PRT WASIT: LOCAL LEADERS ASSESS RECENT VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001056 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PINS PINR SUBJECT: PRT WASIT: LOCAL LEADERS ASSESS RECENT VIOLENCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 842 ¶B. BAGHDAD 952 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1040 Classified By: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary. On 04 April, PRT TL and IPAO met first with the Wasit Governor and then with the PC Chairman to discuss events of the past week and the current situation in Wasit. Both officials shared their views of the Sadrist movement and their ideas about how to address it, and both offered predictions for the future of the province. The PC Chair reiterated his previously-expressed contention that "it is clear that none of the (Sadrist) political representatives have power," and that the movement in Wasit is controlled by the military wing. However, despite apparent JAM overextension, actions of the IP and widespread popular hatred of the provincial government threaten to fuel popular discontent. End summary. ¶3. (C) PC Chairman Jabir met with Sadrist CoR member Imam Jalal on her recent visit to Kut where she convened with Wasit Sadrist political and militia leaders. Jabir expressed regret over the extent to which Sadrist political leaders appeared marginalized and militants strengthened by recent fighting. Ra'ad Abdul Hussein, appointed two weeks ago by CoR Sadrists as the Sadrist interlocutor with the Wasit government, said in one of the meetings that his efforts to control the violence failed because "the AK-47 is more powerful than political speeches." Jabir said JAM leaders attending the meetings dismissed recent efforts by politicians like Abdul Hussein to influence militia plans and actions, asserting that the militia took direction only from Najaf. ¶4. (C) Describing al Kut as a powder keg that can be defused only through combined political and military efforts, Jabir expressed frustration at Sadrist inability either to form a coherent message, or to appoint provincial representatives with any decision-making authority. Jabir repeated his disappointment that fighting continued for days in Wasit after political accommodations between Sadrist militia and provincial governments were reached in Dhi Qar, Najaf and Muthanna. He attributes this to Sadrist militia strength in Wasit which reduces Sadrist incentive to negotiate with the government as they seek to take advantage of perceived JAM superiority, especially in Kut, Numaniyah and al Hayy. He also noted the nefarious role of Iran in the Wasit violence, saying "it was clear when al-Amri went to Iran that the (ceasefire) decision was made by IRCG." ¶5. (C) Jabir said the mood of the citizens is set against JAM in part because of militia fear-tactics, such as trolling streets after dark and seeking "taxes" from families too terrified to refuse. JAM intimidates the government as well and focused many attacks last week on government buildings downtown. Jabir mentioned an episode last week in which JAM physically beat two provincial council members in the market. These, he said, are examples of the militia's increasingly brazen, independent streak. Dawa sponsored a pro-government rally on 3 April, but turnout from either the citizenry or government officials was small, in part because JAM threatened retaliation against any attendees. Jabir compared JAM with Saddam's Fedayeen, which became more radical over time and increasingly less concerned with popular perceptions or the welfare of the people. Jabir cautioned that though the people despised these JAM tactics, they were also wary of the ISF, and that Jabir himself personally had received "hundreds of complaints" regarding abuse, theft, and unnecessary violence by the IA and IP. He warned that these practices prevented the government from "capitalizing" on support from the people. ¶6. (C) The Provincial Council formed three committees to look at the performance of the police, local councils, and other government officials, respectively. Jabir said the review process, which began on 4 April, would result in dismissals for those who had performed poorly and awards for those who performed admirably during the crisis. ¶7. (C) When asked about the effect of the Basrah operations on the stature of Prime Minister, Jabir noted that the PM had a "tough position" compared to the enemy because he had to "account for the health of the population" and ensure the ISF performed in an effective but legal manner respecting human rights. By contrast, the militia only needed to fight back and cause destruction, with no regard for collateral damage or humanitarian considerations. ¶8. (C) In a separate meeting, Governor Latif Hamid Turfa offered his customary, one-dimensional perspective saying BAGHDAD 00001056 002 OF 002 that "uneducated" Sadrist leaders represent only "simple, stupid" people and that the best course now is to forcibly disarm the militias. Without weapons, he said, people could freely elect their leaders, and there would be no way that Sadrists would win "half of the provincial council seats," as predicted Sadrist CoR members. Turfa expressed fear for the future of Kut, Numaniyah and Hayy because of Sadrist strength in those cities, but said quickly that PM Maliki had won this confrontation and had weakened the Sadrists politically. (Note. Although nominally independent, Turfa has strong ties to Dawa and is unabashedly pro-Maliki, frequently boasting about his close relationship to the PM. End note.) ¶9. (C) Comment: Sadrist politicians and militants in Wasit appear to have separate channels leading back to Najaf, with the militant channel now dominant over the political. Though non-Sadrists like Jabir would engage with Sadrist politicians, Sadrists at the provincial level lack the unity of message and, it seems, even the authority, to carry on meaningful dialogue. The province remains tense but generally quiet, though vulnerable to panicked rumors such as one started by JAM members last week that the provincial government had collapsed. Jabir wryly pointed out mortar impacts outside his window, driving home that the Wasit Government, not CF, was the prime target of JAM attacks. Our conversations with these provincial leaders and the tenor of the recent violence shows that this conflict is clearly political in nature, reflecting the rivalry between the political parties, as well as more generalized rage towards an unpopular, corrupt provincial government, emanating from the uneducated and unemployed poor that constitute Sadrist and JAM core constituencies. End comment. BUTENIS