on regional terrorist networks to provide them with suicide bombers and other fighters. Suicide bombers and vehicle bombs are responsible for the most deadly attacks on Iraqi civilians - accounting for over 5,000 deaths in 2007. Most foreign terrorists and suicide bombers detained in Iraq are citizens of Arab states. 70-80% of foreign terrorists who enter Iraq travel through Syria. ¶3. (U) Large numbers of Iranian weapons continue to flow across the Iran-Iraq border despite Iranian claims to the contrary. Numerous weapons used by and seized from criminal militia elements involved in fighting Iraqi Security Forces in the flare-up of violence in Basrah, the southern provinces, and Baghdad were clearly of Iranian manufacture and made as recently as 2007 in many cases. Some of the most often used and dangerous of these weapons are Iranian rockets, used in indirect fire attacks on Iraqi and Coalition facilities, and explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs),used to attack Iraqi and Coalition civilian and military vehicles. Numerous Iraqi officials have been assassinated by Iranian EFPs, including the governors of the provinces of al Muthanna and al Qadisiyah. ¶4. (U) Despite repeated expressions of U.S. and Iraqi concern about the flow of foreign terrorists through Syria, the SARG has not cooperated sufficiently with neighboring and regional governments to identify and stop terrorists transiting Syria into Iraq or to shut down the facilitation networks operating in Syria which enable their infiltration. Iraq and the U.S. have not stood still, but have invested significant effort in improving Iraq's border security and attempting to counter terrorist infiltration. Since the last Border Security Working Group in August 2007, Iraq and the U.S. have shared information on some 700 such foreign terrorists by adding the BAGHDAD 00001063 002.2 OF 003 information to INTERPOL databases. Millions of dollars have been invested in improving Iraqi ports of entry and border forts. ¶5. (U) There is a real threat that foreign terrorists who gain experience in Iraq may eventually seek to return to their home countries or travel to third countries to reinforce al-Qaida networks throughout the region. Indeed, there are already reports of this taking place. Taking steps to prevent foreign terrorist movement and the operation of facilitation networks throughout the region, with a focus on those facilitating traveling to and from Iraq, serves every country's interest. The time has come for intense regional efforts to institute effective measures that will identify and prevent individuals from traveling to Iraq directly or through third countries to commit acts of terror. -------------- SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶6. (C/REL BSWG PARTICIPANTS) The Border Security Working Group can play a crucial role by recognizing foreign terrorist facilitation networks as a regional problem which can only be solved with regional cooperation. A strong commitment among Iraq's neighbors to stopping the movement of foreign terrorists and the influx of weapons may provide the necessary impetus for hesitant governments to take difficult actions, such as requiring visas for travelers from source countries. ¶7. (C/REL BSWG PARTICIPANTS) Examples of such measures include the following: -- Turn Around Suspected Terrorists: Return suspicious individuals to their home countries and make arrangements with those countries to detain and investigate them upon their return. -- Detain the Criminals: Arrest recruiters, facilitators, and the financiers that support the flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq and other countries. -- Asset Forfeiture: Freeze assets of known financiers and foreign terrorist recruiters and facilitators. -- Enhanced domestic intelligence effort: Increase domestic intelligence collection on facilitators, financiers, and recruiters. Relay information through appropriate channels and identify intelligence gaps. -- Regional Information Sharing: Pass relevant intelligence and law enforcement information rapidly and effectively to regional partners, particularly those sharing land borders with Iraq. -- Travel restrictions: Carefully screen young men seeking to travel to Iraq, Iran, and Syria and turn back those whose reason for travel is suspicious or suggests an intent to commit terrorism in Iraq. -- Passport/document improvements: Increase the vigilance of immigration, customs and security personnel against the use of fraudulent travel documents, particularly from countries known to have documents that can be easily forged. BAGHDAD 00001063 003.2 OF 003 -- Information campaigns: Develop an information campaign to undercut the lies of those who recruit young men to come to Iraq. Rather fighting the so-called occupation, they are being used to kill the men, women, and children of Iraq. BUTENIS