MEETING WITH KRG SECURITY DIRECTOR SINJARI AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001054 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PTER IZ TU SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KRG SECURITY DIRECTOR SINJARI AND UNHCR REP ON MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP BAGHDAD 00001054 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: MNF-I DCS for Strategic Effects MG Bergner and D/PolMil Couns met with KRG security director Karim Sinjari March 19 to discuss closing Makhmour refugee camp. Sinjari supported closure of the camp, noting that absent any employment prospects, the younger residents would likely gravitate towards the PKK. He pointed out the difficulty of KRG forward movement on the political track until the GOT made similar steps. While pleased that PM Erdogan was reaching out to Turkish Kurds through visits to the southeast and an economic development package, no progress would occur without TGS buy-in. Only the Pentagon could put the needed pressure on the Turkish military to change the situation. Sinjari cited the hand of the TGS behind the motion filed by the Turkish Court of Appeals to close the ruling party, AKP. ¶2. (C) D/Polmil Couns Sasahara and MNF-I Strategic Effects DCS MG Bergner met with KRG Security Director Karim Sinjari March 19 to ascertain his views on closing Makhmour refugee Camp. Sinjari said that he very much wanted to see the camp closed, as it poses a security risk to the region. According to Sinjari, the camp is home to some 3,400 children between the ages of 6-12. Absent any employment outside of the camp or other positive prospects, the children will gravitate towards the PKK. While he believes that the camp is civilian in nature, Sinjari said the GOT views the camp as a PKK nest and breeding ground. ¶3. (C) MG Bergner told Sinjari that the GOI sent a diplomatic note to the GOT in early February inviting them to meet with GOI officials to discuss closure of Makhmour refugee camp. The GOI has not yet received a response from the GOT. Sinjari said that while it would be appropriate for the MFA to take the lead in the initial opening discussion, he felt that the operational details should be handled by the Ministry of Immigration. Progress on the Political Track -------------- ¶4. (S) Sinjari said that the KRG will not be able to take the difficult steps forward without similar political steps from the GOT. PM Erdogan's trips to the southeast and an economic development package were the rights steps. Some kind of amnesty also was an important signal and the type of measure that would undercut the PKK position and also lead them to lay down their weapons. Sinjari noted the discussions TNIO Taner has had with PKK leaders in Europe, commenting on how "different" Taner's stance was on dealing with the PKK and Kurds. ¶5. (C) While he applauded Erdogan and his AKP party's interest in addressing the Kurdish problem, Sinjari said that nothing would change unless the TGS concurred, and the diplomatic approach would not work. The only way to change that situation, he said, was for "the Pentagon" to put pressure on the TGS. Commenting on Turkish domestic politics, Sinjari said that Erdogan was the first real religious leader in the history of Turkey, noting the PM's wife wears a headscarf. Erdogan had won 54% of the Kurdish vote in the elections. That was "bad for the PKK and the TGS." Sinjari claimed the TGS was trying to shut down the AKP, as demonstrated by the legal motion filed by the Turkish Court of Appeals to close down the AKP. Meeting with UNHCR Irbil Representative -------------- ¶6. (C) In a separate meeting, UNHCR Irbil Rep Charles Lynch clarified the status of Makhmour refugee camp, explaining that the camp was under the control of the GOI and the UNHCR was present in the camp and provided services to the residents. While the residents have not undergone individual screening, UNHCR considered them prima facie refugees and under the UNHCR mandate, they were deemed "people of concern." Lynch mentioned that there were in fact five other refugee camps in which some 4,000 other Kurdish refugees who also fled southeast Turkey between 1994-1998 were living. ¶7. (C) Lynch said that the UNHCR would resume its role in Makhmour refugee camp if the GOT were to re-engage on the issue. Under that scenario, the UNHCR would then conduct what it calls an intention survey, in which residents would be asked if they wanted to return to Turkey and what expectation they would have upon return, in terms of housing, training, and assistance in re-integration into society. In response to D/PolMil Couns's comment that Makhmour refugee camp members had talked about return to Turkey under international protection, Lynch explained that scenario would entail UNHCR monitoring of the returnees, an operation that would require a significant increase in manpower, as UNHCR BAGHDAD 00001054 002.2 OF 002 would have to be physically present for monitoring purposes. ¶8. (C) MG Bergner said that MNF-I would continue to canvass the Makhmour refugee camp stakeholders on their perspectives and the way forward in an effort to approach the issue wisely. MG Bergner conveyed to Lynch Sinjari's request for more UNHCR services in the camp. Lynch said that they already provided considerable services to the residents, but would take the message on board. BUTENIS