PRT WASIT: LOCAL LEADERS ASSESS RECENT VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001056

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PINS PINR
SUBJECT: PRT WASIT: LOCAL LEADERS ASSESS RECENT VIOLENCE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 842

B. BAGHDAD 952

C. BAGHDAD 1040

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary. On 04 April, PRT TL and IPAO met first with
the Wasit Governor and then with the PC Chairman to discuss
events of the past week and the current situation in Wasit.
Both officials shared their views of the Sadrist movement and
their ideas about how to address it, and both offered
predictions for the future of the province. The PC Chair
reiterated his previously-expressed contention that "it is
clear that none of the (Sadrist) political representatives
have power," and that the movement in Wasit is controlled by
the military wing. However, despite apparent JAM
overextension, actions of the IP and widespread popular
hatred of the provincial government threaten to fuel popular
discontent. End summary.


3. (C) PC Chairman Jabir met with Sadrist CoR member Imam
Jalal on her recent visit to Kut where she convened with
Wasit Sadrist political and militia leaders. Jabir expressed
regret over the extent to which Sadrist political leaders
appeared marginalized and militants strengthened by recent
fighting. Ra'ad Abdul Hussein, appointed two weeks ago by
CoR Sadrists as the Sadrist interlocutor with the Wasit
government, said in one of the meetings that his efforts to
control the violence failed because "the AK-47 is more
powerful than political speeches." Jabir said JAM leaders
attending the meetings dismissed recent efforts by
politicians like Abdul Hussein to influence militia plans and
actions, asserting that the militia took direction only from
Najaf.


4. (C) Describing al Kut as a powder keg that can be defused
only through combined political and military efforts, Jabir
expressed frustration at Sadrist inability either to form a
coherent message, or to appoint provincial representatives
with any decision-making authority. Jabir repeated his
disappointment that fighting continued for days in Wasit
after political accommodations between Sadrist militia and
provincial governments were reached in Dhi Qar, Najaf and
Muthanna. He attributes this to Sadrist militia strength in
Wasit which reduces Sadrist incentive to negotiate with the
government as they seek to take advantage of perceived JAM
superiority, especially in Kut, Numaniyah and al Hayy. He
also noted the nefarious role of Iran in the Wasit violence,
saying "it was clear when al-Amri went to Iran that the
(ceasefire) decision was made by IRCG."


5. (C) Jabir said the mood of the citizens is set against JAM
in part because of militia fear-tactics, such as trolling
streets after dark and seeking "taxes" from families too
terrified to refuse. JAM intimidates the government as well
and focused many attacks last week on government buildings
downtown. Jabir mentioned an episode last week in which JAM
physically beat two provincial council members in the market.
These, he said, are examples of the militia's increasingly
brazen, independent streak. Dawa sponsored a pro-government
rally on 3 April, but turnout from either the citizenry or
government officials was small, in part because JAM
threatened retaliation against any attendees. Jabir compared
JAM with Saddam's Fedayeen, which became more radical over
time and increasingly less concerned with popular perceptions
or the welfare of the people. Jabir cautioned that though
the people despised these JAM tactics, they were also wary of
the ISF, and that Jabir himself personally had received
"hundreds of complaints" regarding abuse, theft, and
unnecessary violence by the IA and IP. He warned that these
practices prevented the government from "capitalizing" on
support from the people.


6. (C) The Provincial Council formed three committees to look
at the performance of the police, local councils, and other
government officials, respectively. Jabir said the review
process, which began on 4 April, would result in dismissals
for those who had performed poorly and awards for those who
performed admirably during the crisis.


7. (C) When asked about the effect of the Basrah operations
on the stature of Prime Minister, Jabir noted that the PM had
a "tough position" compared to the enemy because he had to
"account for the health of the population" and ensure the ISF
performed in an effective but legal manner respecting human
rights. By contrast, the militia only needed to fight back
and cause destruction, with no regard for collateral damage
or humanitarian considerations.


8. (C) In a separate meeting, Governor Latif Hamid Turfa
offered his customary, one-dimensional perspective saying

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that "uneducated" Sadrist leaders represent only "simple,
stupid" people and that the best course now is to forcibly
disarm the militias. Without weapons, he said, people could
freely elect their leaders, and there would be no way that
Sadrists would win "half of the provincial council seats," as
predicted Sadrist CoR members. Turfa expressed fear for the
future of Kut, Numaniyah and Hayy because of Sadrist strength
in those cities, but said quickly that PM Maliki had won this
confrontation and had weakened the Sadrists politically.
(Note. Although nominally independent, Turfa has strong ties
to Dawa and is unabashedly pro-Maliki, frequently boasting
about his close relationship to the PM. End note.)


9. (C) Comment: Sadrist politicians and militants in Wasit
appear to have separate channels leading back to Najaf, with
the militant channel now dominant over the political. Though
non-Sadrists like Jabir would engage with Sadrist
politicians, Sadrists at the provincial level lack the unity
of message and, it seems, even the authority, to carry on
meaningful dialogue. The province remains tense but
generally quiet, though vulnerable to panicked rumors such as
one started by JAM members last week that the provincial
government had collapsed. Jabir wryly pointed out mortar
impacts outside his window, driving home that the Wasit
Government, not CF, was the prime target of JAM attacks. Our
conversations with these provincial leaders and the tenor of
the recent violence shows that this conflict is clearly
political in nature, reflecting the rivalry between the
political parties, as well as more generalized rage towards
an unpopular, corrupt provincial government, emanating from
the uneducated and unemployed poor that constitute Sadrist
and JAM core constituencies. End comment.
BUTENIS